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ABSTRACT
A WANT OF NEWS IN AN OCCUPIED ZONE:
NEWSPAPER CONTENT IN OCCUPIED LILLE, ROUBAIX, AND TOURCOING,
1914-1918

Candice Addie Quinn, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2011

The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain exactly what news people in the
occupied zone of France received during the First World War, in an attempt to assess the
general assumption that the people of occupied France received little to no news. It is
certain that the people in the occupied cities of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received
less news than before the occupation, and most of the news they did receive came from
an untrusted source, namely the German occupiers. However, research for this
dissertation reveals that the cities at the urban heart of northern France, Lille, Roubaix,
and Tourcoing, received more news than historians previously have believed. Research
for this dissertation comprised of reviewing all the sources available in Lille, Roubaix,
and Tourcong during the occupation, which included German-controlled newspapers
produced in France and Belgium, a short-lived clandestine press, and newspapers
published outside the occupied zone covertly imported into the cities.
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Introduction
Consistent receipt of news from a trusted media source plays a vital role in the
modern consciousness of western societies. People have a need for news, that is, a
composite, shared, ordered, and edited product, informing them in a timely manner about
current events.1 This was no less true for the people of occupied northern France during
the First World War, who for four years suffered German occupation and isolation from
their own country. Despite the numerous physical hardships they endured under
occupation, including food shortages and forced labor, history remembers the lack of
news as one of the greatest deprivations the people of occupied northern France
underwent. Very nearly every historical work that examines the experiences of northern
France agrees with Deborah Buffton’s assertion, “It was the lack of information that was
perhaps the hardest thing to bear during the war and occupation.”2 The purpose of this
dissertation is to ascertain exactly what news people in the occupied zone received, in an
attempt to assess the general assumption that the people of occupied France received little
to no news. It is certain that the people in the occupied cities of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing received less news than before the occupation, and most of the news they did
receive came from an untrusted source, namely the German occupiers. However, research
for this dissertation reveals that the cities at the urban heart of northern France, Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing, received more news than historians previously have believed.
Our concentration on the flow of news in no way diminishes the dreadfulness of
life under occupation. Northern France became a virtual German colony, governed by a
1

Michael Schudson, The Power of News (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 3.
Deborah Buffton, The Ritual of Surrender: Northern France under Two Occupations, 1914-1918, 19401944 (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987), 39.
2

2
regime aimed at economic extraction rather the production.3 Leonard Smith, Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker aptly describe the horrors of life under German
occupation. They note, “The paradigm of imposed brutality adhered to the true meaning
of terrorism, designed to humiliate and thus dominate the civilian population by keeping
it in a state of shock through the systematic use of emergency regulations and violence.”4
The Germans, they further state, employed “…[a]ncient practices of extraction and
slavery… administered through the most modern bureaucratic techniques of coercion.”5
A central component of this system of domination was a control over the flow of
information. The position of occupied France behind the German trenches gave the
Germans dominion over the transmission of information. To make their monopoly
greater, they quickly issued restrictive measures forbidding the publication of any
material without their prior reading, as the Fourth Convention of The Hague allows in
occupied zones during war.6 The Germans immediately banned the publication of any
newspapers without their approval and all French newspapers disappeared. The Oberste
Heersleitung’s (OHL) order pertaining to the publishing and distributing of news
appeared in the Bulletin de Lille in May 1915, as the activities of the clandestine press
motivated the German occupiers to reiterate their publication rules. Article one of the
order stated that all printed material must be submitted to the German censor, and article
two noted that reproduction and publication of any written material could not be done
until signed by the censor. Article three stated that a free copy of every issue had to be

3
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submitted to the censor after it was printed.7 Article four stated that everything submitted
to the censor must be identified with the name and address of the printer or editor.
Article five of the order forbid having in one’s possession imported newspapers.8
The Germans did not limit their control to public media, but brought private
communication under their eye as well. They only allowed personal letters in a limited
form, sent unsealed to allow censor supervision. The German occupiers confiscated
almost all private and public telephones and all radios and outlawed the keeping of
pigeons, which they feared could carry messages back and forth to unoccupied France.
For urban populations habituated to having multiple local, national, and international
newspapers at their disposal, the limitations placed upon their consumption of
information was greatly discombobulating.
This dissertation is an act of historical reconstruction, aimed at revealing what
information was available through newspapers in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing region
during the occupation. Paul Connerton writes that historical reconstruction is still
necessary even if the social memory preserves direct testimony.9 The social memories of
survivors of the occupation, displayed in numerous sources, long have asserted the
absolute lack of news in occupied France. Yet, Connerton urges us to question such
memories. He continues on to note, “Historians do no continue to question the statements
of their informants because they think that the informants want to deceive them or have
themselves been deceived. Historians continue to question the statements of their
informants because if they were to accept them at face value that would amount to
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4
abandoning their autonomy as practicing historians.”10 Such an historical questioning as
urged by Connerton will reveal that there was not a complete lack of news. Survivors’
memories may have been shaped by their juxtaposition of the wartime news they
received with the information they had access to before the war. Combined with the
direness of their situation under occupation and the painfulness of the uncertainty
surrounding their future, the people of occupied France may have created a collective
memory that they received less news than appears to be the case after looking at their
media sources.
The German-controlled press was the single greatest source of news in the
occupied zone, comprising newspapers published in Lille and Roubaix, and papers
originating in other areas of occupied France and occupied Belgium. This was the only
media allowed by the German occupiers, but the area did mange slightly more press
diversity than the Germans intended. Outdated Parisian newspapers appeared irregularly
in the region, either smuggled in or dropped from airplanes. Newspapers recorded
reaching the occupied zone include issues of Matin, l’Echo de Paris, and Petit Journal.
Dutch, English, and clandestine Belgian papers were also infrequently available on the
black market, as well. A clandestine press also published within the confines of the
occupied zone, with at least such eight newspapers appearing in Lille alone between
January 1915 and December 1916.11 The French government also made some rather
anemic attempts at influencing people through newspapers in the occupied zone. The
French army was in charge of propaganda directed at French territories occupied by the
Germans. The Section de la propagande aérienne dropped forged German newspapers
10
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5
meant to demoralize the occupiers and French newspapers meant to raise the morale of
the French population.12 French people trusted these sources, but they were infrequent
and outdated. The German-controlled press, while biased and chocked full of
propaganda, was regularly available and provided a surprisingly substantial amount of
war information.
The first three chapters of this dissertation provide the background necessary to
understanding the environment and context in which the people of occupied France
received news. The first chapter will examine life in metropolitan northern France before
the war. For a successful reconstruction of news dissemination, one needs to know the
receiver. This chapter will allow for a better understanding of the people receiving the
news and why they believed they received such little information under the German
occupation. This view examines the physical layout of the cities, and the economic and
social make-up of the tri-city area, including the living and working conditions, language
usage, political and religious trends, and the pre-war newspapers available in the area.
The second chapter provides an overview of German occupation of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing. This will supply the context within which the occupied people received
information via newspapers and why they were so unreceptive to news from German
sources. This overview includes a look at the invasion and capture of the three cities, as
well as the German administration and economic exploitation of the area, including the
ensuing food shortages. To better understand the relationship between occupier and
occupied, it shall examine the French resistance to occupation and the German response.
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The third chapter briefly discusses news coverage in unoccupied France and
Germany, to demonstrate how the warring powers cast the news received in occupied
France. This chapter reviews how the French and German governments availed
themselves of their nations’ presses to influence their people to support the war. A
Chicago Tribune reporter noted during the war that, “The most serious and the most
disheartening thing about this war… is the strict censorship which will lie in the face of
overwhelming defeat as well as exaggerate the importance of a minor victory…The
papers print only what the ministry dictates, and they all print the same thing.”13 This
quotation referred to the French press and people, but was also applicable to the
Germans. Almost all newspapers in warring nations contained propaganda and faced
censorships; what made the lot of occupied French people more painful was that they
were exposed to propaganda and censorship controlled by the enemy rather than their
own nation.
Chapters four through eleven of this dissertation dissect the German-controlled
sources of information available to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. The
agenda of all the newspapers in this category was to terrify the population and create a
defeatist mentality among the occupied French people. The aim was discouragement.
Realistically, the German-occupiers knew they would not turn the populace to their side,
but they could hope to create a dislike for the Allies, in particular the British, and a desire
for peace under any terms. The German-controlled papers obviously had an agenda that
distorted much of the news, but that agenda was clear to the audience. This was an
intelligent audience aware of the occupiers’ aims, and hence they had the ability to a

13
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certain extent to screen out the propaganda and extract the nugget of news it was
enveloping. An extraction process – or seeing beyond the propaganda – was made easier
by the fact that German propaganda was not that well crafted. It was obvious and heavyhanded, as we will see in analyzing German-dominated newspapers. Thus, the fourth
chapter of this work looks at the Bulletin de Lille and fifth chapter studies the Bulletin de
Roubaix. These two regional newspapers played the distinctive and important role of
supplying their communities with local news and information, while continuing to instill
fear and a defeatist attitude. La Gazette des Ardennes is the focus of the sixth chapter.
The next three chapters examine the three newspapers imported from German-occupied
Belgium. Under the control of a different censorship bureaucracy, the Belgian
newspapers in general provided more information and a tad less propaganda than those
produced in occupied France. Chapter seven looks at La Belgique and chapter eight at Le
Bien Public. These two newspapers were available only briefly in occupied France, until
February 1915. The Germans imported these two newspapers only temporarily because,
despite being under the control of a German censor, the staff of these two papers allowed
points of view and information that the Germans did not relish into their papers.
However, the subject of chapter nine, Le Bruxellois, was a newspaper available
throughout most of the occupation, because of its staff’s willingness to follow German
publication orders. These newspapers are at the heart of this dissertation, as the fact that
these newspapers reached occupied France is hardly remembered.
Chapters ten and eleven of this dissertation examine the clandestine press and less
influential sources of news. Chapter ten details the short-lived clandestine press, which
for a brief period of time was the only truly trusted source of information for a fortunate

8
few in the occupied cities. While short-lived and only reaching a small portion of people,
the existence of newspapers untainted by German meddling was as important as the
actual information they contained. Finally, chapter eleven provides a rundown of the
other sources available to the readers of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing that the people did
not read as regularly, for various reasons. This category includes smuggled-in
newspapers, in whose case the difficulty and danger involved with attaining the
newspapers made them a relative rarity. Another infrequent but cherished news source
were newspapers produced in France and England for the occupied territory. The
German passion for intercepting these papers and the need for good weather to drop them
made them an infrequent source. German language newspapers were easy to attain but
few Frenchmen in these cities could read German, and these newspapers only provided
more news from the German perspective, hence their lack of popularity. Finally, while
the focus of this dissertation is newspapers, it is worthwhile to briefly mention the books
and pamphlets the Germans tried to sell to the French people. Not surprisingly, these
books were not too popular, as again, they promoted German righteousness and
greatness.
This dissertation is the product of a great deal of help from multiple sources. I
would like to thank the staff of the five archives that graciously allowed me to consult
their collections. These archives are the American Naval Historical Center, the University
of Minnesota archives at the Anderson Library, the Archives Departamentales du Nord in
Lille, the Royal Library of Belgium, and the Widener Library at Harvard University. I
would like to thank the Marquette University Graduate School for its support in the form
of an Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship, as well as research and teaching assistantships, which
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were invaluable experiences. I would like to thank my committee members, Professors
Philip Naylor and Timothy McMahon for their input. Finally, and most of all, I would
like to thank my advisor, Professor Julius Ruff for his tireless effort to better this work.
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Chapter One:
The People of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing

Félix-Paul Codaccioni opens his work, De l’inégalité sociale dans une grande
village industrielle: Le drame de Lille de 1850 à 1914 by noting that Lille could be the
symbol for inequality created by nineteenth-century industrial expansion.1 Nothing
defined life prior to the war in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing more than the presence of a
large worker population. The industrial era transformed this area, bringing great wealth
and comfort to a few, but a hard life of toil and near-poverty to many. To understand the
people of this area, this chapter begins with an examination of the physical layout of
these three cities in the Département du Nord. Then it examines the economic and social
makeup of the tri-city area in the years leading up to war. This summary of pre-war
conditions will conclude with an overview of the people of the area, including such
features as living and working conditions, language, available newspapers, political, and
religious trends.

Physical Layout
Louis Trenard describes the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area of the First World War
era as a polynuclear conurbation, with Lille being the biggest city but with the majority of
the area’s population living outside Lille.2 Lille is in the Département du Nord, situated
on the Deûle River, near France’s border with Belgium. Roubaix is six miles northeast of
Lille, on the Canal de Roubaix and one mile from the Belgian border, with Tourcoing
1

Félix-Paul Codaccioni, De l’inégalité sociale dans une grande ville industrielle: Le drame de Lille de
1850 à 1914 (Lille: Université de Lille III Éditions universitaries, 1976), 1.
2
Louis Trenard, ed., Histoire d’une métrople (Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1977), 5.
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touching Roubaix to the north. Historically, the Département du Nord was part of the old
counties of Hainaut and Flanders, both dating back to the ninth century. The area became
a part of France during the late seventeenth century under Louis XIV. Towards the end of
the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization forged Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing into
an unbroken urban sprawl. The area represented an exceptional level of urbanization for
France during this period.3 However, the three cities’ histories varied, and all three
preserved some unique characteristics, representative of their different pasts.
Before Lille was a manufacturing town, it was a port settlement on an important
northern river, a key link in European trade for almost a thousand years. It conducted
most of this international trade with Belgium. Lille, moreover, was a city dating back to
medieval times, unlike Roubaix and Tourcoing that remained small villages into the
nineteenth century. It swiftly went from a trading hub with a blossoming commercial
center to a large industrial city. This development of industry fuelled a surge in
population, due to the high birthrate of nineteenth-century workers, immigration from
Belgium, and Lille’s annexation of neighboring towns.4 Despite this growth, much of
Lille retained a medieval aspect that was in place during the First World War. The center
of the city lay around the historic Grand’ Place, which is still the heart of the business
district. To the east of the Grand’ Place, were the Saint-Maurice and Saint-Sauveur
neighborhoods, notable for numerous factories and busy streets. While many workers
lived in Saint-Maurice and Saint-Sauveur, a middle-class element also called these
neighborhoods home. The upper class lived to the west and north of the Grand’ Place, in

3

Patricia Hilden, Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 1880-1914: A Regional Study (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986), 9.
4
Ibid.
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beautiful neighborhoods made up of the homes of the bourgeoisie and upscale hotels.5
Most of the mills sat on the outskirts of town, allowing the heart of the city to retain its
medieval character. Also north and west of the Grand’ Place was the citadel designed by
Vauban. The citadel made Lille one of the keys to France’s national defense, and added a
concentration of armed forces to the city’s makeup. During the Second Empire Lille
underwent the same urban revolution as Paris, as a series of gigantic public works,
including the development of parks near the citadel and the widening major
thoroughfares, transformed the city, at least in its wealthier center.6
Unlike Lille, which had been an urban center for centuries, both Roubaix and
Tourcoing remained very rural in character well into the nineteenth century. Roubaix’s
lack of growth stemmed from its isolation from the important national commercial
channels. Instead, it grew slowly as a small town, on the left bank of the small Trichon
River, located at the intersection of local roads. Patricia Hilden describes Roubaix as “a
city without a past,”7 although in truth, as early as the seventeenth century people began
weaving luxury cloth in a few scattered cottages. The village carried on this way for two
hundred years, but factory production of cloth overwhelmed the traditional economy
around 1850.8 As industrialists built factories, they gave little regard to the layout of the
existing village. Segregation of the rich and poor did not occur in Roubaix as in Lille;
rather workers’ slums surrounded the small brick homes of white-collar employees and
the ornate mansions of the bourgeoisie, allowing for daily confirmation of the stark

5

Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 319.
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contrast between rich and poor.9 Sadly, a lack of thought and rapid growth caused
Roubaix to lose all vestiges of its rural character. This early form of urban sprawl
absorbed small neighboring villages, such as Wattrelos, “transforming them into squalid
terraced housing for Roubaix’s growing textile workforce.”10
Unlike Roubaix, Tourcoing managed to retain much of its medieval town
character. As in Lille, industrialists built their mills and factories on the open land that
encircled the city, leaving the heart of the city unscathed. Despite differences, both
Roubaix and Tourcoing quickly became part of a conurbation centered on Lille. Railway
trains and trams connected the three cities during the second half of the nineteenth
century. Trams in particular provided a relatively cheap mode of transportation, and
slightly better off workers utilized them to expand the physical area in which to look for
jobs.11

The Economy
These three cities formed one great industrial center prior to World War I.
Economic growth accelerated quickly in this urban region. Beginning in 1810, the area
transitioned to industrial capitalism, fuelled by small textile and manufacturing
workshops.12 The tri-city region was a great industrial center by the mid-nineteenth
century, based on chemical manufacturing, metalwork, and, most importantly, textile
production. By the twentieth century Roubaix and Tourcoing focused upon the wool

9
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industry, while Lille became a center of cotton and linen production.13 According to the
1911 census, 25 percent of France’s textile workers worked in the Département du Nord.
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were the heart of French textile production: woven in the
conurbation was 60 percent of the nation’s cotton textiles, 80 percent of its woolen cloth,
and most of its linen.14 The Michelin Illustrated Guide to Lille Before and During the
War noted that the Lille region, called the “Key to France’s Treasure-House,” also
contained the country’s richest coalfields.15 Indeed, coal production and related metals
trades were a second cornerstone of the economy of the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing region,
which before the war accounted for 53 percent of the France’s coal production, 64
percent of its pig iron, and 62 percent of its steel.16
Lille’s regional economic dominance was uncontested. By 1821, forty-three
cotton factories in Lille employed almost 30,000 workers.17 By this time Lille was the
premier linen producing area in France, and one of the most important in all of Europe.
Receiving a boon from the cotton famine of 1861-1865, linen production continued to
grow in Lille thanks to the city’s tradition of textile work, the number of workers
available, its proximity to the Belgian border, an infrastructure that allowed easy
transportation of goods, an abundance of capital for investment, and the dynamism of
local industry owners.18 Beyond this, the city enjoyed a plethora of other industries,
including food processing, woodworking and furniture manufacturing, soap production,
13

Philippe Marchand, Histoire de Lille (Lille: Jean-Paul Gisserot, 2003), 84.
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leather production, the processing of building materials, and porcelain production.19 A
key industry for the city was non-heavy metal works, with the sector’s most important
company, Compagnie de Fives-Lilles, founded in 1861.20 Beyond this, Lille was a major
banking and commercial center. By the end of the nineteenth century, Lille developed
important banking and service industries. The city was home to 80 percent of the area’s
transport services, 68 percent banking and economic services, 70 percent of the public
services, and 66 percent of the commercial services.21 Between 1850 and 1914 Lille’s
total wealth rose by 383 percent as its population reached 218,000 people. Another
indicator of wealth: deceased Lillois left assets of 344 million francs in 1908-1910, as
compared to 72 million francs in 1856-1858.22 Lille was also the university capital of the
entire northern region of France, adding thousands of academics to the workforce. All
this made Lille the de facto capital of northern France.
By 1875, Roubaix and Tourcoing were the center of a wool empire, a fact made
possible by improved communication channels, including roads and tramways, and a
strong pride in the area’s tradition of producing fine materials, combined with knowledge
of advanced production techniques.23 Félix-Paul Codaccioni describes Roubaix’s growth
during the second half of the nineteenth century as a “miracle.” In 1851 the city had
grown to 35,000 people; by 1861, 50,000 people, and by 1900, it had 125,000
occupants.24 Tourcoing’s population also grew, from 28,000 people in 1851 to 85,000 in
1911. While tripling the population in sixty years represents amazing growth, Belgian
19

Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 319.
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workers, who utilized the development of the tramways to travel daily to work in
Tourcoing, and then return to their homes in Belgium, lessened the city’s potential
growth. The region’s transport network allowed many Belgian workers to profit from the
relatively higher wages available to workers in France and the lower cost of living in
Belgium.25 Unlike in Lille and Roubaix, factory production of textiles by largely
unskilled labor did not immediately dominate Tourcoing’s economy. Rather, the small
town continued to support a class of skilled wool spinners and weavers.26 A bustling
smuggling trade from Belgium also gave Tourcoing’s economy a unique aspect.
The industrial and urbanization trends that defined Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing
during the first half of the nineteenth century continued up until the outbreak of the First
World War. Textile activity gained such momentum that the area became one of the
leading textile manufacturing areas in the world.27 The industrial character of Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing created a small wealthy elite, a moderate sized middle class, and
an enormous working class that accounted for most of the population. Even before the
German occupation, the majority of northern France’s urban population lived in dire
straits. Philippe Marchand describes Lille on the cusp of the First World War as a “city of
workshops and workers.”28

Societal Trends
Two important societal trends were the population boom, born of an influx of
immigrants and high birthrates, and the uneven distribution of wealth. Both directly

25
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related to the area’s industrial nature. Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing all assimilated large
immigrant populations from Flemish Belgium. By 1875, approximately half the
population of Roubaix was either Belgian or of Belgian descent.29 Lille also experienced
an influx of people beyond that from Belgium, including transplants from the rest of
France. By 1872, 30 percent of the city’s population was born in a department other than
the Nord.30 In 1889, France passed a law encouraging foreign settlers to take French
citizenship in an attempt to increase military conscripts. Belgians in the Département du
Nord did so in high numbers.31 However, this did little to abate French xenophobia;
Belgians continued to be scapegoats for native workers’ anger at unemployment, working
conditions, and low pay. An interesting side effect was that local xenophobia seems to
have trumped traditional French misogyny; little animosity developed between the sexes
in northern France as Belgians were always the focus of distain.32 Immigration helped
fuel the population boom that accounted for much of the misery of the working class by
creating a plentiful labor supply that helped hold down wages. A high birthrate was the
other main factor adding to the population explosion. The tri-city area had 41.54 births
per 1,000 people in 1870, as compared to 25.9 births per 1,000 for the whole of France.33
While this number began to decline towards the end of the nineteenth century, and by
1908 it was down to 25.2 births per 1,000 people, a high birthrate had already ensured
overcrowding in the poorest areas of the cities.
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As stated earlier, Lille was a wealthy city as it entered the twentieth century.
However, that wealth was not distributed evenly. Félix-Paul Codaccioni notes, “in this
regard, an organic inequality reigned unchallenged in the capital of Flanders, and nothing
is more representative of a deep split of the three social components of tryptic Lille, with
its dominating managerial class, its working class that was overwhelmed with misery,
and its paradoxical and disengaged middle class.”34 The upper echelons of Lille society,
which included industry owners, those in the liberal professions, and high-level civil
servants, comprised 9.21 percent of the population, but possessed 92.9 percent of the
city’s wealth. Interestingly, wealth was not the only element that distinguished the upper
reaches of Lillois society. The industrial haute bourgeoisie was a close-knitted stratum of
society, and very few examples exist of social ascension into this level of Lille society
prior to the First World War. Families kept large businesses within the family, oftentimes
via marriage between cousins, such as with the Motte-Motte marriage in Lille and the
Delannay-Delannay marriage in Tourcoing. Each son usually expected to receive his own
factory. This upper class truly only respected one profession: business owner.35 Their
class believed in not only this dynastic conception of business, but also a complete
identification of family interests with those of the company; business, religion and family
were the trinity that defined them.36 This group set itself off residentially too, by its
congregation in Old Lille, surrounding the rue Royale.37
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The working class, composed of manual laborers in the factories, domestic
workers, and those with miscellaneous occupations, comprised 67.5 percent of the
population in 1872, and 60 percent of the population in 1911. They held less than 1
percent of the wealth.38 Towards the end of the nineteenth-century approximately 65
percent of Lillois had no property to leave heirs when they died.39 The number of
working class people dropped slightly as Lille became less industrial and it developed
secondary sectors (like banking) that created a petite bourgeoisie.40 Between the suffering
of the working class and the luxury enjoyed by the upper classes, Lille developed a
middle-class, largely composed of mid-level civil servants and service industry workers.
By 1890, this group made up 27 percent of Lille’s population and held just over 9 percent
of the wealth. Nevertheless, Félix-Paul Codaccioni declares with certainty that social
inequality pervaded life in Lille.41 That social inequality was even more pronounced in
Roubaix and Tourcoing, where the social structure was less complex. These two cities
had a larger worker class, and a much smaller middle-class due to the lack of service and
banking industries. As the First World War approached, however, even the lives of the
working class were slowly improving, often thanks to socialist political gains discussed
later in this chapter. These gains are not to be exaggerated; they simply meant not every
worker’s life was constant misery.
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Living and Working Conditions
Working conditions in factories varied greatly according to duties. Workrooms
could range from extremely unhealthful to well ventilated, and tasks from safe to
extremely dangerous. However, in almost every case, adversity and harsh conditions
characterized the experiences of most textile workers.42 The monotony and long hours
workers endured physically and emotionally drained most of them. In mid-nineteenth
century northern France, the working-day in cotton mills ranged from fifteen to seventeen
hours, and one investigator asserted that some male workers occasionally worked twentyfours at a stretch.43 The factory workforce was nearly half female.44 They earned lower
wages for doing the exact same work as their male counterparts. Relief from such toil
came late in life. People worked until an advanced age; one quarter of workers in the
thread industry were over fifty years old.45
Many workers blamed poor working conditions and low pay upon the immigrant
population rather than on industry owners. Manual laborers from Flemish Belgium were
expert workers, willing to accept almost any salary that kept them alive. Their
employment lowered wages, and hence they experienced some xenophobic responses to
their presence in the workforce.46 The inadequacy of workers’ wages, the unhealthful
conditions they often worked in, and the squalid quarters they could afford to inhabit
severely limited both the quality of life and lifespan of most workers. A charity worker
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visiting a Lille slum just prior to the war commented that Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing
were “waiting rooms for the dead.”47
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing faced enormous housing problems. Like
purchasing food, rent was a colossal burden for most workers in Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing. With average wages of two francs a day for a man and one franc a day for a
woman, bread costing fifty-two centimes a kilo in 1847 represented a huge portion of a
person’s salary.48 In 1843 Lille a single room cost six to seven francs per month and a
cellar room six francs; this cost represented a week’s wage for the lowest paid textile
workers.49 Frequently every family had to work to be able to afford one or two rooms.
By the 1880s, squalid housing for the cities’ workers scarred the cities. The working class
living in dank cellars and extremely crowded tenements had an exceptionally high
fertility rate, bucking the general French decline. Without adequate sanitation, working
class neighborhoods were incubators for diseases, hence residents also suffered a high
rate of infant mortality.50 The Lille neighborhoods of Wazemmes, Moulins-Lille, SaintSauveur, and Fives were enclaves of poverty where the working class lived. Incredible
population density, as people lived in very tight quarters, characterized these areas.51 A
housing survey in 1911 found that 32,442 Lillois living in homes with less than onequarter of a room per person. A further 69,925 lived in homes with more than one-half
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but less than one room per person. In Roubaix, 4,288 people lived in less than a quarter of
a room, and 29,555 people live in just over one-half a room each.52 Nothing was done to
alleviate the misery, and, particularly in Roubaix, speculators built more and more
courées (tall buildings built around a small courtyard that could house thousands of
workers in a very small space) at low cost for high profits.53 Patricia Hilden speculates
that perhaps textile owners and authorities, stunned by the rapidity of social change, felt
too overwhelmed to take action.54 Even if workers could afford the higher-rents of nicer
neighborhoods, for reasons of prestige and fearing “the rapid deterioration of property
associated with overcrowding,” owners preferred to rent to middle-class tenants.55 Hence,
a situation that began as appalling squalor in the 1880s worsened over the next thirty-four
years.
Such misery afforded workers few recreational activities. One of the few luxuries
the working class indulged in was having a drink at the local estaminet. Estaminet, a
word of Walloon origin, encompasses cabarets, cafés, inns, taverns, and bars. In his short
history of estaminets, Jacques Messiant writes that the history of northern France cannot
be told without including them. Indeed, the workers of these three cities possessed a
historical tradition from French Flanders, which concentrated upon communal life, social
activity, and a love of drinking establishments.56 Estaminets helped characterize the
urban landscape; in most working-class neighborhoods, there could be one or two per
block. Defined as an “assembly of smokers and drinkers,” these establishments were the
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bastions that kept oral traditions alive and provided peace and repose for the lower
classes.57 At the 1912 Conference of the French Socialists (SFIO), Jules Guesde
contended that cafés provided a refuge for the working class.58 Estaminets prior to World
War I were places workers came to “listen” to the newspaper and hold political meetings.
Local leaders of the socialist movement that swept much of northern France before the
war planned in bars and cafés. Estaminets also provided a refuge from the overbearing
industrial leaders, priests, nuns, and police, who believed it their duty to check up upon
workers, including in their homes.59 In areas where living space was extremely limited,
these taverns became communal living rooms, in which alcohol was an escape that
deadened the effects of the new industrial discipline of the time clock and production
lines. Of course these bastions of enjoyment did nothing to help the cycle of poverty and
debt that characterized the lives of most industrial workers. The social problems of
alcohol abuse were legion, including domestic abuse, male-on-male violence,
absenteeism from work, and the misuse of money needed for food. While the Northern
department had one of France’s lowest murder rates, “cabaret murders” – or murders
connected to alcohol consumption in estaminets were an acknowledged occurrence. Anne
Parella notes that after the 1870s, drinking establishments became a place to bury one’s
troubles without being disturbed, and barkeeps and patrons did not tolerate disorderly
people. Hence the type of murders connected to estaminets occurred against a spouse or
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other intimate, with a prior situation worsened by alcohol, rather than murder of a
stranger resulting from rowdiness taken too far.60
While it was culturally acceptable for women and even children to visit
estaminets, working women’s dual role of employment outside the home and continued
responsibilities for domestic chores, meant that drinking places were primarily the
domain of men, with women making fewer and much shorter visits,61 and it was almost
always the fathers and husbands who over drank. Many did drink wine or beer, but the
potentially lethal absinthe was still legal and a popular drink. The role of the estaminet as
a working class living room meant that children also frequented such places in the
company of parents. Children’s cries, often fuelled by exhaustion and hunger, were
quieted with laudanum, an opium based drug, purchased from the bartenders.
Singing songs was a form of entertainment that cost little to no money that many
workers enjoyed. In his work, Chantier pour survivre: Culture ouvrière, travail technique
dans le textile Roubaix, Laurent Marty examines the lives of Roubaix textile workers
through their culture of song writing and singing.62 Songs sung in the estaminets and
homes of Roubaix workers revealed little pleasure in their work or pride in their skills, as
machines now provided the expertise in preparing textiles. Rather, songs frequently
described the factory as a prison and workers as convicts allowed only a few hours a
week to meet friends and play billiards at the local estaminets for relief.63 These songs,
whose working-class composers were frequently socialist in leaning, told of hostility
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towards Roman Catholic charities, whose true aim was to control every aspect of their
lives, and disillusionment with the Republic that had once promised so much. Songs
were usually male and misogynistic, but they also displayed a fierce form of “frontier”
patriotism, that at best revealed great pride in the French nation, and at worst deteriorated
into anti-Belgian xenophobia.64
Sports were another form of recreation available to some workers. Large
employers attempted to strengthen company loyalty by subsidizing (male) workers’
football teams.65 Workers also followed the Easter Paris-Roubaix bicycle race with great
interest, and one could imagine it was frequently a topic of conversation in the
estaminets. Newspapers allowed workers to follow sporting events occurring throughout
France at little cost.

Newspapers
A “city of readers” is how many people described Lille prior to the war. By 1914,
thanks to the Ferry school laws, almost all adults were literate, including those of the
working class. By 1910, the city had fifty-five libraries, including its municipal library,
which possessed over 96,000 titles. Before 1914, Lille enjoyed six daily newspapers, and
a number of weekly papers. The larger Lille agglomeration had fourteen newspapers in
1884 and twenty-one papers in 1914.66 By 1903 there were ninety-eight different
locations in the city where one could purchase a newspaper.67 Being informed was a way
of life. As in the rest of France, none of the newspapers available in Lille, Roubaix, and
64
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Tourcoing were unbiased – newspapers had a clear point of view. The majority of
newspapers were political in nature.
Several Catholic newspapers published in the area, including la Vraie France, le
Nord hebdomadaire, le Propagateur, and La Croix du Nord, which became a daily in
1890 under Paul-Féron Vrau.68 These newspapers combined their religious message with
a political slant on the news of the day. La Croix du Nord reflected many of the values of
industrialists, while La Vraie France reflected legitimist values. The Comité Vrau
assured that several of these papers were given out for free in poor neighborhoods and
Paul-Féron Vrau created La Presse Régionale, a media trust that centralized much of the
work of Catholic newspapers, including their finances and some editorial work, and
allowed northern newspapers to share information with Catholic papers in other parts of
France.69
Le Journal de Roubaix, founded in 1856, and la Dépêche de Lille founded in
1882, were both daily conservative, monarchist newspapers.70 Another right-wing
newspaper available in the three cities, la Nouvelliste du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, was
an evening newspaper, founded in 1883 through the fusion of Mémorial de Lille and
Propagateur. Socialist newspapers proliferated as well. The Réveil du Nord began
publishing in Lille in 1889, as a radical newspaper but became a socialist organ in 1894.
It displaced le Progrès du Nord as the left-wing radical paper, and combined with its
Roubaix-Tourcoing edition, titled l’Egalité, sold more than 100,000 issues daily.71
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L’Echo du Nord was by far the most important and widely read newspaper in the
three cities. A republican-leaning newspaper, it could be found on the desks and
nightstands of almost every industrialist, who could safely assume the day’s news would
be told in a manner that reflected his sensibilities. Workers must have read this
newspaper in large numbers as well, for combined with its evening edition, le Petit Echo
du Nord, it sold more than 180,000 copies daily in 1914.72

Language
Until the end of the Second Empire, most working class people in Lille, Roubaix,
and Tourcoing still spoke the local patois rather than a more standardized French. To
outsiders, this patois sounded like French spoken very rapidly with a Flemish accent. In
some working class neighborhoods before the First World War, this patois was still
prevalent.73 The dialect of French spoken in the Département du Nord remained quite
distinctive from that found in the capital. Timothy Pooley notes that this parlance resulted
from the three-way language contact between Flemish, Picard, and French.74 Louis
Vermesse published a dictionary of Lille vernacular in 1861, noting that the local
language had vitality and a poetic quality to it. The vocabulary of the patois lillois
remained so unique that Richard Cobb included a glossary of it in his work on occupied
France, and Vermesse’s 183-page book enjoyed republishing in 2003.75 The Ferry laws
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may have created a population mostly literate in French, but there is little indication they
did anything to undermine the unique version of the language spoken in Lille, Roubaix,
and Tourcoing.
As Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing evolved into manufacturing hubs, thousands of
Belgians flocked to the area looking for work, some commuting daily across the border.
But many of these mostly Flemish-speaking workers also ended up living in sordid
ghettos in the neighborhoods of Wazemmes, Moulins, Fives, Saint-Sauvier, and SaintMaurice.76 Their presence added a linguistic element to the social inequality created by
industrialization. Timothy Pooley notes in his recent study examining the linguistic
ramifications of Flemish immigration to northern France that, for such a large group,
living in close proximity to their native land, Belgian immigrants became active
participants in the economic, cultural, and political life of their new home, often while
also remaining a tight-knit community among themselves.77

Political Trends
Lille prior to the war was “a place of intellectual ferment.”78 Along with Roubaix
and Tourcoing, these three industrial cities were ardently socialist on the eve of war, but
it was a different form of socialism than that found in the capital. A strong allegiance to
both royalism, and later Bonapartism, were the prevalent sentiments through most of the
nineteenth century.79 The history of republicanism in the tri-city area was brief and
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complex. The history of republicanism coincides with the rise of a liberal bourgeoisie,
who were the republican leaders prior to the war. Business owners remained loyal to
Catholicism despite the laic nature of republicanism, perhaps due to a link between their
Catholicism and capitalism, as industrial leaders understood success in business as a sign
of divine protection.80 However, republican electoral success depended greatly upon
working class support.
There was an evolution of working class political consciousness in the Nord. It
began with national - Catholic - habits of deference, which initially bound the working
class to the radical republicanism of their bourgeois employers. When the Republic
offered no tangible amelioration of conditions, workers drifted into socialism, and a few
into syndicalism and anarchism. This was possible, as republicanism and radicalism were
not deeply entrenched in the Nord. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the industrial
workers of the Nord were uncommitted to any definite philosophy of working-class
emancipation.81 There was a large group of newly industrialized workers that had
previously been conservative or apolitical, that during the 1880s were drawn to the type
of Marxism preached by Jules Guesde, which mixed reformism and French anticlericalism with orthodox Marxist economic and social ideals.82
Workers’ strikes became quite frequent and intense between 1889 and 1893 and
aided the rise of socialist parties. At this time, Nord workers turned more and more to
Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier Français (POF).83 The textile workers of Lille and Roubaix
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were quick to embrace the POF’s socialist message of class solidarity.84 A nationwide
party, the POF garnered its greatest support from the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing
metropolitan triangle. Despite the suffering of workers, however, the party remained
passive for quite a while, and Guesdists, including Guesde himself, suffered electoral
defeat in the early 1880s at the hands of traditional elites. Nevertheless, the rise of the
POF began in the Nord as it won the allegiances of the textile union, whose initial
membership was largely unskilled females and Belgian immigrants. However, by the
1890s, when the POF became more concerned with electoral victories than union
achievements, it began to concentrate mostly upon male workers’ demands.85 By the turn
of the century, no vestige of women’s earlier contributions to the movement remained.86
Socialist electoral success began in 1891, when Lille elected the POF co-founder,
Paul Lagargue to the Chamber of Deputies as a deputy from Lille. In 1892, Guesdists
captured all thirty-six seats on Roubaix’s city council, with Henri Carrette, an organizer
of a textile workers’ union, becoming mayor.87 In the legislative elections of 1893, Jules
Guesde took industrialist Motte’s seat in the Chamber. POF politicians captured the
municipal government of Lille in 1895.88 Guesde won election to the Chamber of
Deputies from a district outside Roubaix in 1893. Motte won that seat back in 1898 and
again in 1902, but Guesde regained it in 1906, and then held it until his death in 1922.89
Gustave Delory, who began as a newspaper peddler for the socialist Le Cri du Peuple,
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became a loyal disciple of Jules Guesde. Mayor of Lille from 1896 till 1904, Delory
became a national, then international figure for the party, as he became its secretarygeneral, internationally representing first the POF and thereafter the new, unified socialist
party founded in 1905, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO).90 Once
Guesdists gained control of municipal governments, they provided social assistance that
challenged the traditional church and public system of aid. Dues-paying members had
access to food cooperatives, financial assistances through mutual aid societies if injured
or fired, maternity benefits, and childcare including free kindergarten.91 Socialists even
established a seaside sanatorium for textile workers’ children suffering from
tuberculosis.92 While socialist parties would remain a defining characteristic of the
Nord’s major cities, they would not command the unquestioned loyalty of the majority of
workers.93
This urban, proletarian disposition toward socialism did not prevent the traditional
industrial elite from remaining a force in politics. The socialist movement, however,
clearly weakened the position of the traditional elites. Pierre Pouchain writes, “The
industrial citadel of Roubaix-Tourcoing was menaced from within.”94 However,
industrial workers showed themselves to be less interested in advancing the POF’s
socialist vision then in backing whichever politician would provide them with the greatest
material benefits.95 For example, Eugène Motte in Roubaix and Charles Delesalle in
Lille, won their mayoral positions by promising great things. Both then came through on
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those promises. In Roubaix, Motte built a beautiful city hall and hospital, and then
helped Roubaix successfully host the 1911 international textile exposition. Motte
presented himself as a moderate republican and played upon native workers’ xenophobia,
too, portraying the POF as a “foreign” party that was more concerned with the rights of
immigrant Belgian workers than with Frenchmen.96 Delesalle was mayor of Lille from
1904 until 1919, and transformed that city into a true regional capital, expanding public
electricity, and building beautiful boulevards. He also incorporated some socialist ideas,
such as bread banks and funding maternity and newborn assistance, into his works.97
Delesalle may have been a conservative, but two out of three of his deputies were from
the extreme left.98 The POF overcame electoral losses to men like Delesalle and Motte,
but at the turn of the century their electoral support leveled off at approximately one third
of the total in the Département du Nord.99 Guesdists believed that a socialist municipality
in Lille foreshadowed a potential national socialist government. However, these dreams
were often met with dismay, as Nord workers hedged their bets, often voting for the POF
locally but for a “bourgeois” candidate nationally.100
Tourcoing took a slightly different path to socialism than Lille and Roubaix.
While Tourcoing had become more socialist leaning by the start of the twentieth century,
it was socialism of a different flavor than Roubaix or Lille. The worker population
remained much more ardently Catholic, and, despite their urban environment, retained
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their rural mentality.101 It took longer for textile workers to make the shift from a wider
community loyalty to class solidarity. When the shift did occur, it was more gradual than
in Lille and Roubaix, where it came intuitively.102 Hence, as Patricia Hilden describes it,
the “socialist conquest of Tourcoing lagged behind.”103 It was not until just before the
outbreak of war that Tourcoing voters began to elect a number of socialist councilors, and
it was only in 1914 that the Guesdist militant, Albert Inghels, became their deputy.104
Socialism plays an enduring role in the Nord; Lille is still a bastion of the socialist party
to this day and gave the Fifth Republic a prime minister, Pierre Mauroy from 1981-1984,
under François Mitterand. Pierre Mauray served as mayor of Lille from 1973-2001.

Religion
Spain governed the Lille triangle until 1667 and that country’s influence created a
virulent type of Counter-Reformation Catholicism that endured late into the nineteenth
century. Perhaps tied to this, northern France remained Catholic despite the deChristianization trend some claim spread across most of France.105 While church
attendance decreased in the large industrial cities of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, and
the secular socialist worker movement gained influence, the people of these cities
celebrated religious holidays in much greater numbers than much of the rest of the
country. Weekly church attendance may have waned but in terms of still taking part in
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rites of passages, such as marriage and baptism, the working-class remained largely
christianized as the war approached. Deborah Buffton suggests that the celebration of
religious holidays increased even more once the occupation occurred because they
established a sense of continuity and comfort to people feeling helpless and alienated.106
Different factors ensured Catholicism remained relevant in these cities. One factor
was the influx of Flemish-speaking Belgian immigrants who clung to Catholicism as part
of their cultural identity.107 The strength of Catholicism also remained greater in the north
than elsewhere because a large majority of the working class had to rely on Catholic
charities to supplement their meager wages.108 A related element was that the industrial
elite of the cities remained religious, and frequently imposed their convictions on their
dependent workforce.109 Some members of the bourgeoisie returned to the fold of the
Church in response to worker unrest. At least one historian suggested that the northern
business elite was actually largely unconcerned with matters of faith, and simply saw
religion as a tool to control workers.110 Whether their faith was real or a façade,
industrial leaders wanted the church to act as “gendarmes in cassocks,” or to be agents of
industrial discipline and social control, a role most Catholic churches were more than
willing to play.111 Many Nord textile industrialists employed the sisters of Notre Dame de
l’Usine confraternity to oversee the installation of religious artifacts and religious
practices on factory premises.112 They also regulated sexual segregation in the workplace,
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and monitored the “morality” of employees requesting charitable aid.113 Indeed, the upper
classes felt horrified by the immorality of fraternization between the sexes at work, and
frequently asked sisters to watch over workers to ensure no unnecessary interaction took
place. They required female workers to attend mass at work and made obligatory
confessions within the chapels in the mill.114 It should be noted that the clergy did not act
merely as agents of control. At times they attempted to oppose industrial abuse, however
most of the time their efforts were futile because of the inability of individual priests and
sisters to change the whole industrial system. One exception was Philibert Vrau. A
wealthy industrialist and lay Roman Catholic activist, he made it his mission to
reinvigorate the religiosity of the citizens of Lille while improving their lives through
beneficial societies for workers and demands that workers receive a decent wage. His
work was a rare example of religious and socialist aims over lapping. However, the
socialists and Vrau differed greatly on the issue of education. His Comité Vrau (which he
ran with his relative Paul-Féron) paid for 9,045 (out of the city’s school age population of
20,700) Lille children to attend parochial schools, rather than secular public schools by
1883.115 His aim was to counteract what many saw as the positivist side of the lay
movement, which opened seventy-five laic schools in the tri-city area. Even at the height
of socialist programs providing relief and support to the working class, many still relied
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upon the church for both comfort and charity. This ensured that Catholicism remained
relevant in the Nord even when anticlericalism was a politic theme.

Conclusion
While life in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing was difficult for most prior to the
war, it did nothing to prepare them for what was to come under occupation. Political
battles, waged through the democratic process, did not prepare the citizens of these three
cities for the authoritarian rule that would accompany German occupation in October
1914. Problems faced by people before the war were often just exacerbated under
occupation. A large portion of the population was already physically weakened preceding
an occupation that would send an already high death rate even higher.116 It is interesting
to note that a large number of people in these cities truly internalized their religion during
occupation rather than simply attending mass to conform to societal demands. Under the
union sacrée, the church openly supported the war effort and the French government took
a hiatus from criticizing the church. This occurred throughout France, and during the
war, distinctions between religion and politics blurred. In occupied France the blurring
occurred at an even deeper level – that between the daily lives of the people and their
religion. All Saints’ Day, the day Catholics remember their dead, became a focus for
people in the occupied zone. Living in harsh conditions so close to the battlefront, almost
everyone in these major towns had recently lost a loved one, and consequently November
1st had meaning for almost everyone. Buffton illustrates how the Nord in general dealt
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with the holiday, describing, “Mixtures of pride, sadness, hope, and grief seemed to
characterize the accounts of the holiday. Toussaint [All Saints’ Day] was deeply
meaningful and its significance had increased because of the conditions of war.”117
People in this area, although not geographically far from Paris and the heart of
France, were in some ways culturally different from the rest of the country. Their
geographic location shaped by their feelings towards the war. Unlike some of their
countrymen, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were not jubilant at the thought
of war.118 Mayor Delesalle of Lille and other politicians made obvious their pessimistic
sentiments about the war once France declared it, but most treated the war as a grim but
important duty.119 The pacifist tendencies of this area did not translate into any
sentiments of affection toward the Germans once the war began.
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Chapter Two:
The German Occupation of Northern France

Alan Kramer’s Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First
World War describes the German occupied zones during the Great War as vast prisons.1
While not always utilizing prison imagery, every historian examining occupied France
from 1914-1918 provides the same bleak image of inhospitable living conditions in the
metropolitan area of France encompassing Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. These harsh
conditions included food shortages, requisitioning, severe and often-time arbitrary
German rule, and enemy control over the availability of news, which is the focus of this
work. To comprehend how the conurbation of Lille understood the news it received
during the war some background information about the German occupation is necessary.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the war leading up to the invasion and the
capture of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. It then explores the German administration of
the three cities, and the economic exploitation of the area, including requisitions and
labor requirements, and the resulting food shortages. Additionally, this chapter examines
examples of French resistance to German rule and the German response.

The War Leading to Occupation
Fighting began on the Western Front in August 1914. The German military plan –
a slightly modified version of the Schlieffen plan - required Germany to defeat France to
the west before engaging Russia to the east. To do so quickly, the Germans planned to
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outflank the French fortifications by attacking through Belgium, consequently violating
Belgian neutrality.2 The Germans placed only light covering forces to the south – where
French military leaders assumed the major offensives would take place – and instead
placed a heavy concentration of troops further north, made up mainly of their First and
Second Armies, with 320,000 men and 260,000 men respectively.3 The right wing of the
German attack swept through Belgium and northern France then moved toward Paris,
eventually pushing the French army toward Switzerland.4 France’s General Joseph Joffre
expected a German offensive via Belgium. However, he assumed that the British
Expeditionary Force could contain what he expected to be a small German force,
allowing him to utilize most of his troops in a French offensive beginning in Alsace and
heading towards Berlin. What surprised General Joffre was not where Germany chose to
attack, but the strength of that attack. He believed Germany lacked the numerical strength
its military possessed. Joffre’s incorrect assessment grew from his assumption that
Germany manned its army like France, that is that it did not include utilizing reserve
troops in the frontline. Germany did employ reservists on the frontline, providing it with
thousands more troops than Joffre expected. Joffre frantically attempted to reposition
French armies while the British landed to make a heroic stand in Mons, Belgium, on
August 23, 1914. These miscalculations placed Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing in the
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Germans’ path. Historians traditionally understood Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing’s
capture by the Germans and the cities’ proximity to the front a result of the failure of the
Schlieffen Plan at the Battle of the Marne, during which the Germans failed to capture
Paris and were pushed back to a position that led to a war of attrition.5

The Capture of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing
The battles of August through October 1914 swirled around Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing; the cities changed hands several times. In an attempt to save the city from the
devastation wrought on several Belgian towns, the French military declared Lille an open
city on August 1, 1914, much to the surprise of the Military Governor of Lille, General
Lebas. Lebas pleaded with the French General Staff not to abandon Lille. However, the
French General Staff’s strategy called for them to turn their back on the Belgian frontier
and face the Rhine. One member of the General Staff, General Michel de Castelnau
pointed out that for the Germans to reach Lille they would have to greatly overextend
themselves in terms of the number of troops per a meter, stating, “If they [the Germans]
come as far as Lille, so much the better for us!”6 On August 17, 1914, Lille became part
of the military zone and General Albert d’Amade hence took control of the area, on
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August 20 ordering that Lille again prepare to defend itself.7 The number of garrison
troops stationed at Lille’s fortifications increased from 15,000 to 25,000 men on August
21.8 Initially German invading troops disregarded Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, as they
quickly moved south. On August 23, however, German troops advanced upon the
Roubaix-Tourcoing railway station, blowing up the station of Mouscron, but French
troops pushed them back and the Germans chose to continue towards Paris.9 The next
day, August 24, a telegram arrived from France’s War Minister, Alexandre Millerand,
granting the request of Lille’s civilian leaders that the city be declared an open city once
again, so as not to expose it to the horrors of siege.10 General Percin disagreed with this
decision but withdrew all troops and military supplies.11 A small German detachment
entered Lille on September 2, but disappeared three days later.12 General d’Amade’s
troops attempted to fight the larger German contingent heading towards Lille but the
French troops had to fall back. The Germans re-occupied the city shortly after on
September 6, 1914. After the first enemy airplane appeared and dropped two bombs on
the General Post Office in Lille on September 9, French military authorities ordered all
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight to leave all three cities for Dunkirk
immediately.13
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Meanwhile Paris remained untouched. On September 5, British and French troops
launched an attack through a gap that opened between the First and Second German
armies, near the Marne River, causing the Germans to retreat. This dashed German hopes
of quick victory and led to the “race to the sea.” Outside the tri-city area, both sides
attempted to outflank each other as they moved northward and westward from La Bassée
towards the northern coast, from October 16 until November 11, 1914.14 Neither side
possessed advantage enough to exploit gaps in both fronts or find the other’s flank. Once
the sea was reached, both sides entrenched the fronts, leaving northern, industrial France
in the hands of the Germans, isolated from the rest of the country. Over time, this line
became defensively more secure with permanent trenches and fortifications, some of
which would hold until the very last days of the war.15 Behind this line, France lost
3,400,000 hectares of land – almost 6 percent of her territory - after the Battle of the
Marne. In this area lived 12 percent of the country’s population and was located much of
its iron, coal, and steel industry.16
The advance of German forces toward the Marne left Lille briefly free again. In
the “race to the sea,” about 4,000 troops under Colonel Pardieu tried to defend the city
against approximately 70,000 German troops from October 10 until October 12. On
October 11, bombs struck Lille until seven o’clock in the evening at a rate of forty-three
shells per minute.17 Shells destroyed 1,200 buildings, with some reduced to ruins.
Buildings hit included the railroad station, and the Musée de Beaux-Arts, which was hit
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by seventy-five shells on October 11, 1914.18 Over half the buildings struck were private
homes.19 In certain cases, such as the rue de Vieux-Marché-aux-Poulets, the bombs
destroyed entire streets.20 Such shelling forced Pardieu to surrender Lille on October 13.
In Roubaix and Tourcoing, the shells battered some neighborhoods, but these two cities
were less harshly shelled prior to the occupation than Lille. Once the occupation began,
however, the German forces looted and vandalized the twin cities to the north to the same
extent as the regional capital.21 The taking of the city killed 200 Lillois civilians.22 The
German capture of northern France killed 896 people.23
The make-up of the cities’ populations changed considerably in the weeks leading
up to occupation. Richard Cobb notes that most Frenchmen of military age escaped by
October 10, which he cites as an indication of confusion on the part of the German high
command.24 This skewed the area’s demographic make-up, leaving the cities with a
disproportionate number of women, children, and older men. Many people with the
financial means to leave the area also did so before the invasion. Homer Folks describes
the exodus, “[a]s the gray German flood rolled over northern France, a million people
fled before it as before a tidal wave.”25 The citizens of these towns partially knew what to
expect, as the Belgian population of these cities already had exploded in late August
1914, as refugees from the German invasion fled south. The Belgians brought with them
tales of German horrors that foreshadowed the tri-city area’s destiny. Prefect Félix
Trépont of the Département du Nord asked all town mayors to provide financial
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assistance to these refugees, noting that the large number of Belgian workers already
contributed to the area’s prosperity through their hard work, and Belgians should be
given the same assistance as Frenchmen.26
The British soon launched two attacks attempting to retake Lille, resulting in
battles around La Bassée and Armentières.27 The British held no advantage, and the
Germans successfully resisted their attack. As the tri-city area began its long sentence
under occupation, a war of attrition – one that would be won by whoever held out the
longest – solidified along the trenches. A 450-mile long front from Nieuwport to the
Swiss frontier separated Lille from Armentières by early 1915, two cities that were only
about ten miles away from each other but on opposite sides of the trenches, and hence
worlds apart for the next four years.28

German Administration of the Occupied Zones
The German military during the First World War gravitated towards extremism.
In terms of occupation, extremism meant the desire to establish perfect order and
complete obedience in the enemy population.29 Utilizing the existing municipal
government system, it was possible to impose a much greater degree of control over
people in the cities of northern France as compared to occupied zones on the Eastern
Front.30 The Germans removed French government officials from power in positions
higher than that of the mayor. The Germans required mayors to remain in office to act as

26

Buffton, 28-9.
H.P. Willmott, World War I (London: DK, 2003), 61.
28
Kramer, 36.
29
Hull,1.
30
Hull, 249.
27

45
conduits to pass information to the citizenry.31 This policy decapitated the French
departmental hierarchy, with the removal of prefects and subprefects. Mayors (or other
civil servants if the mayor had mobilized) along with a municipal commission oversaw
the execution of orders to civilians, the organization of finances, and the payment of
indemnities.32
The civilians of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing suffered through an occupation,
during which German military and administrative authorities alternated in maintaining
their subjection. The German authorities first divided occupied France into staging areas,
or “zones d’étapes,” under military administration. A governor was at the head of each
major regional division and a commandant at each local headquarters.33 General von
Heinrich commanded in Lille, Commandant Hofmann was responsible for Roubaix, and
Commandant von Tessin was in charge of Tourcoing. Officially a civilian inspectorship,
an Inspection des étapes des affaires économiques, was supposed to oversee economic
affairs, but the need to use military force to carry out requisitions and forced labor
confused the distinction between German civilian and military personnel.34 Military
police were responsible for discipline and public order, and field police were responsible
for gathering military information and conducting censuses. Both were present in all
three cities.35 Despite the tight control of people’s movements, the Germans clearly had
not developed an overall plan for administrating the cities. Rather, their administrative
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policies developed slowly, through trial and error, and did not show any consistency until
two years into the occupation.36
German occupation did have one overarching theme: isolation. The French
civilians were not only isolated from the rest of France, but from other areas of the
occupied zone. The Germans treated each municipality individually, making every town
an independent commune with little interaction with neighboring areas. This
municipalization of civilian life and authority – each town’s mayor reported directly to
the German authorities – meant that as the occupation dragged on there was less and less
contact between Lille and Roubaix and Tourcoing. Starting in January 1915, French
civilians needed German regulated passes, attainable only for heavy fees, to travel outside
one’s immediate vicinity.37 Obtaining the necessary passes to travel from Lille to the
other two cities was both difficult and expensive. While travelers also needed passes to
move between Roubaix and Tourcoing, the French could more easily attain these passes.
A certain irony existed as the trams continued to run and go everywhere they did before
the war, including the Belgian frontier, but the Germans forbade the French from riding
the trams without a pass.38 This system also aimed to avoid the occupied area acquiring a
regional identity.39 Each city became its own despotically ruled state. Richard Cobb
asserts that such municipalism was firmly rooted in the area’s history, and at the best of
times Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing rarely cooperated with each other.40 But such
enforced municipal autonomy reversed the work of building a centralized French state
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and epitomized the efforts of German authorities to divide and control French citizens in
the occupied zone.
In addition to the passes necessary for most travel that we have noted, the German
authorities used their power to control every aspect of life. They took a fastidious census
of the population early during the occupation and repeatedly updated it. German
regulations demanded each house post on the front door a list of occupants, including
their ages, genders, and occupations. Identity cards with photographs were mandatory.
The German authorities frequently issued new rules, made available to the urban
populations through notices posted through the city and in local newspapers. Many of
these rules were vague in nature (for example, telling people they must shovel their
walkways in a timely manner, without clarifying what constituted a timely manner),
adding to the stress of occupied life.41 At times, it was the more minor rules that truly
insulted the French people. For example, the Germans imposed Berlin time, one-hour in
advance of Parisian time, in the occupied zone, a change meant to show complete
German control of civilian life, rather than to allow for more hours of light to work. The
German occupiers also placed strict curfews upon the French public, which varied over
the course of occupation. Grusserlass, the requirement that Frenchmen had to step off the
sidewalk and tip their hats in deference to German officers, was another much despised
rule.
The taking of hostages was a technique of control the German occupiers
employed freely. While in a sense every Frenchmen in the occupied zone was a hostage,
the Germans took literal hostages as well. On the first day of occupation, the Germans
seized approximately sixty hostages in Lille, chosen from among the city’s leaders. Those
41
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taken included Bishop Charot, the Prefect Félix Trépont, Mayor Charles Delesalle,
deputy mayors, and a couple members of the Chamber of Deputies.42 Ten men at a time
spent the night at the Citadel under German supervision. Starting in 1915 the Germans
relaxed the rules, only requiring hostages to sign a presence-sheet, but later that year they
again forced hostages to spend the time in the Citadel. Then the rules switched to all the
men signing in both morning and evening, until the Germans dispensed with hostage
taking in October 1915.43 The Germans took hostages to be able to hold them
accountable for civilian actions; this was supposed to deter major acts of resistance with
the threat that the authorities could deport hostages to Germany or even execute them.
Later in the war mass arrests, imprisonments, and deportations were the deterrents. Such
issues added to the psychological trauma of occupation.44
An exception to the Germans’ all-encompassing control was schooling. The
German overseers showed little interest in regulating education in the occupied zone.
Perhaps this was because in occupying northern France, Germany only aimed to
contribute to the success of their fighting troops: “[n]o grander goal (of annexation, or
demonstration of organizational superiority) clouded their practical aim.”45 To the extent
feasible, the pre-occupation education personnel remained in place.46 Furthermore,
schools utilized the same pre-war history textbooks, which uniformly carried an extreme
anti-German bias. The Germans ordered revisions, but with paper and ink shortages, they
did not pursue the matter.47 The Germans spent most of their energy exploiting the area
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for short-term benefit, rather than preparing it for long-term administration.48 Not
surprisingly, in such an environment, the schooling of children took on a secondary
importance to simple survival, but it did not disappear completely. By November 1914, a
third of Lille’s schools had reopened.49 The original bombardment destroyed five schools
in Lille, while the Germans converted two other schools into hospitals and ten more into
troop barracks.50 Schools of higher education, including the Lycée, the École Industrielle,
and Conservatoire resumed in 1915. While there was no permission for baccalaureate
candidates to travel to Lille to take the required exams, the German authorities
compromised by allowing those candidates to go to Saint-Quentin in 1915. Nevertheless,
difficulties stemming from occupation interrupted all levels of schooling at times. During
the winter, schools often closed for a lack of heating fuel.51 The absence of a great
number of younger teachers mobilized in advance of the occupation left as teachers older
men whose health began to fail. Furthermore, fewer students were able to attend school,
either due to their need to scrounge for extra money to support their families, the
undernourishment which sapped their health, or their conscription by German occupiers
into labor gangs.
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Economic Exploitation
Germany prepared for war with a newly updated field manual for rear areas, the
Kriegs-Ettappen-Ordnung, or KEO.52 While it offered little guidance for a long
occupation, it did make clear that rear zones, especially if they were enemy territory, had
to furnish all categories of provisions to the German military.53 The occupation of
northern France was total as the Germans brought every aspect of French civilian life
under their control and expropriated the region’s wealth and destroyed its infrastructure.54
Thus, German official policy fostered a situation of conflict, in which the German
occupiers sought to extract the most out of their economically rich new territory, while
the French living in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing did the best to counter their efforts.55
At the same time, the KEO set the stage for individual acts of economic terror by German
enlisted personnel. Omitting any discussion of international law, while at the same time
encouraging subordinates to behave independently in rear areas, the KEO helped create a
German attitude that would economically destroy the tri-city area. As Eugène MartinMamy bitterly recalled in his memoir about requisitioning during the occupation, the
Germans “were men who steal to live, and live to steal.”56
The plundering began with exorbitant war contributions. From Lille alone (the
Germans charged each city separately), German authorities demanded a million francs by
November 10, 1914, two million more by November 17, and three million more by
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November 24.57 The Germans expected that each city pay to feed the troops billeted
within its limits, which for Lille amounted to 10,000 francs daily at the start of the war.
While German authorities did permit some deadline extensions when cities could not
obtain the funds, they never reduced the amounts demanded. By the end of the war, Lille
had paid over 184,000,000 francs to the Germans.58 These demands quickly depleted the
cities of enough French currency for circulation in a normal fashion. Thus, the Germans
developed vouchers to act as paper money in each city, and this system of local paper
currency operated for the rest of the war. It provided the Germans with an additional
implement of control, as this currency was not routinely accepted outside the occupied
territory, although vouchers from one occupied city would be accepted in other occupied
towns.59
Requisitions of material items quickly degenerated into expropriation, as the
Germans confiscated industrial and personal goods for not only immediate military use,
but also exported items back to Germany as booty.60 Requisitioning depleted homes not
just of silver, wine, and other valuable items, but furniture, linens, and other necessities
needed for basic comfort. The machinery and raw materials of several large factories
simply vanished on trains headed to Berlin. The Germans ordered owners of businesses,
such as some shops and secondary industries, which employed older men and women,
but that were of no use to the Germans, to close down and lay off their workers, adding to
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the already considerable unemployment problem.61 While shutting down these businesses
worsened the economy of the cities, and meant more people needed official aid to obtain
food, the German occupiers, still thinking in the short term, requisitioned all materials of
value from closed businesses. The disappearance of industrial equipment was not the
only obstacle to continued production in the occupied zone. Most able-bodied men left
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing preceding German entry, leaving industrial towns without
young male workers. The initial bombardment of Lille destroyed some of the city’s
largest factories, including the Wallaert and Le Blan cloth manufacturing plants and the
Albert Dujardin steam machine workshop.62 The British blockade meant no new supplies
of cotton, a key raw material for this manufacturing center, could enter the occupied
area.63 Whatever production did continue needed the German authorities’ permission, and
was to be for German use. Several industrial leaders bravely refused to produce for the
Germans, sometimes leading to the confiscation of their entire businesses. Eugène Motte,
Roubaix’s leading industrialist and former mayor, demonstrated great reluctance to cooperate with the Germans, despite the large sums of money offered to him. Roubaix’s
mayor at the time of occupation, Jean-Baptiste Lebas, spent a large portion of the war as
a German prisoner because of his refusal to work with the Germans.64
Some stores, restaurants, banks, and other basic services in the cities did reopen in
modest form shortly after the occupation. With limited supplies and funds – German
requisitions and indemnities quickly stripped the cities of most of their consumer goods
and hard currency – economic life hardly returned to normal. Life was more difficult in
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Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing than in the countryside, since it was extremely difficult to
find work (for those unwilling to work for the Germans) in the cities and food was scarce.
Germany published reports in 1915 stating that commercial life in Lille was once again
thriving a mere fifteen weeks after those fateful days in October 1914.65 This was far
from the truth. German economic exploitation ravaged the region’s industry and
economy.

Labor Requirements
The German occupiers viewed the civilian population as another commodity for
their exploitation. At some point during the occupation, the Germans subjected almost
every person (other than very small children) in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to forced
labor. At first, the Germans attempted to recruit unemployed volunteers to dig trenches
and work various construction jobs, but it quickly became apparent that volunteers would
not meet the workload the German occupiers required. Thus, the Germans forced a large
number of people to work for them locally, in the construction jobs as well as in seized
factories or in providing sanitation services. An important element of forced labor,
however, was also deportation. One of the harshest elements of life in occupied France
was the constant fear of deportation. It was common practice to deport people from the
city to work in agricultural settings in other parts of occupied France or within Germany.
During the invasion of 1914, the Germans deported approximately 10,000 French
civilians to Germany, where they endured harsh conditions.66 The Germans’ motivation
for such early examples of deportations remains unclear, but deterring resistance by
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removing community leaders and collective punishment may have been two possible
aims.67 Whatever other reasons the Germans had for deporting French civilians from the
occupied zone, economic exploitation became the key motivator. Most shocking for the
three cities’ urban population, Germans shortly extended such labor service to women as
well as men, and soon they too lived in fear of general mobilization. Frequently civilians
had thirty minutes notice before the Germans herded them to unknown locales. Some
young girls were “dragged from their parents at bayonet-point, screaming and
terrified…”68 The most infamous of these deportations occurred on Easter 1916, when
the Germans deported twenty thousand people from Lille, a large portion of whom were
women and young girls. The Germans sent many of these women to the countryside of
the Ardennes and the Aisne to do heavy fieldwork. Local villagers treated the women
harshly; the Germans told locals that the women were “femmes à boche,” or prostitutes
cozy with German soldiers.69 The occupiers sent some to Germany. The outcry was even
greater against these deportations, because of the large number of people taken, and the
relative youth of many of the women; some were as young as sixteen years old. Other
aspects of the deportation incensed the Lillois, too. The Germans rounded up women on
Good Friday, and subjected even the youngest girls to forced gynecological exams.70
While the French government’s white book portrayed the Easter deportation as cruel and
heartless, it certainly served real German needs.71 It alleviated a real and growing labor
shortage in Germany while at the same time helping empty major French cities filled with
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unemployed, hungry populations. Presumably, too, such tactics served to keep occupied
populations pacified by demonstrating German mastership.
While this treatment of women outraged much of the world, less noticed was the
deportation of men to work camps in Germany. While deportations occurred prior to
1916, German labor policy for the occupied territories moved from a focus upon
recruiting volunteers from the occupied zones to one of forced labor in late August 1916
when German Field Marshal and Chief of Staff Paul von Hindenburg and his
quartermaster general Erich Ludendorff took over the Third Army Supreme Command.72
In 1916, the Germans formed the ZAB (Zivil Arbeiter Bataillonen) or forced civilian
labor battalions. Known among the French as the brassards rouges for the red armbands
workers had to wear, this “uniform” demonstrated that they were a conscripted army of
civilian workers.73 Many of the people doing this hard labor were young men not of age
to mobilize in 1914.74 The German occupiers deported men forced into the ZAB to labor
camps in the occupied territory. The Germans chose the men from lists of unemployed
that the mayor provided, often under duress. When this did not provide enough workers,
the Germans simply rounded men up in the street. These workers endured extremely
harsh living and working conditions even by the standards of occupied France; they were
often near the frontline and always without adequate shelter or food. Those unlucky
enough to be deported to Germany faced a day and a half journey made in overcrowded
cattle-cars without access to food or washrooms. Once at the camps, life was harsh.
Helen McPhail does not overstate the situation when she notes, “…these conditions were
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a dreadful forerunner of later decades in other countries’ gulags and concentration
camps.”75 While estimates exist for how many men Germans kept at different camps at
different times, the constant rotation of men between camps (to avoid any bonding with
the local people and because their bodies simply wore out) makes it difficult to estimate
how many men served in labor gangs both in Germany and occupied France along the
frontline. Estimates of around 100,000 seem plausible.76 A large number of French
people from the occupied zone worked as forced labor in Germany and France until the
summer of 1917. From this point until the end of the war, forced labor and deportation
still occurred in the occupied areas on a smaller scale, with the Germans reverting to a
policy of recruiting volunteers.77 While French civilians in the occupied zone lived in
constant fear of deportation, it is worthwhile to note that despite the severe hardship
caused by deportations, they were not an expression of a grand ideological scheme to
empty northern France of its native people.78
Much of the work demanded by the Germans was contrary to the Hague
Convention that stipulated no civilian is supposed to be forced to work in the war effort
against his or her own country. Violating international law seemed to concern the
German high command little, as on the subject General Ludendorff stated, “all social
misgivings or reservations deriving from international law must be ignored.”79 While one
could argue almost all work fell into this category, whether it was harvesting food for
German soldiers, weaving cloth at a German-seized factory that would end up either as
uniforms or sandbags, or working in German-seized mines bringing up coal for the
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enemy, some work was blatantly in violation of the Convention. French civilians repaired
railway lines and fortifications and made barbed wire entanglements and mantraps.80 The
knowledge that they were helping the enemy plagued many people in occupied France.
One person wrote, “We are forced to construct trenches to kill our fathers, our bothers,
our cousins.”81 It is not surprising that such radicalized exploitation fuelled great hatred
amongst the occupied French population for the Germans. Intertwined with the misery
caused by forced labor was the constant hunger most French civilians experienced under
occupation.

Food Shortages
Northern France was a highly industrialized and densely populated area cut off
from both export markets and imported raw materials. Simply feeding the population
became extremely difficult in this situation. Technically, the local commandants’ duties
included feeding the poor and reacting promptly to civilian complaints.82 Instead, the
occupiers seized over 80 percent of the 1914 harvest to feed German troops stationed in
France and civilians back in Germany, ensuring there was not enough food even for those
French people who could afford to pay.83 Within the German leadership, feelings on this
topic varied only slightly. The Prussian finance minister commented in September 1914
that “it’s better that the Belgians starve than that we do.”84 Bethmann’s counter position
that “Germany had naturally assumed the duty of satisfying the most pressing needs of
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the population … as far as this can be reconciled with our own needs” was hardly a
strong defense for making sure people in occupied Belgium and France were well fed.85
As prices soared with depleted supplies in occupied France, cost became a form
of rationing, leaving only a limited portion of the population able to purchase needed
food. By 1915, the German authorities in each city established rations for the French
population – 150 grams of rye and 250 grams of potatoes per day, and 150 grams of meat
per week.86 These rations dropped throughout the war.87 The caloric intake of the average
city dweller was much below that required for a healthy existence. By October 1917, the
average Lillois survived on a diet of 1400 calories, 800 less than the minimum daily
requirement for an adult; caloric intake was perhaps slightly higher in Roubaix and
Tourcoing.88 Eugène Martin-Mamy noted that by the winter of 1917 people showed signs
of a lack of food, the streets filled with yellow faces, hollow and sickly from nutritional
deprivation.89
Doctor Albert Calmette, a physician and director of the Pasteur Institute of Lille,
remained in Lille during the occupation, and was a leading source on the healthfulness of
occupied France.90 He notes, “…Food rations distributed to the population were much
below the normal needs of young people. Bread was scarce and of bad quality. There
was little rice, beans, or corn, and very small amounts of sugar, lard, and canned meat.
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For more than a year before the end of the war, there were no potatoes and no fresh
meats. Butter and eggs were to be had only by the very rich.”91 The consequences of this
food shortage were obvious: Doctor Calmette believed the most serious effect was to
arrest the growth of the juvenile population. Fourteen-year old children looked to be ten
years old, and the majority of eighteen-year old girls were only as developed as average
thirteen-year olds during normal times.92 Due in part to a lack of food, disease ravaged
the cities. Dysentery, scurvy, tuberculosis and other diseases related directly to a lack of
food were common in all three cities. A typhoid fever outbreak overtook Lille in
December 1915, but German authorities, through tight control of travel and sanitation
measures, kept it from spreading to Roubaix and Tourcoing. The people of the cities lived
in a weakened state. As Helen McPhail writes, “[T]he need for food brought degradation
to everyone, no matter what their peace-time status…”93
The Germans allowed outside agencies to help counteract the negative effects of
their aggressive exploitation of the area’s food supply. The efforts of the Commission for
Relief in Belgium (C.R.B.) kept many people from succumbing to malnutrition and
disease. Officially founded on October 22, 1914, Herbert Hoover’s relief organization
started by aiding occupied Belgium and extended assistance to occupied France in March
1915.94 All foodstuffs supplied by the C.R.B. were meant for the civilian population,
unlike food produced in the environs of the cities, to which the Germans claimed first
right. The Commission for Relief in Belgium was an amazing organization that acted
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more like an independent state than anything else; to secure and transport food to the
needy in the occupied zone, the C.R.B. not only raised and spent vast amounts of money,
it created its own shipping and distribution network to reach the occupied zones.95 The
C.R.B. raised funds, bought, shipped, and imported the food, and a local body, the
Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France (C.A.N.F.) oversaw local distribution. Local
C.A.N.F. boards set daily rations, and households could purchase goods once a week at a
fixed price. They also provided free ration cards to those without means to pay. When
supplies failed to meet basic needs, it was the local boards’ responsibility to see that
hospitals, children, and charities received priority for scant resources.
Despite its remarkable efforts, the C.R.B. was unable to provide a constant supply
of all foods. The items available varied considerably over time and location.96 Frequently
citizens of the three cities lacked necessities. For example in Lille during January 1916
potatoes, butter, eggs, and milk were all unavailable, vegetables were extremely scarce,
and there were insufficient quantities of bread.97 Part of the problem was simply attaining
and shipping supplies to the occupied zones. Sadly, another problem was that many of the
Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France’s local boards proved to be corrupt, keeping
supplies for themselves and friends or selling them to black market brokers. When this
occurred local staff turned people away from C.R.B. stores despite valid ration cards and
money, simply telling them supplies were exhausted.98 Despite these problems, the
C.R.B. provided food that kept the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing from dying
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of starvation in large numbers. A New York Times article from spring 1917 quotes an
escaped Englishman from Roubaix, who reported that the city exhausted its food supply
and was almost wholly dependent on the Commission. “Without it, all the people would
have starved.”99

Resistance and Repression of Resistance
How did people respond to the pitilessness of occupation, what Andreas Laska
terms, “hard and pure Germanification?”100 Open rebellion against German forces in the
cities was rare. Perhaps widespread agitation did not occur because practically everyone
in the Nord concentrated his or her efforts on obtaining food. Most people were also
fearful of German reprisal for any acts of disobedience, which was certain to be swift and
harsh. As Isabel Hull discusses in Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the
Practices of War in Imperial Germany, the Imperial German military repeatedly resorted
to tremendous violence and destruction in excess of Germany’s own security
requirements and even contrary to military effectiveness.101
Some people defied the Germans by doing as little for them as possible without
facing arrest. Forced labor frequently met with resistance – people refusing to comply.
The Germans always responded to such resistance with fines, imprisonment, and
deportation, followed by even severer conditions and harder work. People did not work
against their own country willingly. Disturbances broke out in Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing over the issue of sewing sandbags to protect German trenches. The German
authorities quickly squashed such resistance, with taking more hostages and more
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extreme forced labor practices.102 A brave few partook in even great resistance in the
form of covert activity that undermined the German authorities.
Resistance sometimes took the form of hiding allied soldiers and helping them out
of the occupied zone or sending messages to British and French armies by releasing
carrier pigeons, making signals, ringing bells, or using radio transmitters.103 All these
activities carried the risk of the death penalty. A number of British and French soldiers
found themselves stranded behind the German lines once the war of movement ceased
and would be the subject of heroic local repatriation efforts by French and Belgian
citizens, such as Edith Cavell. General von Heinrich, the German governor of Lille, made
it clear that those who protected and hid soldiers after December 4, 1914 faced the death
penalty.
History remembers the most famous resisters as the Jacquet Committee, named
after Eugène Jacquet. Several men and a few women worked together to form a regular
escape network to aid soldiers trapped in the occupied zone. They provided food, money,
shelter, and forged passes for men whom they hid from the German occupiers until they
could sneak them across the Belgian border. Once in Belgium, escaping soldiers still had
a harrowing journey ahead of them, which often involved showing German sentries
forged identity cards, sneaking past other sentries at night, and crawling under wire
fences.104 After successfully aiding dozens of military age men, the Germans arrested the
group and placed them on trial. The Germans knew a covert group was aiding people’s
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escape and in July 1916, the military closed off Lille for a detailed search and German
military police arrested approximately 200 people.105 The four leaders of the group,
Eugène Jacquet, Ernest Deconinck, Georges Maertens, and Sylvère Verhulst, faced
insurmountable evidence, including the diary of an escaped British pilot named Robert
Mapplebeck, who taunted the Lille Governor Heinrich with flyovers and dropping notes
to him. Despite Jacquet’s claim that he worked alone, all four received death sentences
and died by firing squad. As we shall see later in the chapter exploring the clandestine
press, other brave French civilians resisted the German mandate against disseminating
any information not pre-approved by occupation authorities.
Another national war hero, Louise de Bettignies, began her career as a secret
agent by volunteering with the Red Cross, carrying letters from her hometown of Lille to
unoccupied France.106 The British Intelligence Service, impressed with success, created
for her the false name of Alice Dubois and she, along with a Roubaix woman named
Leonie Vanhoutte – alias Charlotte – began collecting information for them in February
1915.107 The two women, utilizing Bettignies’s church connections, created the “Alice
network” of two hundred agents and gathered information important to the war effort,
including items on the locations of artillery batteries, munitions depots, and troop
concentration, and then secretly crossed the Dutch border to deliver the intelligence.108 In
October 1915, the Germans captured both women, who bravely refused to provide the
Germans with information, protecting their agents from arrest. In prison Bettignies
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continued to resist, as she refused to do any work that would have aided the German war
effort, an act which earned her solitary confinement, where privations and poor medical
care led to her death in September 1918.109 After the war, the people of Lille worked to
secure her place in history, which included a monument in honor in Lille. In 1924,
Antoine Redier published the well-known text La guerre des femmes: Histoire de Louise
de Bettignies et ses compagnes, which detailed the activities of the Alice network .110

Conclusion
No history of northern France’s occupation would be complete without
mentioning the January 1916 explosion of the Lille ammunition storehouse in the city
ramparts. The blast wounded or killed many people, both German and French, and it
rendered a large area uninhabitable. Both the Germans and French suffered and the cause
of the explosion was never conclusively discovered. Briefly the tragedy brought both
sides together; both sides marched in the funeral procession for the dead together and
they grieved together. However, the Germans assumed espionage and blamed the
French. The Germans seized glass supplies to replace windows for the occupying forces
from people who were left with extremely inadequate shelter during the harshest winter
months. Perhaps this event captures the essence of the German occupation of Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing: everybody suffered, but the French always suffered more.
The war’s total physical damage to the occupied territories was overwhelming.
During the course of the war, military action destroyed or damaged 360,000 buildings in
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the Département de Nord.111 As the Germans retreated from Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing in October 1918, the German high command ordered their troops to destroy
everything in the area, leaving behind only a wasteland for the enemy to take back. As
Alan Kramer notes, these actions, that included stripping museums of their artifacts,
could by not by any stretch of the imagination be justified as a military necessity; it was
simply pillage and destruction without purpose.112 Liberated Lille’s population was
110,000, only half of its prewar 220,000.113 Not surprisingly, most occupied populations
interpreted their lives as living on the front, where they were doing daily battle with the
enemy, even though their relationship with the enemy varied slightly.114 Despite the fact
that the Germans committed most of the extreme violence in the early months of
occupation and in the last years of the war the two sides tentatively moved closer to each
other and formed some personal relationships, the resentment and fear always remained,
as every urban dweller had to face hunger, potential imprisonment, deportation, and
forced labor.
The siege that the occupation represented to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing began October 1914 and lasted until October 1918. For almost 1500 days, the
German military and civilian authorities persecuted civilians, seeing them both as
“human requisitions” that could be used to strengthen the German position, and
opponents to be treated much like enemy soldiers. Surviving in such a situation was
extremely difficult – towards the end of the war approximately 80 percent of the urban
population relied upon charities to survive. Helen McPhail summarized the situation by
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stating, “Most people survived on a personal dogged resolve, concern for family and
neighbors, and a scorn for the occupying forces which infuriated the more perceptive and
sensitive among their German overlords.”115 The people of the tri-city area never got used
to occupation. All three cities, but Lille in particular, were very close to the battle line.
As Vernon Kellogg noted, the people, daily seeing English scout fliers and hearing
English cannons always felt close to freedom.116 He further laments, “Two things, the
difficulty about food and the feeling of the nearness to rescue, have kept them in more
restlessness and perhaps intractable state than the inhabitants of other parts of the
occupied territory.”117 Herbert Hoover’s analysis of life in occupied France was similar
to Alan Kramer’s, “…[it] can be seen from all aspects as a vast concentration camp…”118
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Chapter Three:
Impartial News: The First Casualty of War

Sophisticated government intervention into the media began with the First World
War. All of the combatant nations utilized the main media source of the period –
newspapers – to influence their citizens’ morale. In France and Germany, newspapers
became a vital tool used to circulate propaganda, as the warring nations realized they had
to fight a psychological war simultaneously to the military one.1 Such measures were
necessary, as the French (and German) people needed to be fortified for further
sacrifices, and this would not have been possible if they had known what actually was
happening on the Western Front.2 In both countries, government control of the media had
two interwoven facets: censorship of information and the dissemination of propaganda.
Both elements of government control worked together to alter greatly newspaper content
during the war. Censorship can limit information but it can only help form opinions to a
certain extent. To drive public opinion, governments entered into the realm of
propaganda. Propaganda is only effective if the public’s access to the unadulterated
version of the truth is restricted; hence newspapers also had to be censored of other
information to enable propaganda to be effective.3 Phillip Knightley describes the results,
“And so began the great conspiracy. More deliberate lies were told than in any other
period of history and the whole apparatus of the state went into action to suppress the
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truth.”4 This chapter examines how the French and German governments utilized their
nations’ presses to stimulate their people’s support for the war. This overview includes an
examination of the various government and military bureaucracies created to control the
press, how this control altered the character and content of newspapers, newspaper
editors’ responses to government control, and how these systems compared to news
manipulation in occupied France. First, this chapter provides working definitions of
censorship and propaganda.

Definitions of Censorship and Propaganda
In the simplest terms, censorship is the control of information and ideas. The
American Library Association provides a slightly narrower definition of censorship that
explains the aims of the French and German governments during the First World War.
The ALA defines censorship as “the suppression of ideas and information that certain
persons – individuals, groups or government officials – find objectionable or
dangerous.”5 Defining propaganda is slightly more problematic as many different
definitions of the word exist. Philip Taylor, in his foreword to The Encyclopedia of
Propaganda, captures the basic essence of propaganda; it “involves saying some things
and avoiding saying others. Propaganda arranges arguments and impressions to achieve
specific aims.”6 This dissertation employs the slightly more complex definition created
by Jacques Ellul in the 1970s. He defined propaganda as “a set of methods employed by
an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its
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actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological
manipulations and incorporated in an organization.”7 This definition applies to the efforts
of the French and German governments because it allows for passive participation goals,
like simply not rioting about food shortages or not hindering conscription procedures.
The lines can blur between censorship and propaganda, as censorship can frequently be
an integral part of a propaganda campaign. Propaganda need not contain lies. It can report
events accurately, but ignore or exclude other information to alter perceptions. World
War I propaganda transformed news providing biased interpretations of events and
reporting it as if it were impartial.
Information theorists explain how propaganda via newspapers reaches its
audience in terms of the standard communication model of a sender relaying a message to
the addressee, who decodes it based on a shared linguistic and cultural foundation.8 This
model aptly describes the relationship between the French and German presses and their
respective home fronts. However, this model does not allow for the subcommunicative
intercourses created by the sociocultural circumstances in which the message is emitted9,
which can undermine the senders’ trustworthiness. In the case of occupied France
receiving the majority of its news via German-controlled newspapers, the sociocultural
circumstances included the German occupier’s desire to create a defeatist attitude
amongst the French population. The readers’ knowledge of German intents colored their
interpretations of news presented, making people in occupied France less susceptible to
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propaganda in newspapers than readers in the rest of France and Germany. To be
effective, propaganda must be creditable in the environment in which it is projected.

French Control of the Press
The Gazette de France, appearing in 1631, was the country’s first newspaper and
marked the start of France’s active press. For most of its history, the French press
operated under strict government control, enjoying only brief moments of greater
freedom until the Third Republic. A new press law then permitted close to complete
liberty of expression, causing the number of daily and weekly newspapers in the country
to double by 1900.10 This translated to 240 newspapers in Paris alone – more than any
other city in the world – with 2,160 newspapers in the rest of the country.11 These
newspapers sold numerous copies. In 1870, the Parisian dailies enjoyed a circulation of a
million issues daily – by 1910 that number rose to five million.12 By 1914, France had a
flourishing newspaper culture. Paris was home to fifty-seven daily newspapers, and the
provinces contributed two hundred forty-two more. Waning in influence but still present
were newspapers controlled by political parties or people with clear political views who
utilized their newspapers to broadcast their viewpoints. Aimed at a larger audience were
newspapers that offered both local and world news without any obvious political slant.
These newspapers resembled the modern mass-circulation American newspaper of the
time.13
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Two other factors helped the newspaper boon. First, the 1860s saw the
introduction of high-speed rotary presses in France. Newspapers became smaller in
physical size, more diverse in content, and less expensive to both produce and purchase,
based upon the tabloidal Le Petit Journal model. Second, the growth of cities, the popular
press, and universal military service made French society more culturally homogeneous,
and while France remained mostly rural, urban culture was widely diffused.14 Hence, the
cultural infrastructure needed for wartime propaganda already existed, even if obstacles
created by the Great War negatively affected the newspaper industry, and froze
expansion of the press. Publishers faced their staffs’ mobilization to fight and a shortage
of raw materials. Economic conditions also affected the French press; thirty Parisian
daily newspapers folded during the first few months of the war.15
The French Assembly’s declaration of a state of siege in August 1914 activated
the grand and intricate machinery of censorship that shaped the French press during the
war. Regina Sweeney notes, “The immediate and relatively smooth imposition of the
machine reflected not only the current government’s wish to eliminate all subversive
activity but also a collective memory of how the censoring mechanism had worked.”16
France established a comprehensive bureaucracy aimed at controlling public opinion
through the press. Even before the outbreak of fighting, the French Ministry of War
distrusted the French press, finding its overall tone irresponsible and sensational. This
cynicism toward the press developed out of the “Sedan disaster” of September 2, 1870,
when German forces captured 83,000 French troops, including Napoleon III, in the
14
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Ardennes department because they knew the French army’s plans from reading them in
Le Temps.17 Military leaders simply believed the war was too important to trust to
journalists; they were only to act as conduits to relay information. This distrust
demonstrated itself in the fact that none of the top military men – including Joseph Joffre,
Henri-Philippe Pétain, and Ferdinand Foch – ever gave interviews.18
The principles of censorship pre-existed the outbreak of war and the law of 5
August 1914 simply strengthened them by prohibiting the publication of non-official
military information. Prior to this law was the law of 8 August 1849 that permitted
military authorities to disallow all publications that might excite or encourage disorder.
The law of 29 July 1881 noted that the aforementioned publications included the
newspaper press; hence, military authorities had the right to ban newspapers that might
upset public order or have a negative influence on morale.19 The French parliament
passed the Law of August 5, 1914 prior to adjourning. The law disallowed information
published about: 1) troop and ship movements; 2) operations or mobilization; 3) number
and composition of units; 4) lists of men not called up; 5) lists of men killed, wounded, or
taken prisoner; 6) details about armaments and operations to move provisions; 7) sanitary
operations; 8) changes in high command; 9) any news concerning military or diplomatic
operations that might favor the enemy and have a negative influence on the morale or the
army or the population.20 The broad definition of the last category meant censors could
invoke it to make any news article they wished disappear. As early as August 1914

17

Collins, “The Development of Censorship in World War One France,” 4.
Bellanger, Godechot, Guiral and Terrou, 402.
19
Jean-Jacques Becker, The Great War and the French People, trans. Arnold Pomerans (NY: St. Martin’s
Press, 1986), 48.
20
Collins, “The Development of Censorship in World War One France,” 5.
18

73
General Joffre declared almost all information as news of a military nature, and
consequently subject to restriction.
The French military envisioned the Agence Havas as playing an important official
role in news distribution, similar to Reuters’ position in England. Reuters, the British
press agency, was a patriotic force during the war. Starting in the nineteenth century,
Reuters proved loyal in its coverage of any wars involving British troops. Under the
leadership of F.W. Dickinson, its chief editor during the Great War, the agency
reconciled patriotism with journalistic objectivity. It never quoted information from
German communiqués that carried news negative to British endeavors, and gave
countenance to anti-German propaganda, although the agency couched it in terms of
speculation, rather than confirming it as truth.21
In pre-war France, the Agence Havas dominated news service. Havas gained
control early in the Third Republic, and by the late 1800s reached agreements with
foreign agencies, most notably Reuters and Wolff, to share information and divide the
world into geographic areas, regard by the group as each agency’s exclusive market, with
Havas receiving France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal.22 The French military wanted the
French press to take war reports solely from Agence Havas, which would only provide
such information as the military deemed acceptable. The military wanted to both censor
Havas reports and disallow any critical comment of the war. The Agence Havas’s
management, while enthusiastic supporters of the war effort, were unwilling to accept
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such an extreme relationship, so while Havas was a useful tool for the French military to
release stories, it did not become the sole conduit of information for newspapers.23
Havas was still central to the government control of news as it was a part of the larger
Messageries Hachette Company, which handled the distribution of most French
newspapers, particularly in the capital.24
Utilizing law and control of distribution, the French government and military
created an immense bureaucratic system to control and utilize the press in two manners.
They began by censoring newspapers, preventing publication of information they did not
want circulated, and grew to also influence newspapers to publish stories that authorities
believed would sustain morale. The overall wartime propaganda /censorship machinery
grew quickly and arbitrarily, often making the two arms of media control difficult to
differentiate.

Censorship
A rather convoluted system of censorship developed in France. Ross Collins
described it as the “two-headed censorship” system. Two ministries, the War Ministry
and Interior Ministry jointly controlled the censorship apparatus. The War Ministry
oversaw the Bureau de la presse, which supervised Paris publications and directed
censorship commissions throughout the rest of France. Under the Interior Ministry were
additional, provisional censorship commissions, located in prefectures and subprefectures, composed of military officers reporting to a regional military commander
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and civilian censors chosen by the prefect.25 Such close monitoring of the French press
took an army of censors, which included a staff of hundreds, with a censorship bureau in
every major French city.26 Military censors oversaw censorship of military and
diplomatic news, while the civilians covered the rest. The Ministry of the Interior’s
civilian censors focused upon articles covering domestic politics. Domestic politics
quickly became a category under which any news critical of the authorities or potentially
damaging to public morale fell. The military / civilian division of censorship labor
showed signs of weakness in the provinces, as military and civilian censors did not
always agree on what should be allowed published. Problems arose in 1915 and
disagreements lingered for two years until 1917, when the military eliminated all civilian
authority on censorship commissions.27
General Joseph Joffre denied reporters access to the front and provided no
communiqués for over a month at the start of the war. Hence, early in the war French
editors, needing to fill their newspapers with information the public demanded, borrowed
from foreign newspapers and focused and expanded upon any detail of information they
managed to attain. By the end of August 1914, the French military command began
issuing daily communiqués and in October 1914, the French high command formed the
Service d’Information. Based in Chantilly under the direction of journalist André
Tardieu, it prepared positive stories from the front and distributed them to the press. This
created a press that felt relatively informed. However, of these daily communiqués issued
by the French army, Phillip Knightley writes, “Th[ey] were crisp, beautifully written, and
punctually presented, but, unfortunately, they were closer to fiction than to fact, and
25
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while Germany’s best armies were crashing through Belgium these communiqués
continued to report French army advances on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier as if it would
be only a matter of weeks before the Allies were in Berlin.”28 Therefore, while French
newspapers’ reporting on political aspects of the war may have differed, their reporting of
battles and German and French military behavior were effectively indistinguishable as
they all relied on the same military communiqués.29 As Jean-Jacques Becker notes,
whether a reader consulted L’Humanité, the organ of the Socialist Party, or the L’Echo de
Paris, a right-wing, militarist and Catholic newspaper, that reader learned of poor
German morale, German cruelty, as they were compared to the strength of the French
military cause.30
During that first month of war, the press appeared to support unanimously the
censorship guidelines and accepted the Bureau de la presse as necessary.31 The press even
formed the Commission de la presse under the leadership of Jean Dupuy, the publisher of
France’s largest daily newspaper, Le Petit Parisen, on August 13, 1914, to act as a liaison
between the media and the government. This act was not surprising, as prior to the war,
the press suggested censorship guidelines, perhaps as part of the “first emotional flush of
Union sacrée.”32 Newspaper editors allowed censors continual access
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to their proof sheets33, giving government censors the ability to slash any items deemed
offensive. While the newspaper editors “allowed” these censors access, it should be
noted that the censors had the authority to close without trial any newspapers they
deemed to run truly offensive material.34 This encouraged newspapers to self-regulate.
Editors accepted censorship because they believed the war would be brief, and censorship
would only affect matters of military and diplomatic news. Furthermore, the government
never discussed punishments for publishing news unacceptable to it, and it surprised the
media that the government, rather than the legislature, interpreted the press laws. As it
quickly became clear that the government planned to interpret the law in a severe way,
censoring any criticism of its actions, newspaper editors quickly became disenchanted
with what they rightfully saw as political censorship.35
The reaction of the French press was mixed. Despite the strict regulations placed
upon them, many in the French press did not chaff under governmental control. Quite to
the contrary, the Union sacrée moved them and they agreed to most terms. Many editors
did commit the small rebellious act of leaving black spaces in newspapers to show where
censored news items would have been. While censors preferred not to leave such blanks,
they did appear throughout the war. For example, in 1918, the year that saw the most
information censored in Le Petit Provençal, ninety-five blanks appeared in that paper.36
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Despite the large number of censored news stories, there were never any articles
completely opposed to the war effort published in French newspapers during the war.37
It took only a little over a month after the press law passed for a newspaper to be
suspended. The first well-documented case of the government suspending a newspaper
was that of Georges Clemenceau’s L’Homme Libre. Clemenceau, outraged at the
unhygienic conditions of trains returning from the front with wounded soldiers, wrote an
article denouncing the trains. A sympathetic censor by the name of Marius Richard
allowed the paper to publish the article, leading to the suspension.38 Clemenceau tried to
keep publishing during the suspension, renaming his paper L’Homme Enchaîné, but
censors recognized the name swap. Clemenceau became the leading anti-censorship
voice of the French press, and hence his newspapers became the largest target for
censorship. Interestingly, when Clemenceau became prime minister in October 1917 he
continued the government’s control of the press.39
Clemenceau was not alone in his anger over censorship. By 1915, their fury over
political censorship seemly unified French journalists. The political editor of Le Petit
Provençal wrote in the June 23, 1915, issue of his paper, “The entire industry is going to
end up in unanimous revolt if the good sense and fairness of the government does not
decide to put an end to this abuse.”40 Gustave Hervé, editor La Guerre sociale, pointed
out that censorship had underpinned the likes of dictators and monarchs. Franc-Nohan of
the Echo de Paris suggested that at least one aim of censorship was to help the military
37
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High Command avoid embarrassment. Alfred Capus of the Academié française wrote in
Le Figaro that censorship taken too far could undermine the very liberties France was
founded upon.41 Capus also lamented in the pages of Le Figaro, “Providing one does not
mention the authorities, the government, politics, registered companies, banks, the
wounded, German atrocities, or the postal services one may print anything freely with the
blessings of two or three censors.”42
Censored articles from that period have not been preserved, so history does not
know every item that was expunged prior to newspapers going to press. However, we do
know that censors cut certain stories, such as those about British pits closing down for a
lack of miners, and German submarines carrying out successful missions.43 The French
government told censors to block almost all news related to the Russian Revolution, as
one of France’s major allies experienced a leadership overhaul. Censors disallowed
critical comments about the French cause, as well as any stories about the favorable
treatment of French prisoners of war. Furthermore, censors forbid French newspapers to
publish German communiqués.44 There could also be no reference to peace efforts:
censors eliminated coverage of President Wilson’s speech in which he referred to himself
as a “champion of world peace.”45 When Catholic newspapers within France attempted
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to publish Pope Benedict’s prayer for peace, censors ordered those issues seized.46
Censors also expurgated articles espousing excessive optimism. For example, reports
proclaiming the return of government from Bordeaux to Paris in 1914 as a sign that the
tide was about to turn never appeared in print, for the military did not want to create
short-term expectations that could not be met. Rather, “censors preferred to encourage an
atmosphere of resigned acceptance of a conflict that must inevitably continue for some
considerable time…”47 Not surprisingly, different newspapers had different types of
articles cut by the censors. Censored articles from Le Temps tended to be reporting
diplomatic news, which made sense as the newspaper boasted a large corps of
international reporters relaying numerous diplomatic stories. La Guerre sociale, with a
politically passionate editor, saw numerous articles reporting upon French politics
censored.48
Over time the censor’s grip on the French press tightened, not due to the press
taking more liberties, but rather in response to new ministerial instructions. As early as
September 1914, Minister of War Alexandre Millerand greatly extended censors’
prerogatives, to blatantly include political censorship.49 On September 30, 1915, the
government published a twenty-eight page confidential book, known as Circular No.
1,000, which attempted to answer any question a diligent censor could ask. An example
of directives includes not extolling the value of African troops to the detriment of other
troops and allowing moderate criticism on the function of censorship to go to publication
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but never articles attacking a particular censor.50 The French cabinet quickly took offense
at the military direction of political censorship, and had responsibility for said censorship
transferred to prefectorial authorities, but this did nothing to lessen the censors’ control
over the media.51 Amazingly, the government denied political censorship occurred,
stating that all censorship fell under the articles of the Law of August 5, 1914. But
censorship, a form of news management scholars define as negative control, was
supplemented by what they call positive control of news, that is propaganda.

Propaganda
The French system of censorship developed immediately; its network of
propaganda evolved more slowly. Like the censoring bureaucracy, both military and
civilian arms of the government worked – at times at odds and customarily without any
inter-agency cohesiveness – to produce propaganda. In certain cases, propaganda was a
planned end, and in other cases it simply flowed out of systemic censorship.
The military Service d’information was primarily concerned with providing
censored communiqués that would be the sole source of combat information for French
newspapers. Many would argue that propaganda production might not have been its main
objective, but the S.I.’s public relations campaign did verge into that domain. It prepared
positive stories from the front and distributed them to the press. Tardieu wrote a great
deal of the news released by the army himself, but he also created a system of officercorrespondents stationed with French armies on the Western Front. In 1915, these officercorrespondents published numerous human-interest stories in French newspapers while
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ignoring the horrifying truths of life in the trenches.52 These stories went beyond
censorship, creating a false description of trench life for readers on the home front. The
system broke down however, whenever combat occurred. The journalists were soldiers
first, and hence during battles – when the home front most wanted information – they
were busy fighting rather than writing. For example, when the Germans attacked the
Verdun fortifications in February 1916, no soldiers were available to write and counteract the terrifying rumors circulating on the home front. The army quickly invoked a new
plan: it created a small group of soldier-journalists whose duties entailed only covering
the war. These reporters were the only ones covering battles for French newspapers
because the military disallowed civilian correspondents at the front.53 These military
journalists provided the only French coverage of Verdun for four months and created an
image of French resistance at Verdun that encouraged the civilian population with their
sanitized version of events.54 By all assessments, these reporters provided French
newspapers with well-crafted articles and proved to be solid writers, but their militaryapproved articles hardly produced the unbiased reporting independent journalists would
have provided.
Despite the relative success of the Service d’information, the military reduced its
journalistic activity toward the end of 1916. Then on May 14, 1917, the French high
command complained to the Service d’information that French newspapers were
covering more British operations than French ones because the newspaper editors seemed
to prefer to copy articles from British newspapers than to print material sent to them by
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the Service d’information.55 The French military decided to allow civilian journalists
access to the front for the first time.56 The S.I. took this complaint and negation of its
function to claim a greater propaganda role. The Service d’information split into two
divisions, one that kept its old name and one that became the Bureau d’information
militaire. Both sections expanded beyond simply writing articles to also producing
photography, films, briefings to reporters, radio transmissions, daily communiqués, and
even starting an army newspaper, the Bulletin des Armées.57 All of these sources
portrayed war events as the military high command wished the home front to see them.
Despite the dominance of the military, the French civilian government did
contribute to the distribution of propaganda. In October 1915, Aristide Briand became
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he promptly began plans for a central propaganda office.
In January 1916, the French government established the Maison de la presse in Paris.
With funding attained from a stash of twenty-five million gold francs from secret service
funds,58 it became the agency for the management of propaganda, slowly merging all
other small organizations into its fold. This organization aimed to help not only the
French press, but also the world media understand the war from the French point of view.
It contained four offices: the diplomatic department, the military department, the
department of translation and analysis of the foreign press, and the propaganda
department. The propaganda department contained three sub-sections, dealing with allied
countries, neutral countries, and general ideas. Philippe Berthelot was in charge of the
entire operation. By 1917, the Maison de la Presse was the clearinghouse for all the
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government’s propaganda efforts, nationally, but mainly internationally. While the
Bureau de la presse continued to function, in a surprise case of civilian-military
cooperation, the military channeled most its information through the Maison. Working in
conjunction with army headquarters, known as the Grand Quartier Général (GQG), the
Bureau also relayed captured German diaries and letters of propaganda value to the
papers.59 While the Masion de la presse provided military news, the Bureau de la presse
circulated more political information. When Clemenceau took power in October 1917, he
placed the Section militaire under the Minister of War. Clouding the divisions between
negative and positive control, the Maison also began responding to journalists’ questions
about censorship.60
The efforts of these agencies meant that the press created a distorted picture of the
war. The journalists over-romanticized the war, provided optimistic reviews of military
operations, and glamorized French soldiers while demeaning German fighters.61 Soldiers
home on leave were shocked at the false ideas civilians had from reading the newspapers.
The term bourrage-de-crâne described the lies and exaggerations many readers believed
filled the newspapers of the First World War. In his study of Parisian dailies during the
first few months of the war, Ross Collins established five categories or types of such
propaganda. The first type includes patriotic items, extolling the glory and justness of the
French cause and its purifying effect on the national spirit. The inspiration for such
articles was the pre-war writings of young conservatives, such as Charles Maurras and
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Maurice Barrès and others associated with of the group Action française.62 The second
form of propaganda described the French troops in exaggeratingly heroic terms. Such
coverage described the brave poilus, fearing neither bullets nor shells, enjoying both easy
victories over a pusillanimous enemy and the somewhat pleasant life of comradeship in
the trenches.63 Such coverage angered many troops as it minimized the difficulty of their
experience. The third category of propaganda focused upon defamation of the Germans,
including accusations of atrocities and slurs on their character and culture. Collins simply
calls the fourth type of propaganda outrageous lies, including the numerous false
statements reported in French newspapers during the war. He notes that bold falsehoods,
such as, “Cossacks Marching to Berlin,” “Kaiser dying,” and “French troops routing
Germans,” frequently appeared in the form of headlines.64 The final category of
misleading information demonstrates how the lines between censorship and propaganda
blurred during the war, for this fifth type was missing information. Propaganda in the
form of what was not reported, namely bad news for the French war effort, or censorship.
Keeping negative information from readers was as important as exaggerating good news.
Prior to Collins’s work, Jean-Jacques Becker identified six reoccurring topics printed in
the French press: the French spirit as a combination of panache and a Spartan work ethic;
German immorality; German spitefulness and ruthlessness; the pre-eminence of French
weaponry; the superiority of French soldiers; and Russian potency.65 The findings of
these two men reveal the nature of the majority of news stories published in French
newspapers during the war.
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While this type of coverage reflected the omnipresent influence of military and
civilian censorship and propaganda efforts, the newspaper editors coveted news to
publish that would sell their papers. The greatness of France fighting an evil enemy sold
newspapers. Sordid, explicit news also sold newspapers; hence, the French press was
eager to include atrocity propaganda. As James Moran Read notes, “they seized the
opportunity to publish sensational murder stories, accompanied by all the lurid details,
without being accused of pandering to the lower instincts of the crowd.”66 Indeed, both
sides in the war committed numerous atrocities, but fewer actual atrocities were
committed than the average newspaper reader would have thought by 1919.67 The
overuse of atrocity stories had a disheartening effect. When Henri Barby of Paris’s Le
Journal accurately reported the atrocities that the Turks committed against the
Armenians, the story was lost among all the false and exaggerated propaganda that was
filling newspapers at the time.68
The authors of Histoire générale de la presse française assert that the war
reduced French newspapers to mediocrity.69 Newspapers, did however, succeed for the
most part in reassuring the home front, albeit through concealment of the direness of the
national situation.70 The French non-combatant population wanted to be convinced of the
righteousness of the French cause and to be assured of an eventual victory. Hence, it was
ready to believe the propaganda present in French papers, even if common sense would
have made it reject it at other times.71
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German Control of the Press
Wilhelmine Germany had a rich newspaper culture, with over 3,600 newspapers
published within the country, but newspaper producers did not enjoy the freedom to
publish uninhibited. 72 An 1874 press law assured a certain amount of press freedom, but
it still permitted government restraints that continued to limit the press.73 Article 68 of the
1871 German constitution put the press into war service, and a treason law of June 3,
1914 outlined the government’s right to censor printed material.74 The Prussian law of
siege of 1851 also applied to the German press during wartime. Implemented the first day
of German mobilization during the First World War, it granted astonishing powers to the
commanding generals of each of the twenty-six military districts of the Reich, that
German military interpreted to include its control over what newspapers published.75 An
interesting peculiarity of German journalism also shaped the nature of German war
coverage. Whereas in France, several newspapers’ political slant defined them, in
Germany, some newspapers were controlled, or even completely owned by the
government. In the case of both countries, audiences of these newspapers were aware of
the relationship of politics and the papers.
On July 31, 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II declared a “state of siege,” which lasted until
November 1918. It suspended the “right to express opinion freely be word, print, or
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picture.”76 It placed executive authority in the hands of the commanders of the twenty-six
military districts, who answered only to the Kaiser, as they monitored political activity,
and censored the press, mail, and public meetings.77 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg
issued twenty-six prohibitions to the press, “to prevent unreliable information from
reaching the public.”78 He justified the drastic action with the fear that newspapers would
publish sensitive military information. Control of censorship became the purview of the
military. During the first months of the First World War, district military commanders
assumed control over the domestic administration of Germany, which included issuing
directives for the local press. Almost all domestic issues were deemed of military
importance, as almost all news might either relate to the economic war effort, hearten
Germany’s enemies, and conversely dishearten Germans, undermine the populace’s faith
in their government, or in other ways destroy the country’s wartime solidarity.79
If the French military could only rely upon the Agence Havas to disseminate
French propaganda within limits, the German military could expect the Wolff news
agency to publish whatever they wanted. Established in Berlin in 1849 by Dr. Bernhard
Wolff, it was the source of world news reports for German newspapers. It began as the
Berlin Telegraphische Anstalt, distributing commercial information until 1855, when it
also entered the general news field. In 1865, it joined with the Continental Telegraphen
Compagnie, and gained Prussian governmental support, becoming a quasi-official news
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service.80 Until 1859 the Wolff, Havas, and Reuters agencies shared information and after
1870 were all part of the alliance of news agencies referred to as the “ring combination.”
Each agency had territory in which they had exclusive rights to distribution; Wolff’s
included the German empire, Austria-Hungary, and much of northern and southern
Europe.81 Despite acting and been treated like a major international news player, Wolff
never kept pace with Reuters or Havas in terms of having correspondents throughout the
world. Wolff never had journalists outside its territories beyond those in a few major
world capitals. The spirit of cooperation between the services, upon which Wolff relied
for news outside its area, slowly diminished, however, as the war approached, and the
Wolff agency became a propagator of the German government’s agenda.82 While the
Wolff agency garnered almost all its news from military sources, newspapers could run
articles provided by Wolff or cite the agency as a source and make it appear that it was
news relatively independent of the military.

German Censorship
In February 1915, the German military created Oberzensursteille, or the Central
Office of Censorship. Eight months later, the military moved it under the
Kriegspresseamt, or War Press Office, overseen by Lieutenant-Colonel Erhard
Deutelmoser. In turn, the Information and Espionage Bureau, known as IIIb and
controlled by Commander Walter Nicolai, controlled this office.83 These agencies only
allowed newspapers to publish military news given as bare statements by the
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Kriegpresseamt, which convened with editors three times a week at the Reichstag.84
Numerous people filtered news before it reached the press. Field units submitted reports
to staff headquarters on the Eastern and Western Fronts, and the reports were then
forwarded to general staff headquarters in Berlin, where the army’s press department
sanitized them prior to making the information available to newspapers at these thriceweekly conferences.85 As the German military forbid their country’s journalists from
coming near the front, these meetings were the only source of battlefield news. The
General Staff instructed the officer conducting the press conferences to remember one
point: the key element is not the accuracy of the news presented but the effect it will have
on the reading population.86 A corps of officer correspondents, overseen by the
Kriegpresseamt, provided the bulk of information most military communiqués were
based upon.87 Newspapers throughout German published identical reports of battlefield
operations.88 Not surprisingly, disheartening news did not have a place in these reports.
Even with complete control of combat news, the military still deemed it necessary
to censor numerous articles. Censored news pieces included those concerning food
shortages, casualty lists, notices of death, and peace demonstrations. In all areas, the only
leniency allowed in voicing dissent was at the local level; officials who oversaw
municipal rationing could be criticized for food shortages, but never military or civilian
leaders in Berlin.89 Germany, like France, had newspapers bent on challenging the
government, with the newspaper of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Vorwärts, being
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comparable to France’s L’Humanité, the organ of the French Socialist Party (SFIO). Both
suffered from their respective censors’ pens numerous times.
Despite tight military control, inconsistency plagued German censorship efforts
until 1917 when centralization of the different press offices occurred. Until that point,
newspapers received direction from both the aforementioned military censors, and also
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information bureau, the Nachrichtenabteilung, controlled
by Otto Hammann, and the Prussian Interior Minister’s press bureau.90 Even then, the
power held by local military commanders to decide what area newspapers could publish
allowed variation in items censored.91 Censorship was most stringent in Berlin, the
Rhineland, and Westphalia, areas under the control of the Third and Seventh Army
Corps, while regulations tended to be relatively more lax in Bavaria.92 These differences
stemmed from the federal nature of Germany, leading to deputy commanding generals in
different military districts interpreting censorship directives differently. The result was
that Germany did a far less satisfactory job than France (which could utilize its historic
centralization of state functions) to control the flow of information consistently through
the country. In Germany, local editors attempted to make sense of the reports they
received, often injecting contentious issues of domestic and foreign policy that local
censors may have allowed but that the military did not intend to be included.93
In general, military censorship created an information chasm between a minority
of well-informed policymakers and the majority of civilians and military personnel, who
only know what censored newspapers relayed. However, censorship of newspapers did
90
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not prevent all domestic knowledge of war news. War postcards proliferated and often
escaped the notice of censors, disseminating images of the war to millions of people back
in Germany.94 Even though no German domestic newspaper reported a single German
defeat until 1918, these reports did not fool the home front into believing this was the
case.95 The deprivations of their daily lives and the number of men killed at the front
(even if not reported in the papers) made obvious to German readers how poorly the war
was going. In their general history of the twentieth century, Geoffrey Bruun and Victor
Mametey note, “the ultimate defeat of the Central Powers was greatly aided by the
breakdown of morale on their home fronts…”96

German Propaganda
The German government honed its ability to manipulate media before 1914, as it
utilized newspapers to propagate and bolster its ambitious military and naval programs.97
Charles Roetter believes, however, that prior to the war Germany did not have anything
close to a coordinated propaganda effort. Even in August 1914, the German leadership
felt the rightfulness of their cause was so self-evident it did not need any justification.
Furthermore, they believed the war would not become lengthy enough to justify such
efforts. It was only with the German disaster at the Marne and with it the prospect of a
long war, that the Foreign Office began producing propaganda material in a haphazard
fashion. This was not suitably coordinated with other official bodies, including the
military, which late in 1914 developed an extensive press service to report military
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operations, carry out propaganda, and control what newspapers reached soldiers at the
front.98
Newspaper editors in Germany – like France – were expected not only to limit
negative news, but also to ensure their papers had a patriotic tone.99 In early 1915, the
Imperial Ministry of War provided the German press with the following
recommendations: 1) do not question the national sentiment or determination of any
German because it injures the impression of German unity; 2) disseminate the idea that
German victory will liberate Europe and other areas from Russian despotism and English
hegemony; 3) harsh language may be used to describe the enemy but belittling the enemy
is not dignified; 4) neither the Chancellor, Kaiser, or military leaders can be criticized but
deserve our confidence.100 For further guidance, the Oberzensursteille had a process for
generating “positive press,” attitudes in, the Berliner Pressekenferenzen, or Berlin Press
Conferences, during which military censors provided detailed instructions to the press on
how to treat different questions raised by the war.101 The Kriegpresseamt also made
attempts at blatant propaganda. It prepared and distributed periodicals, subsidized proGerman pamphlets, and sponsored books that advanced the German point of view.
The over-arching theme of German propaganda was to justify the German war
effort by showing that Russia mobilized first, the French invaded German territory, and
above all that the spiteful British wanted to destroy an economic rival whose commercial
and naval superiority was looming.102 The military also encouraged newspapers to
remember and report the “spirit of 1914,” so named for the first week of August, 1914,
98
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when the German people were moved by feelings of patriotism that caused them to
embrace the war and inspired feelings of fraternity and community. Later the “spirit of
1914,” – including its expression in German newspapers – was invoked as both an
experience and a goal, as a “holy memory” and a vision of a “utopian future” that would
exist when Germany won the war.103
German propaganda attempts never quite matched the success of those of the
French. Thanks in large part to the French (and British) media much of the world
believed that the Germans were the aggressors. Few newspaper editors in France thought
twice about utilizing ethnic slurs, referring to the Germans as “Huns” or “Boche”; the
Germans’ witty epithet of the Allies being the “All-Lies,” never caught on in the same
manner.104 While Germany may have lamented the atrocities French newspapers accused
it of, it did not mean that the German government did not encourage its own country’s
papers to print similar stories about the British and French. These stories shocked the
German people, but in the battle for world public opinion, the French wielded a great deal
more power.105 For example, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a leading Berlin
daily from 1861 till 1918, which had been the official organ of Bismarck’s government,
reported on December 1, 1914, that Gurkha and Sikh troops (fighting for the British)
liked to sneak across the battle lines at night and slit German throats and drink their
blood.106 For much of the war there were no foreign soldiers on German soil apart from a
small part of Alsace, so German propagandists could not claim Allied soldiers were
committing atrocities on civilians like those of which the Germans stood accused in
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Belgium and northern France. The only counter propaganda they could produce was to
present a positive image of German soldiers. Most of their propaganda was defensive in
nature, hence less successful. The exception to this rule: the German military frequently
focused upon the actions of Belgian franc-tireurs, utilizing this imaginary threat to turn
their invading army into victims.
Another example of Germany’s unsuccessful defensive propaganda surrounded
the deportation of people from their homes in occupied France around Easter 1916. The
situation, as we have seen, was horrible enough to demand unexaggerated outrage, but
the French press manipulated it into the sacrilegious mistreatment of girls and young
women. The German military tried to respond through German newspapers. In the
August 1, 1916, issue of the semiofficial Kölnische Zeitung it was remarked that not a
single deported worker lost his life (a statement open to interpretation), while English
shells and bombs killed dozens of French and Belgians in the occupied zone. The August
25, 1916, issue elaborated on occupied France, suggesting that, “The French should be
thankful that the Germans and not the English were in northern France. If one could
judge by the Boer War, the whole population would be sitting behind barbed wire, were
the English in the place of the Germans.”107
The German propaganda machine also handled the Edith Cavell case poorly. The
Germans executed Edith Cavell, a British nurse in a hospital in Brussels, on October 12,
1915, after she admitted to helping Allied servicemen escape the occupied zone, an act
widely known to be punishable by death. The French and British media praised Cavell as
a martyr and violently denounced the Germans as vile women-killers in their media. The
German rebuttal in their media was feeble; they complained that Edith Cavell was an
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enemy citizen committing acts she knew were punishable by death, but made little of the
fact that the French had already executed one woman for the same offense and were to
put to death another eight for capital offenses during the course of the war.108

The Press in the Occupied Zone
Newspapers in northern France in the few months between the outbreak of war
and occupation particularly felt the effects of war. On August 3, 1914, the editors of the
main regional papers, including L’Echo du Nord, La Dépêche de Lille, La Croix du Nord,
Le Réveil du Nord, and Le Progrès du Nord placed their newspapers at the service of the
civilian and military authorities. Others ceased publication entirely.109 The newspapers
that continued publishing represented greatly varying outlooks - from the republican
L’Echo du Nord and Le Progrès du Nord, to the clerical Le Croix du Nord, and the
bourgeois Catholic La Dépêche de Lille, to the socialist Le Réveil du Nord - but they all
followed the government wartime line. Indeed, on October 9, 1914, during the midst of a
successful German attack on the capital of Flanders, Le Progrès du Nord reported the
situation as “in general, excellent,” and the same day Le Révil du Nord stated that the
enemy was retreating south of Arras.110 The people of northern France quickly felt the
repercussions of French media restrictions. Trying to avoid panic in the northern cities,
the government ordered newspapers to say nothing of the August 20,1914, German
occupation of Brussels. Citizens of northern France found this out only when Belgian
refugees arrived in French towns on August 24, telling of the horrors they had
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experienced and creating a sense of panic in their region.111 Deprived of accurate news in
their own press, citizens of northern France soon were subjected to the press of the
occupier.
The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain what news was available and
through what newspapers during the occupation. As we shall see, the German-authorized
newspapers in occupied France provided a great deal of information, but with it came a
view of life as the Germans wished the French to see it, including who was to blame for
the war.112 Censors allowed different news within Germany and areas occupied by their
forces. For example, in occupied areas and neutral countries, newspapers published
stories of Entente forces’ cruelty toward wounded German soldiers to anger people and to
cause them to question their own nation’s military. Such stories did not appear in German
newspapers, for fear they would disquiet families with young men at the front.113 To
these stories of Entente atrocities, German propaganda in occupied enemy countries
added stories designed to encourage defeatism and despair. Thus, we will find in the
press in occupied France the certainty of German victory, news of disaffection among the
Entente powers due to divergent war aims, and of nationalist and revolutionary
movements within the British and Russian empires.114
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Conclusion
News management was necessary in both wartime Germany and France, as it was
in the interest of security as well as public morale. Through neutral countries or captured
soldiers, or even spies, published news could easily find its way into enemy hands.115
However, keeping details of military operations out of the public sphere immediately
descended into censorship of all sorts of information and the insertion in to the press of
propaganda. Propaganda was effective during the war thanks to the relative
unpreparedness of its receivers. Average newspaper readers in Paris or Berlin hardly
knew what the word “propaganda” meant; they had no other sources analyzing the
propaganda published in newspapers and elsewhere.116 They were willing to believe
wartime propaganda that “stripped the enemy of any vestiges of humanity and appeared
to confirm the worst suspicions and fears of the prewar era.”117 While Germany may have
been the country with the authoritarian traditions, it was France that most efficiently
controlled an omnipresent and organized press.
France established a comprehensive bureaucracy aimed at controlling public
opinion through the press. French government and military leaders believed this system
of censorship and propaganda as central to the country’s ability to sustain moral through
the war.118 In newspapers as dissimilar as L’Humanité (the newspaper of the Socialist
Party) and the Echo de Paris (a militarist and Catholic right-wing paper), parallel
accounts of poor German morale, German cruelty, and shoddy German equipment
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prevailed.119 Regaining Alsace and Lorraine was a paramount theme, often supplemented
with versions of a post-war France annexing all the territories on the left bank of the
Rhine.120 Depoliticizing the war and ensuring a pro-war stance was not enough for
French authorities. The war provided occasion to continue earlier efforts to disseminate
middle-class values of clean language, a discriminating sense of humor, and proper
behavior, at the expense of a working-class culture. “The goal of civilian morale dictated
attention to morality.”121 Despite the resources the French poured into creating
propaganda, historians’ opinions on the success of the program are mixed. Leonard
Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker contend that the French
censorship/ propaganda apparatus never became a truly creative force that could give
meaning to the war.122 Instead, they note it was journalists, teachers, actors, popular
singers, photographers, painters, designers, industrialists, and others that defined war
culture in France, not the government.123 However, other countries appreciated and
admired the complexity of the French propaganda system. In April 1917, the French
press control accepted Americans onto its staff, teaching them the French techniques of
propaganda dissemination.124 For the most part, however, the French censors achieved
their aim of calming public opinion by cutting all disturbing news, while convincing
people there was no alternative to the continuation of the war; the ends appear to have
justified the means.125
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Germany’s leaders – both civilian and military – agreed that winning the war
depended upon civilian unity and the will to fight on. Hence, they saw manipulating
public opinion through censorship and propaganda on the home front as paramount to the
war cause.126 Many have argued that the German lack of success in maintaining home
front morale was a contributing factor to them losing the war. Richard Bessel notes that
German mobilization during World War I occurred in three distinct but interrelated areas:
the military, the economy, and the spirit. Mobilization was most successful in the first,
less in the second, and least in the third.127 While initial efforts to mobilize the spirit,
consisting of public displays of war enthusiasm, were successful, newspapers could not
keep up the war zeal as everyday privations – namely food shortages – dominated the
lives of those in Germany from 1916 on.128
In German-occupied France, other problems handicapped German efforts. When
the public’s interests diverge from that of the ruling class, and when they have their own
independent sources of information, the official line (propagated in the media) may be
widely doubted.129 In occupied France independent sources of information were
infrequently available but the divergence between the public’s interests and that of the
German occupiers was so great as to mean that the effect of propaganda in the occupied
zones was much less than on the French and German home fronts. In all these places,
however, the average person did not truly understand what was going on with the war
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and, as Pierre Sarddella notes, “without news man would find himself incommensurably
diminished.”130
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Chapter Four:
The Bulletin de Lille

Acting upon a demand from the German authorities, and always under their
control, the Lille municipality published the Bulletin de Lille on Sundays and Thursdays
for the four years of occupation, beginning November 15, 1914. Although controlled by
the Germans, some people in Lille welcomed this usually two paged, double-sided
newspaper as the only voice – however distorted – of the city.1 German authorities
closely supervised the editor, Paul Cornille, a fact never hidden from the reading public
as every edition carried the subtitle “published under the control of German authorities.”
The paper’s content suggests that the occupying Germans did not intend the Bulletin to be
a forceful propaganda tool like the Gazette des Ardennes. Instead, it was an implement
of control and exploitation. Often its main purpose appeared simply to inform the city’s
populace of the voluminous series of new laws and ordinances enacted by the German
authorities, to facilitate the exploitation of materials from the area, and to distribute
information about shared concerns, such as public health issues. However, the manner in
which the newspaper conveyed this information appeared meant to instill fear in the
population, even when appearing innocuous, making the paper a part of a system
described by historians as “a true reign of terror.”2
To garner an understanding of the information the paper published and its
reception by Lille readers, means examining how the German authorities utilized the
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Bulletin de Lille to inform the population of the rules and regulations of occupation and
how they used it as an apparatus to facilitate requisitions and the economic exploitation
of the area. It is also important to examine the local affairs not directly under German
control that the occupiers allowed published in the paper. While the Bulletin may not
have been principally an instrument of propaganda like the Gazette des Ardennes,
German control ensured that some attempts at changing public opinion found a place this
paper.

Informing the Population of the Wretchedness of Occupation
Goethe noted of his countrymen, “If there has to be a choice between injustice
and disorder, the German prefers injustice.”3 To this end, the Germans in occupied
France often resorted to a policy of Schrecklichkeit, or frightfulness, as they aimed to
scare the civil population into absolute submission with the least possible diversion of
German military strength.4 The policy of Schrecklichkeit manifested itself time and time
again in the recurring section of the Bulletin de Lille entitled “Acts of German
Authority.”5 Starting with the first edition of the paper and continuing until the April 12,
1917, issue, “Acts of German Authority” appeared in over eighty-five percent of the
issues of the paper, and always in the lead-story position frequently dominating the front
page.6 This section dictated the tone of the newspaper and overwhelmed any editorial
character the paper may have possessed. The first edition noted the German military
3
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authorities’ desire to see published, by the municipality, a newspaper that contained
official information such as proclamations, notices, and conferences of commanders,
during which the Germans briefed French leaders on new orders.7 The first section of the
first edition set the tone for the paper. It included a list of hostages to be taken, a demand
of a 5,000 francs guarantee against hostile action, a proclamation of forbidden acts - some
punishable by death, - and an invitation to the lillois not to force the occupying army to
damage even more of their beautiful city and suburbs by being hostile towards German
troops, placing the responsibility for destruction on the people. Such a proclamation
created a tenor of dread, noting that when the Germans could not identify those guilty of
an infraction, they would punish the population as a whole.8
Other decrees and ordinances under the heading “Acts of German Authority”
established among other policies, requirements for passes for French civilians to travel
outside the city-center, specific hours during which each person must be inside their
home, and providing board to German soldiers. Other regulations prohibited the flying of
balloons or pigeons, selling goods on the street, communicating with those outside the
occupied zone with the exception of prisoners of war, or having in one’s possession arms,
radios, clandestine newspapers, or any other objects the Germans saw as potentially
dangerous.9 The information was often redundant as the German authorities felt the need
to reiterate regulations, making their rule seem all pervading. In the December 19, 1915,
December 23, 1915, and June 25, 1916, issues of the newspaper, the German authorities
offered, “to refresh” the memories of the occupied people, reiterating practically the
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whole litany of their regulations.10 There was a certain macabre humor to the recapping
of laws in December 19, 1915, issue, as the list of offenses punishable by death appeared
as a two-part series, to be continued in the next issue. If, as Michael Nolan suggests, the
French saw in Germans what they feared most about modernity, namely regimentation
and anti-individualism, the heavy-handedness of their emphasis on regulations must have
confirmed their collective fright.11
The recurring nature of proclamations, ordinances, and decrees did not mean that
readers could safely skip reading them, as the occupying forces sometimes arbitrarily
changed the rules and regulations. A quick survey of five proclamations, representative of
dozens more, offers evidence of how the German occupiers created fear, either
intentionally or unintentionally, by capriciously adjusting regulations and expecting the
people to be aware of them because of their publication in the Bulletin de Lille and
various posters displayed around the city. After having set strict curfews early in the
occupation, the German authorities surprisingly demonstrated a more lenient attitude and
announced in the Thursday June 3, 1915, issue of the paper that the Germans extended
curfew to 10pm for the summer months.12 This small concession came with a caveat; the
new curfew was a privilege, and the occupying authorities would take away if the
occupied people abused it. Take it away the occupying forces quickly did, as just nine
editions later the lead proclamation declared that from July 1 until July 14 all nonGermans in occupied France must stay inside their homes between the times of 6pm and
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5am, with those caught outside risking prison sentences.13 To further rub salt in the city’s
collective wound, the proclamation did allow for restaurants and stores to stay open later
than curfew, presumably for the benefit of the German occupiers. Unlike many of the
other proclamations, the German authorities explained their actions in this one, noting
that they felt forced to take these measures (which also included disallowing any more
passes for travel west of the city) because French laborers refused to work in accordance
with German military demands. German retribution included not only sentencing the
supposed ringleader of this labor resistance to death, but also punishing the whole city.
For thirteen issues, no mention of curfews appeared in the newspaper. Then a notice
appeared in the August 19, 1915, issue, noting the expiration of the 6pm curfew and
setting the new time to 10pm.14 The status of the curfew between July 14, which the
original decree stated as its own expiratory date, and the August 19 announcement of the
end of the earlier curfew remained unclear. This curfew remained in place until late
autumn when the Germans reset it for the winter months.15 Surely, such instances of
contradictory information in the paper added to the sense of fear as uncertainty
surrounded what acts would bring down the wrath of the German authorities.
If creating uncertainty was one of the Bulletin de Lille’s methods of invoking fear
in the population, it must have provoked especially great apprehension in readers in late
September 1915. The September 26, 1915, issue of the paper informed readers that the
Germans sentenced to death four people for hiding British pilots and aiding their
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escape.16 The next issue included a notice that all passes already given out were no
longer valid starting that day and that the Germans planned to issue no new passes.17
Unlike the last example where the earlier curfew was clearly indicated as retribution for
the workers’ actions, the German occupiers drew no link between the crime of harboring
enemy soldiers and the voiding of passes within the pages of the newspaper. The perhaps
intentional ambiguity of the reasoning behind the new pass law must have added to the
state of fear. The Bulletin de Lille also created uncertainly as it provided information
with very short notice or even a few days after the fact. Dozens of illustrations can be
found of the paper providing pertinent information a day or two late. For example, on
Sunday April 2, 1916, the people of Lille read that all permits to circulate with a
harnessed horse expired two days earlier and people had to request a renewal before the
Germans issued a new permit.18 The Sunday October 1, 1916, issue of the paper told
people to move their clocks forward an hour on September 30, 1916. The newspaper also
reported that starting that very day the curfew reset to 9pm from 11pm.19 While these
proclamations were often posted throughout the city, many an instance of panic must
have occurred when people found out they had committed punishable acts because they
were not aware of rule changes.
The only level of French government left intact during the occupation was the
municipal level, in Lille under the auspices of Mayor Delesalle, elected in 1914 before
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the German invasion.20 Richard Cobb notes that the municipalization of civilian
authority and the regional polarization that ensued was feasible because municipal
loyalties remained stronger in northern France than anywhere else in the country.21
However, the role of the mayor could not have been an easy one. The Byzantine position
of Mayor Delesalle was evident in the pages of the Bulletin de Lille. Often times German
regulations were prefaced with the introduction that the Germans informed the mayor of
the following request / requirement / change.22 Furthermore, another regular section of
the paper, “Notices from City Hall,” demonstrated how the German occupying authorities
exploited the mayor. While this section did include information about local affairs not
directly related to the German spheres of influence, a great deal of space was dedicated to
repeating, if in a kinder, gentler, tone, the demands of the German authorities. For
example, the Germans left it to the mayor’s office to announce their decision that any
bicycle owners not currently employed needed to report to the German authorities for
work.23 One week later, the notice from the mayor’s office cited municipal code to
invoke people to keep the streets clean and safe from black ice, a minor fixation of the
occupying authorities.24 German authorities also frequently used the mayor’s voice on
the subject of identity cards. The occupying authorities regularly repeated decrees
requiring all non-German adults in Lille to carry identity cards, but they left the gentle
reminders and instructions on how to obtain the cards to the mayor’s office, which the
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Bulletin’s staff included in several issues.25 From an administrative standpoint,
employing the mayor’s office to provide such services must have proven convenient.
Beyond this expediency, linking the mayor’s office so closely to the occupation within
the pages of the Bulletin de Lille gave the impression not only that German control was
all pervading, but also that at some level the city leaders might to begun to acquiesce to
the occupiers’ authority. While the concept of collusion with the enemy existed before
the Second World War, the term “collaboration” originated in Vichy France. When
Marshal Pétain met with Hitler in 1940 at Montoire, he announced he was setting off
along the “path of collaboration.”26 Historians now apply the concept to similar situations
throughout the twentieth century.27 Stanley Hoffmann made the distinction between
“involuntary collaboration” and “voluntary collaboration.”28 The German occupiers may
have wanted to create the appearance of collaboration with the leadership in city hall, and
attempted to create such an appearance by forcing it to reiterate many of their demands.
However, the people of Lille respected their civic leaders and understood any
collaboration that occurred was of the involuntary variety.
From early in the occupation, the German authorities required census reports on
the number of horses, dogs, and other domesticated animals owned by those under their
control.29 The Sunday November 14, 1915, issue of the Bulletin informed people that the
census of horses, chickens, mules, and donkeys would occur monthly, and the newspaper
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provided people with a detailed chart of when they were supposed to report to the
German office responsible, the Festungs-Fuhrpark.30 The regulation of people was no
less. The top half of the front page of the Thursday September 2, 1915, Bulletin
announced the undertaking of a general census of the population.31 Reinforced by its
discussion in the city-hall section of the paper, the census was to be of the whole
population except Germans and German allies, and was to include a listing of each
person’s profession and all their properties.32 When by the end of December not everyone
filled-out the necessary paperwork or complied with the decree to post their information
on the front doors of their homes, the tone of the Governor’s decree became harsher,
threatening those who did not meet these terms with a fine of 3,000 marks “or worse.”33
All these serve as examples of how the Germans used the Bulletin de Lille on a regular
basis to give updates on what information they required from people, making it a useful
instrument for keeping close track of the occupied.
Surprisingly, the Germans did not use this newspaper to the extent one would
expect in their demands for forced labor. As Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette
Becker note in 14-18: Understanding the Great War, the Germans were quick to
conscript men, women, and older children to repair railway lines, roads, and
fortifications.34 This was in violation of The Hague Convention’s stipulation that nobody
be forced to work for the war effort against his own country. Some workers refused to
work for the Germans in early July 1915, citing The Hague Conventions. The Germans
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replied in the Bulletin de Lille that this reading of the Convention was completely wrong,
alluding to Article 52, stating that working for the enemy was acceptable as long as the
actions were not explicitly against their own country.35 Article 52 states in part that
“Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from communes nor
inhabitants, except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion
to the resources of the country.36
This was the first reference found in the paper to the occupiers’ right to require
work from the French, and they based their position on logic, rather than fear. An
agricultural labor shortage existed in the countryside by 1916, coupled with
unemployment in the cities, leading to German attempts to recruit farm workers from the
cities. When this failed, the Germans resorted to conscription.37 In May 1916, the
Germans transported 25,000 men and women to Germany from the occupied zone,
having given these people an hour and a half to pack their belongings, a fact easily
overlooked from reading the Bulletin de Lille.38 However, by July 2, 1916, the German
need for workers had led to harsh work requests in the paper. The lead piece in that day’s
paper stated “We demand the following: For people of both sexes to do agricultural
work.”39 The pay for men was to be 2.5 francs a day and women were to receive 1.5
francs a day, with room and board included.
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Later on that same year the Germans tried a different approach to gain workers.
The lead section screamed “Unemployed! You will find permanent work in different
fields and services in Lille.”40 While references to the need for workers appeared
intermittent throughout the publication of the paper, the use of double terminology about
volunteers and employment opportunities, sometimes tied to the German occupying
forces and sometimes not, makes it difficult to determine which references were related
to the harsh system of forced work that characterized much of life in the occupied zone.41
There were frequent demands for various groups (usually men of a certain age, but also
women) to report at a certain time to German authorities, but the Bulletin de Lille does
not reveal which of these calls led to deportations and which were just random checks or
demonstrations of their control. The only indication in the Bulletin that the menace of
deportations was nearing an end was an announcement from city hall that the mayor
received word to that effect and hence the Germans now permitted the changing
addresses within Lille (the Germans forbade this during the period of deportations.)42 It is
bewildering that Germans authorities did not emphasize the peril of deportations in the
Bulletin de Lille when it was such a central facet of what Martin Gilbert called the allpervasive tyranny of occupation.43
Perhaps the most blatant attempt by the Germans to instill fear and obedience in
the occupied population through the newspaper came in the form of the regular subcolumn to “Acts of German Authority,” entitled “German Military Justice.” This section
detailed who the Germans deemed to be in violation of their rules and regulations and the
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punishments for these infractions. For example, on Sunday, August 1, 1915, numerous
people received sentences for violating twenty-one different rules, including an eleven
year-old girl sentenced to two months in jail for hurling insults at Germans.44 Other
violations cited that day included inciting hostility towards Germans, drawing plans of
the fort without permission, hiding arms and helping to hide arms, carrying illicit
correspondence, keeping pigeons, assisting in desertion, hiding French soldiers, and using
fake passes.45 In this issue of the Bulletin de Lille, it appears the aim was to intimidate by
the sheer volume of people sentenced, for crimes both large and small. The Thursday,
August 17, 1916, edition included another long list of sentences; this list demonstrated
that the Germans were not going to turn a blind eye to even smaller offenses, as every
punishment was either a fine or jail term of thirty days or less.46 In an earlier issue the
“German Military Justice” section was much shorter but fear inspiring. It reported that
the German occupiers executed Belgian student Léon Trulin that morning at the Citadel,
after condemning him for spying.47 The Governor, who at that time was General Von
Heinrich, signed the section for that day, remarking “take this as a warning.”48 Equally
bone chilling, was the “German Military Justice” of Thursday, August 31, 1916. Readers
discovered that the Dean Jean-Baptiste Leclerq of Saint-Christopher church in
neighboring Tourcoing publicly stated to his parishioners that they did not have to
comply with German metal requisition demands. As a result, he received ten years
solitary confinement, and the Germans had already transported him to Germany to begin
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serving his sentence.49 One parishioner remembered Leclerq’s first sermon after the
German occupation, describing him as a saintly man, a brave man, because he defied the
Germans and did not mince his words in doing so.50 During his sermon, Leclerq stated
that whatever happened, no one must work for the Germans or do anything at all to help
them.51
A feeling of helplessness permeated the article as the Germans already deported
Dean Jean-Baptiste Leclerq. The newspaper’s report of other major sentences handed
down by the Kommandantur several days after their implementation, probably only
added to a feeling of helplessness for the French. And certainly the prominence of
Leclerq, an only have further reinforced this sentiment.
Announcements of German extractions of French assets began in the paper
immediately with war contributions. Such heavy demands reduced the mayor by the
fourth issue of the paper to groveling in a published letter to Governor Von Heinrich,
stating that the bank was empty, and municipal workers had to knock on every citizen’s
door twice to raise the first 3 million francs demanded. The mayor explained that he
would not be able to pay the next installment, and, after laying out a detailed recitation of
what the city had already paid and suffered through, he requested a reduction.52 Von
Heinrich’s response, printed under the mayor’s letter, was to give an extension of the
deadline but to offer no moderation in terms of amount.53 Publishing the details of this
communication in the Bulletin made the French representative appear weak and
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ineffectual in the face of German might, seemingly creating an image symbolic of the
entire occupation relationship. This image was repeated in subsequent issues, as the
mayor pleaded to his constituents to exchange bank notes for communal vouchers as he
tried to raise money to meet successive war contribution deadlines. These appeals
continued for several months, slowly waning as the supply of hard currency diminished
in the occupied zone and communal vouchers became the norm. However, German
demands for materials never abated.
The Thursday, October 26, 1916, issue of the Bulletin de Lille contained a
lengthy, severely worded list of objects subject to requisition for the war. This list
included cars, motorcycles, bikes, and all accessories for these vehicles including rubber
in all forms and quantities. The Germans demanded oil and fat from those who had more
than ten kilograms in stock. Wool, cotton, hemp, and other fiber materials; wick and
thread; leather and tanned materials, electrical wire and cord; objects with industrial uses,
such as copper, nickel, pewter, and brass, and all platinum that was not being used for
medical purposes also made the long list.54 The German authorities were not demanding
people relinquish these items immediately. Rather, they were subject to requisitioning.
This meant citizens in possession of such goods had to submit a list of them to section
commanders. Individuals submitting such inventories became responsible for security of
the goods and hence, they could not sell them or, if non-durable, use them, under penalty
of five years in prison.55 The newspaper piece gave enough information to ensure the
populace’s compliance with German wants, but its wording also left enough unstated to
create anxiety and doubt. Which of these items would be requisitioned and if so when
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and how? By requiring a list, the German authorities left the citizens of Lille in a state of
insecurity, unsure of what the occupiers would do with this information. The Germans
frequently used this tactic in the Bulletin. While some requisitions printed in the paper
were straightforward, such as the order requiring that all timber be turned into authorities
within four days56, or all telephones and related pieces need to be given in immediately57,
many required only a written list being handed in, leaving the actual loss of goods to a
later date. The paper warned car and harness owners that if they did not give a detailed
inventory of their possessions, the Germans would confiscate them and their owners
would be sent to prison.58 Photography equipment and alcohol were two categories of
goods that received similar treatment in subsequent issues.59 The follow-through on
many of these requisitions occurred in person in the form of door-to-door seizures and
never made the pages of the Bulletin. To read the paper without knowledge of these
other German actions would not reveal the entirety of the system of appropriation that led
Helen McPhail to observe, “One of the most dreaded words throughout the war in the
north was requisition.”60 A New York Times’ journalist wrote after the war, “Their system
of exactions and requisitions was well calculated to break the spirit as well as the purse of
the great, ancient, and rich city.”61
It is interesting to note that one element that did not play a key role in the Bulletin
de Lille was the listing of German-held French prisoners of war. As Charles Roetter
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notes, the Germans ensured that the French read the Gazette des Ardennes by publishing
lists of captured French soldiers in that newspaper, as “no French family with men folk
serving in their country’s army could be expected to resist such bait.”62 The Bulletin de
Lille did not utilize this same maneuver to ensure readers. Only between January 17,
1915, and March 21, 1915, did any issues contain prisoners of war lists.63 From that point
until 1917, the only reference to prisoners held in Germany was a notice dictating the
rules for sending a monthly postcard or care package to them. Perhaps the Germans
recognized that the Bulletin de Lille would be read without this enticement, as it was
technically published by the municipality, and contained other items of interest, such as
birth and death notices as well as information about food supplies, the limited local
events still available, and even an advice column.

Outside the German Purview: Other Themes in the Bulletin de Lille

The municipality published the Bulletin de Lille, albeit under heavy German
direction, and the Germans allowed space in the paper for local affairs they deemed
necessary or innocuous. These portions of the paper gave the Bulletin any of the
creditability it carried with the people of Lille, and almost all of such information was
local in nature. The small amount of news from beyond the occupied area published in
the Bulletin appears to have been hand-selected by the Germans with a purpose, and the
Bulletin de Lille provided only rare, and extremely controlled glimpses into the outside
world. An early issue of the paper reported that the bells were sounding in Lille again
because Germans troops had won a great victory against the principle section of the
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Russian army that was now in retreat.64 The closest event that could have caused this bell
ringing was the Russian evacuation of Lodz; the Russians retreated thirty miles to a line
along the Rawka and Bzura Rivers, where they created sound trenches.65 This piece
appeared under the heading of “German Authorities’ Communiqués,” that is, as an
official announcement probably designed to demoralize the French. The editorial staff
did not again so blatantly attempt to sap morale. Instead, it used international news in a
more subtle way. These international articles more typically took the form of reprinting
pieces in the general body of the paper (as opposed to under “Acts of German
Authority”) from other newspapers, giving the appearance that German censors allowed
outside voices. However, the newspapers most often quoted were the Gazette de
Cologne and Bien Public, two newspapers published by the German authorities in other
areas. Reprints usually appeared within ten days or so of the original publication. For
example, the April 22, 1915, issue carried a reprint from the April 16 Gazette de
Cologne, stating that the French government under President Viviani had agreed to
accept bank notes issued by the occupation authorities at face value.66 This story suited
the Germans’ needs, as they began to encourage the elderly and sick to move to
unoccupied France. A second example, in the February 18, 1915, issue of the Bulletin de
Lille, carried a reprint from the Bien Public, telling how bakers in Germany dealt calmly
with the white bread shortage by making “KK” bread, made with a high percentage of
potato wheat, barley, oats, and rice, which the German people accepted.67 This story was
blatant propaganda. Within months of this story, wretchedness gripped the people of
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Germany because of a lack of traditional bread. German scientists were so desperate as
they attempted to develop a wheat substitute that they considered not only straw, rushes,
Icelandic moss, and animal blood (as an ersatz) but attempted to chemically treat sawdust
and wood pulp to convert cellulose into a digestible carbohydrate.68 A dietary respite for
the German home front diet only came with the conquest of Rumania and its stores of
wheat.69
The above two instances were clearly included in the Bulletin to support German
endeavors, but another piece reprinted from the Bien Public was even more obvious in its
intent. An article in that newspaper included comments reprinted from a speech given in
the Common Council of Antwerp, where a member stated that for a people who had been
extremely free, occupation is a heavy sacrifice and a real test, but that one worsens his
difficulties if he works against the occupying authorities.70
The Bulletin de Lille also included the occasional article originally from nonGerman controlled papers. A story acquired from a Dutch journal told of the high-cost of
provisions in Holland, showing how neutral countries also suffered from high prices
thanks to the war, with the implication being the Germans did not cause all hardships.71
Sporadic and rare pieces of international news seemed to carry no message at all, such as
the listing of Noble Prize winners.72 However, these pieces were atypical, with the
majority of the paper dedicated to local affairs.
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The Bulletin de Lille was a convenient source of local information. Readers could
remain up to date about when and where French military allocation distribution occurred,
and when charitable organizations provided services.73 Information regarding French
military allocations was particulary important to the people of occupied France, as many
people relied upon this resource and there was frequent confusion about who was eligible
for the payments. On August 5, 1914, the French legislature created military allowances
to provide for the dependents of mobilized soldiers in financial need.74 The law
authorized the payment of 1.25 francs per day to needy adult dependants (wives and
elderly parents) and a 0.5 franc supplement for each dependent child under the age of
sixteen.75 The system was difficult for local officials to administer, even in unoccupied
France, as civil servants attempted to keep down costs, turning away women in dire need
of the money. The distribution of benefits gradually liberalized, until it reached most
military wives and families, and was even expanded to non-martial “companions” and
illegitimate children.76 Beyond military allowances, readers could also remain informed
about what schools functioned at the primary levels and higher, and which programs still
accepted people at the Université de Lille.77 Vaccine availability information became
particularly important as the city faced an outbreak of typhoid fever in the winter of
1915-1916.
The back half of the paper always carried birth and death announcements, as well
as a classified section with job announcements (and much more frequently people
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looking for work) and a great deal of advertisements. The ads provide interesting insight
into life in occupied Lille. People often placed ads selling personal goods as they tried to
remain solvent.78 Several ads concentrated on hard-to-get items, such as coffee,
cigarettes, and home-brewing systems, emphasizing the quantities available.79
Advertisements generated by wartime conditions ran alongside signs of continued
normalcy, such as ads for shampoos promising beautiful hair and the ever-present ad for
pianos.80 A multitude of ads promoted various foods, highlighting the sporadic times
when certain foods became available.
As Helen McPhail notes in her study, “the way in which northern France was fed
during the occupation is an extraordinary one, involving complicated international
politics.”81 Considering the tremendous control the Germans wielded in the occupied
zone, it may be surprising to note that they allowed the Americano-Hispanic Commission
(known as the Committee for the Relief of Belgium after American entry into the war)
and its related organization, the Comité d’Alimentation de Nord de la France (C.A.N.F.)
to exist within occupied territories. Yet, this was help that German authorities gladly
accepted, as it both avoided depletion of their own resources and demonstrated
benevolence to the outside world.82 From May 6, 1915, when the C.A.N.F. began to sell
foodstuffs in Lille, it had a regular presence in the Bulletin. Notice of what items were
for sale, their price, locations of distribution, and quantities allowed per family were
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regular fare in the paper.83 Bread was the central foodstuff the C.A.N.F. focused upon.
Other frequently listed items included dried milk, soap, and produce such as kidney
beans, rice, coffee, and cereal. Despite their best efforts, the Americano-Hispanic
Commission and the C.A.N.F. were the first to admit that the food supply had less variety
than before the war, and people had to be more ingenious in using what they had.84 The
C.A.N.F. offered cooking courses to help in this plight and published in the Bulletin
recipes meant to guide people on how to use lesser-known foods and how to simulate
common goods lacking in the market. For example, olive oil was absent due to
impediments facing Italian imports and German requisitions. Thus the April 16, 1916,
issue included an article explaining how to turn sunflower seeds into oil, while a
December 5, 1915, article offered ideas on how to use tomato oil in cooking instead, and
the October 14, 1915, issue explained how a combination of lard and water could replace
the missing olive oil.85 As meat quickly became scarce, the newspaper lauded the
benefits of vegetarianism, and recipes based more upon vegetables played a starring
role.86 The newspaper dedicated a great deal of space to trying to change the sensibilities
and tastes of the people of Lille. Several issues of the Bulletin tried to convince readers
that rice was not “only for people of the yellow race.”87 The Lilliois read that in
America, India, and Italy rice, rather than bread, formed the basis of people’s diet and
they should utilize it to their advantage in the face of occupied France’s bread shortage.88
The superiority of rice was also extolled in another issue that noted it had more albumin
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and starch than both bread and potatoes and hence was a superior food source.89 The
same issue ran an article entitled “Bread through the Ages,” which placed in context the
current bread shortage in French history by making comparisons dating back to the reign
of Charles VIII.90 Other issues introduced people to the tea flower, offered an extensive
look at the history of the fig, a two-part series on currant drinks, and a detailed discussion
about various cheeses that included a poem.91
When the Lilliois needed advice beyond what to make for dinner they could write
into the Bulletin and perhaps see their questions answered in the “Little
Correspondences” column of the paper. Appearing in approximately fifteen percent of
the issues published between March 25, 1915, and April 12, 1917, this featured article
provided legal and moral guidance to readers. Disputes between renters and landlords
filled many of the articles, as the paper suggested tempering the letter of the law with an
understanding that everybody was going through hardships during this time and
allowances had to be made for late payments.92 As in the case with rental disputes, the
feature often acted as a source for minor legal advice about issues the German occupiers
carried nothing about. A “disappointed mother” received the information that under
French civil code she could do nothing to stop her twenty-seven year old son from
marrying a woman of whom she did not approve.93 Usually the section avoided all
mention of German occupation and in the only three exceptions, the newspaper staff’s
response supported German laws. In the August 17, 1916, issue the counsel provided to
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one man told him that of course he could not fly a kite in public, and the article
sarcastically reminded him that German authorities forbid all visual signals, which
obviously included kites.94 The newspaper reminded another reader that she could not
beat her carpets outside, and told a third person that he could not write to his parents in
Cambrai or Saint-Quentin because that would violate the German rules against the
exchange of letters between communes.95 The column offered guidance on using social
services provided by the municipal government. The newspaper staff chastised an
anonymous reader for claiming multiple military benefits for different family members.96
Another article explained in detail how the French government regulated military
allocations and who had the right to claim them, noting the money was not a
reimbursable charity. The topic of who was eligible for what benefits was also addressed
when the paper informed a reader that welfare benefits were fundamentally local, and that
payments to families of evacuees for their absent relatives were not authorized.97
Another recurring feature was “Stories of Integrity,” although it was not as
frequent as the advice column. A typical anecdote appeared on April 20, 1916. In this
issue, the paper told of an unnamed man who found a five-franc note, and deposited it in
the bank until its owner claimed it.98 The implication of this column was obvious. In a
time and place where almost everyone was having financial difficulties, and rationing
fraud, and black marketeering was plaguing international relief efforts, people were
encouraged to follow examples of honesty. This may not have been an understated
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maneuver, but rarely could any newspaper under German control be accused of
subtleness.

Attempts at Propaganda in the Bulletin

Jürgen Wilke asserts in his study of propaganda use during the First World War
that a lack of understanding of psychological warfare hindered German propaganda
efforts.99 In the Bulletin de Lille, the German authorities for the most part kept their
propaganda strategy simple – overwhelm the people of Lille with their omnipresence and
scare them into submission. Yet, even in following this simple plan, the German
occupiers made a few missteps over the course of publication.
The cardinal rule of propaganda is never to answer enemy charges, as this only
reinforces the original assertion.100 Alice Marquis claims that the Germans violated this
rule throughout the war, and hence defensiveness verging on self-pity was to be the
dominant tone in Germany’s propaganda effort.101 This breach of propaganda theory can
be seen in several instances in the Bulletin de Lille. As we have seen, early on in the
occupation some workers refused to toil for the Germans, citing the Hague Convention.
While the Germans replied with a harsh sentence for their ringleader and punishment the
whole town, they also argued the merits of their side by referencing the Hague
Convention, going as far as citing specific articles. Not only was this action hypocritical
as German military authorities held these international laws in low regard, but it also
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gave a public platform to the original charges that they were violating the rules of war.102
An even worse blunder of this nature was an article in the December 13, 1914, issue of
the Bulletin, entitled “Protection of Art Work.” Reprinted from the December 3 issue of
the Gazette de Cologne, it refuted allegations that the Germans had seized an altar from a
Belgian church and it was now in Berlin. The article claimed German authorities
respected the Hague Convention in regard to its prohibitions against the removal of
artwork from museums or churches in occupied zones.103 This defensive tone mirrored
domestic German coverage. To excuse the destruction of the library at Louvain,
Kunstchronik, an internationally-read German art journal wrote, “Implicit confidence
may be placed in our Army Command, which will never forget its duty to civilization
even in the heat of battle. Yet, even these duties have limit. All possible sacrifices must
be made for the preservation of precious legacies of the past. But where the whole is at
stake, their protection cannot be guaranteed.”104 The world had a justified fear that
despite the preservationist dialogue, that the Germans were willing to destroy artwork
and monuments if they stood to gain strategically, or appropriate artworks and take them
back to Germany.105
On rare occasions, too much information lessened the intimidation factor of the
“Acts of German Authority.” In one of the earlier demands for people to present
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themselves for registration, German authorities explained that the aim was to gain a
general idea of the population size and composition of Lille.106 Since this was an isolated
incidence of German explanation, it appears to be a gaffe rather than an indication of
trying to build a relationship on anything but fear with the people in the occupied zone.
Such a slip also occurred in their use of the mayor’s office as a conduit. Making the
mayor beg for money in the pages of the Bulletin instilled an image of French weakness.
However, when the mayor was allowed to somewhat complain about German demands, it
emphasized their unjustness rather than French weakness. Such was the case in the
March 7, 1915 issue of the Bulletin, when the article entitled “Appeal for Funds” noted
that outside the considerable amounts paid to supply the troops, the German authorities
now demanded a contribution of a million more francs to support the civilian German
government in Lille.107 The mayor as the French representative sounded more
exasperated with than fearful of German rule.
The Bulletin de Lille failed at times as a tool of German propaganda because, as
stated earlier, it gave too much information. Such was the case in the March 30, 1916,
issue when an article entitled “The Health of Lille,” informed readers that for the week of
March 12-18 the city registered 145 deaths, while for the same week a year earlier there
were only 72.108 Certainly the people of Lille did not need the newspaper to know the
death rate was rising, and diseases directly or indirectly related to a lack of food (such as
tuberculosis, dysentery, and scurvy) were claiming more and more lives.109 Nevertheless,
it was a propaganda faux pas to allow the paper’s publishers to include a reference
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pointing out the obvious. The occupiers directly made the same mistake again when
under “Acts of German Authority” they included the results of their last population
census, which included a decrease of almost 8,000 people in one year.110 The many
occurrences of the Germans utilizing their tool of control effectively by simply following
their simple tactic of invoking feelings of fear overshadowed these German propaganda
missteps.
In 1979, Alfred Cornebise published a study of Nachrichtendienst, a Germanlanguage paper produced by the French in the Ruhr valley when they occupied it in
1923.111 The French were trying to control all aspects of the life of the civilian
population while the Germans were responding with passive resistance, strikes, and
sabotage. The French gave considerable attention to propaganda and control of
information, curtailing all other media in the area and using their newspaper as an organ
of French indoctrination and cultural propaganda.112 The study identified several themes
in the propaganda of the Nachrichtendienst, of which the most fundamental – forcing the
occupied people to recognize that resistance was futile- can also be seen in the Bulletin de
Lille.113 The Ruhr paper named the Germans arrested and elaborated upon their deeds.
The impression sought was that the occupation forces were inexorable.114 The same
strategy played out the “German Military Justice” section in almost every issue of the
Bulletin.
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A clever use of propaganda found in the Bulletin de Lille attempted to imply that
the Germans were not the sole cause of misery in occupied France. As Hew Strachan
notes in his survey of the First World War, many of the indignities suffered in the
occupied zone were little different from those suffered as the result of wartime necessities
in the rest of France, but inhabitants of the occupied zone did not know that.115 The
paper informed Lille’s readers that hardships were being felt elsewhere, in stories about
the high cost of provisions in Holland, and through analysis that stated that while
common goods might have been expensive, prices still were not as bad as those in Paris
in 1870.116 By placing the current misery associated with the occupation in both an
international and historical context, the German occupying authorities appeared to
attempt to ease their culpability in the suffering of the people without lessening their
appearance of domination. If, as Richard Cobb asserts, the Germans at times believed
Lille would eventually be included within the Reich or would become part of a satellite
state, this was a good way to start prepping the populace for a less-abrasive
relationship.117
A key focus of wartime propaganda was to drive a wedge between the allied
nations. The Bulletin de Lille did make sly attempts to dampen the anglophile tendencies
other historians have found as prevalent in northern France.118 The Germans employed
British aerial bombings to attempt an “us against them” attitude in the Bulletin. The
“Acts of German Authority” in the January 20, 1916, took on a much friendlier tone than
usual. An open letter to the people of Lille stated that a recent English aerial bombing,
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done without aiming at targets of military importance, had caused considerable damage.
Hence, German authorities counseled the civilian population to seek shelter from
bombing raids in caves and to avoid fire by removing flammable materials from areas
affected by incendiary debris.119 The April 23, 1916, “Acts of German Authority”
attempted to lay blame for forced work deportations on the British, blaming their
blockade for the lack of required supplies getting through, which forced the German
authorities to deport workers in an attempt to alleviate the misery.120 Attempts at
demonizing the British were present to an even greater degree in other newspapers
received in the occupied zone, most notably the Gazette des Ardennes.
Studies of the press demonstrate that newspapers have had more effect reinforcing
existing opinions rather than changing them, and that while minor changes in attitude
have occasionally followed from reading papers, conversions are rare.121 Considering the
hatred the German occupying forces were understandably facing in Lille, the Bulletin de
Lille was not aiming for small conversions, nor did it have any chance of winning over
people to the occupier’s viewpoint. However, as an apparatus of control, the Bulletin
could, over time, hope to create a feeling of helplessness and fear amongst the people of
Lille, as in issue after issue it related Germans’ omnipresence and complete hegemony
over their lives, to convey the futility of resisting their control of the occupied zone. The
paper represented as a relatively easy device to give orders to the population and hence
facilitated the occupying forces’ ability to place demands on the whole city at once,
whether they were to report for deportation or to step off the sidewalk and tip one’s hat in
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deference to officers (a requirement known as Grusserlass). Beyond that, the Bulletin de
Lille was a significant tool that emphasized the absolute control the Germans had, making
it a powerful means of undermining French morale.
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Chapter Five:
The Bulletin de Roubaix

The German authorities deemed Roubaix in need of its own bi-weekly paper
despite the city’s proximity to Lille. Situated fifteen kilometers northeast of Lille and
close to the Belgian border, we have seen that Roubaix became an urban center during
the nineteenth century, with the suburbs of Wattrelos, Lys, Croix, Wasquehal, and
Mouvaux surrounding it. The city experienced great prosperity and growth during the
industrial revolution, led by its success in the wool industry. Its population of largely
working class people reached approximately 120,000 by the eve of the First World War.1
It would have been simple for the German occupiers to include Roubaix-relevant news in
the Bulletin de Lille and publish only one paper for the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing tri-city
area. Indeed, for the first few years of the occupation the Bulletin de Lille was the only
authorized locally published newspaper. However, German occupation plans included the
municipalization of the French conquered area, and hence treated each town as a
sovereign space, subject only to German control and demands.2 Hence, the Bulletin de
Roubaix published its first issue on Wednesday, December 20, 1916. It published without
interruption for almost two years, with the last issue under German control appearing on
Wednesday, October 16, 1918.
The Bulletin de Roubaix usually consisted of one double-sided sheet. Sixteen
times during its two-year run, the paper’s editors expanded it to two double-sided
pages. Published on Wednesdays and Saturdays, it sold for 0.05 francs an issue, or
1.25 francs for a three-month subscription or 2.35 francs for a six-month subscription
1
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until May 1, 1918, when the price doubled, with the editors blaming the cost of paper
for the increase.
By the start of the war, most newspapers were commercial commodities, and
their worth stemmed not only on their capacity to report news accurately, but also to
attract advertising due to the size and makeup of their readership. This was not true
for the Bulletin de Roubaix or the Bulletin de Lille. The occupying German
authorities demanded the creation of these newspapers to control the information the
occupied people received; turning a profit was not the businesses’ raison d’être.
Researching this dissertation revealed no evidence pertaining to how successful this
newspaper was at covering its own costs, or whether the German occupiers ever
invested money into the endeavor. The newspaper staff was French, with Antoine
Neumans being the editor-printer of record, but the German occupiers conceived the
paper and the staff knew German censors would review their work. It is almost
certainly received requisitioned printing presses and paper to begin its publication.
The newspaper’s offices moved twice during this time period, first in April
1917 to give the publishers more space, and again in February 1918 when
management of the paper changed after its original manager, Madame Reboux, was
discovered aiding the clandestine press.3 After altering its typeface in the January 3,
1917, issue, the look of the paper remained the same, although the paper shortage did
cause printers to use yellow or pink colored paper on rare occasions.4 The paper
shortage greatly affected the paper; on five separate occasions early in its publication,
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a message from the editor appeared, noting that there existed more news to report but
that space did not allow it.5 The Bulletin de Roubaix was sold both at newsstands and
was available for home delivery in Roubaix, Lille, and Tourcoing, although the paper
had to remind its readers that it could not guarantee a delivery time beyond that it
would be received the day of publication.6 The newspaper even had an auxiliary
office in Lille with a staff to accept advertisements and notices. This connection
became more tenuous after October 25, 1917, when German authorities forbade
traveling between Lille and Roubaix-Tourcoing without their special permission.7
The Bulletin de Roubaix’s circulation exceeded the 12,000 copies per issue
mark by the first anniversary of the paper.8 It was still available in all three cities,
although the newspaper devoted less and less space to advertisements and news
originating in Lille until they all but disappeared. The publishers claimed that they
were proud of their paper, “which had rapidly gained credence in public opinion,
thanks to providing interesting and varied information that was useful in real life.”9
The administrators of the paper had the limited aim of informing the populace of
German orders, city services, food committee aid, and some news that would be of
daily interest.10 Unlike the Bulletin de Lille, which had a menacing tone, the Bulletin
de Roubaix appears to have truly been a vehicle the German authorities utilized to
disseminate information, without the added aim of continuously instilling terror and
hopelessness in the occupied people. The newspaper included recurring sections,
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much like today’s papers. “Acts of German Authority,” appeared in 131 out of the
191 issues published, and, when present, this article was always in the lead position.
The “Notices from City Halls” section was in every issue but one.11 Theatre reviews
and a sports section appeared frequently. The newspaper commonly reported upon
civil court proceedings, which fell under various headings. Other sections included an
advice column and a review of “Act of Decency,”12 which applauded a local person
who returned lost items of value to their owners without demanding compensation.
Some stories and news pieces stood alone and did not fall into any of these categories.
Advertisements, along with birth and death announcements dominated the backside
of the paper. To best examine the news available to people in the occupied zone
through the Bulletin de Roubaix, this chapter will examine these regular sections.

“Acts of German Authority” to Frivolity:
From Orders to Attempts at Distraction
The “Acts of German Authority” column appeared in sixty-nine percent of
the Bulletin de Roubaix issues as compared to approximately eighty-five percent of
the Bulletin de Lille issues. In both papers, prohibitory decrees and German orders,
including requisition demands and census roll calls primarily made up most of this
section. The notices announcing required census roll calls were frequent, requiring
either the whole population to present themselves, or more frequently, men born
between 1867-1900. On some occasions, the Germans required men over the age of
sixteen not only to present themselves, but also to present evidence of their
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profession, suggesting those not currently employed would be forced to work for the
Germans.13 Another census notice required the population to state where they lived
and note any empty houses around them, warning of up to a three-year prison term if
they did not comply.14 The line between census taking and requisition preparation
blurred when requests included listing every animal owned by the people of
Roubaix.15 Both newspapers at times printed such commands and notices after their
start dates, albeit less frequently in the Bulletin de Roubaix. This happened eight
times in the Roubaix paper, including on September 19, 1917, when an earlier curfew
hour could have made the prior edition.16 As the Germans placed notices throughout
the city, it is uncertain if these publication dates affected that many people, and
whether the late notification was a conscious decision or an error made by a
newspaper staff working under the strain of occupation.
The tone of the demands sometimes differed in the two newspapers, with
“Acts of German Authority” in the Bulletin de Roubaix tending to sound less
terrorizing. At times, the difference between the two papers reflected a difference in
the circumstances of the cities. Thanks to the German-imposed isolation of the cities,
Roubaix did not suffer the typhoid outbreak that afflicted Lille; hence, strict
sanitation decrees were not as necessary in Roubaix. For the most part, however,
both cities endured equal torments of forced labor, food shortages, requisitioning, and
the fear of fines or imprisonment for even minor infractions. The difference in the
papers was not a reflection of the difference of life in the cities, but a variation in the
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communication of information. J.P. Whitaker experienced German control of
Roubaix until he escaped in January 1916. He wrote of the harshness of German rule
in Roubaix, noting that before March 1915, the German governors treated the people
of Roubaix with tolerable leniency, but at this time began “to initiate a regime of
stringent regulation and repression,” perhaps as a response to the British attack on
Neuve Chapelle.17
That is not to contend that “Acts of German Authority” in the Bulletin de
Roubaix read as polite pleas to follow the rules. Most articles sinisterly
prognosticated the fines and punishments the Germans would bestow upon those who
did not follow their often-arbitrary rules. The German writers of the “Acts of German
Authority” ruthlessly told readers the German occupiers would shoot them without
any hesitation if they attempted to communicate with prisoners of war being herded
through their towns and cities.18 Despite the regular reports of people sentenced for
crimes - including those punished by execution - there were no reports in the Bulletin
de Roubaix of the Germans shooting any French citizens for talking with prisoners of
war taken through the city. One prisoner of war reported that as German soldiers
(specifically Uhlans, German cavalry) moved him through the city, they “employed
their lances for beating off Belgian or French women who tried to give [them]
food.”19
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Despite the frequent harsh tone, a benevolent quality often crept into the
section when compared to its Bulletin de Lille counterpart. For example, a request for
workers early in the paper’s publication lauded the rewards of the jobs, rather than
threatening reprisals if French men and women did not come forward to fill the
positions. Potential employees read that employment as masons, locksmiths, and
carpenters paid well and that they could continue to live at home while working.20
Those evacuating to unoccupied France learned what they were allowed to take with
them, rather than having to read what they were forbidden to carry.21 Rather than
telling people all outdoor lights were forbidden and that indoor lights had to have
been invisible in the street, as the Bulletin de Lille did early in 1917, the Bulletin de
Roubaix explained to its readers that the combined danger of airplane attacks and the
need to save energy meant they should restrict lighting as much as possible.22 Another
warning asked readers in Roubaix to immediately report to the closest authorities if
they found any unexploded shells, and not to touch them because the danger of death
– giving the dictate the echo of a paternal warning.23 The fatherly advice quality of
“Acts of German Authority” appeared again when readers learned of a deadly
accident caused by picking up a hand grenade and the German occupiers used the
story as a warning to inform the authorities of any live ammunition.24 The Bulletin de
Roubaix also lacked the menacing sub-column “German Military Justice,” that
commonly dominated the Lille newspaper. The newspaper occasionally included
sentences handed down by the German authorities, but in only one issue did criminal
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sentences dominant the paper. In this one issue, the reporting of sentences by German
authorities seemed clearly to have been meant to instill fear in the population. On
September 1, 1917, the entire front side of the paper and a portion of the flipside
consisted of a sub-section of “Acts of German Authority,” entitled “Sentenced.” In
total, the article listed sixty-three people and their punishments. The least severe
punishments included were a seven-week sentence for the unauthorized selling of a
horse and a three-month sentence for theft. The most spectacular cases, and perhaps
the instigations of this ominous article, included the Abbé Jules Pinte’s receipt of a
ten and half year sentence for possessing a telegraph, and Joseph Willot and Firmin
Dubar receiving ten year sentences (in Dubar’s case ten years and one month) for the
hostile act of editing and publishing an uncensored paper.25 The newspaper also
reported upon executions of people outside of Roubaix in this section four times,
information that clearly meant to serve as a warning.26 Such heavy-handedness was
the exception in the Bulletin de Roubaix but the norm in the Bulletin de Lille. The
newspaper did not refer to the deportations of French men and women, which one
witness described as nothing more than brutal and undisguised slave raids.27
In Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, German-set curfews were ever changing
and the occupied received harsh punishments if they disobeyed these curfews. This
regulation on daily life carried the extra insult as the Germans ordered “German
central time,” to be used, a fact that caused extensive bitterness.28 The phrase,
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“German central time” confronted readers of the Bulletin de Lille with every time
reference in “Acts of German Authority.” In the Roubaix newspaper, writers did not
utilize this offensive term; hours within “Acts of German Authority,” specified
“central European time,” and often the paper carried a reminder outside the “Acts of
German Authority” section that all times indicated were “public time.”29 It is
surprising that writers used the phrase “public time,” for it suggested that in the
privacy of people’s homes, “French” time was still used, which would have been an
act of defiance against the Germans. In one issue, under “Notices from City Hall,”
the French civil servants forced to work under the Germans, utilized the wording
“army time”30 Different wording for the same regulations did not change their
meaning, but it slightly lessened the propaganda message that the Germans were so
entrenched in the occupied zone that one could never hope they would be gone.
German administrative policies in northern France developed haphazardly,
often through trial and error, with an orderly system with clear traits only developing
almost two years into the war.31 Commandants of cities and towns had leeway in
how they governed their realms. Hence some of the difference in styles of “Acts of
German Authority” could be attributed to the different approaches of General von
Heinrich in Lille and Commandant Hofmann in Roubaix. Moreover, von Heinrich
signed the vast majority of “Acts of German Authority” in Lille, which is not
surprising since he included orders and demands given to the civilian administration
during his frequent Commandant’s conferences. Both von Heinrich and Hofmann
ruled their areas punctiliously, but Hofmann did not report with the same frequency
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smaller affairs, such as bar and café closings.32 While Hofmann was responsible for
more declarations in the Bulletin de Roubaix than any other person, several other
voices also emerged. Von Tessin, the Commandant of Tourcoing, did publish
decrees, but usually limited himself to reiterating Hofmann’s message. However,
over ten other German leaders also placed notices in the Roubaix newspaper,
including not only various inspectors working under Hofmann, but military leaders
who saw Roubaix and its surrounding areas as part of their battlefield.33 German
military leaders also viewed Lille as part of their battlefield, but the authoritative von
Heinrich controlled almost all contact with the civilian occupied population,
including issuing orders in the Bulletin de Lille.

Notices from City Halls
The column was entitled “Notices from City Halls,” (with “city hall”
pluralized) but the majority of the information came from the Roubaix administration,
with less frequent notices from nearby Mouvaux, Toufflers, Hem, Croix, Wattrelos,
and Tourcoing. As in the Bulletin de Lille, this section habitually reiterated German
demands. An often-utilized format was to announce under this heading that city hall
received a notice from the German authorities making the mayor responsible for
ensuring public obedience to German regulations, such as those requiring posting lists
of inhabitants on the front doors of homes, declaring all dogs, or not changing one’s
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residence without permission.34 This created an impression of collaboration at times
when the mayor co-signed notices with the commandant, such as one in January
1918, on the distribution of hay for horses.35 Akin to public reaction to similar
attempts by the Germany to create an impression of collaboration, the respect the
occupied people kept for their local leaders suggests they knew it was involuntary
collaboration.
Along with the birth, death, and marriage notices usually found on the back
page of the paper, it was the news that appeared under this heading that mostly likely
drew readers to the Bulletin de Roubaix. Without prisoner of war lists like those in
the Gazette des Ardennes to entice an audience, it was news about all the important
roles the civilian government took on during the occupation that made the Roubaix
paper indispensable to people’s lives. Readers could regularly expect to find
information about state allocation hand-out dates, changes in ration provisions, the
availability of supplies such as coal and chip wood to the population, special
distributions of goods such as vegetables, the maximum prices the Germans allowed
merchants to charge, and pharmacists available during non-business hours. Also
included was news from the locally operated Comité d’Alimentation de Roubaix
(although news from the larger Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France was
given under its own heading).36 It is interesting to note that the only written piece in
the Bulletin de Roubaix emanating from outside occupied France and not from
another German-controlled paper was a letter about attempts to supply the area from
the Comité de Ravitaillement des Villes Envahies du Nord de la France, which
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operated out of Paris. The information in the newspaper made clear how vital the
food supplied by the committee was to the people of Roubaix.
As so many goods were extremely scarce during the second half of the war,
officials often held lotteries for resources or goods. Reading the Bulletin de Roubaix
was a good way to find out about such drawings and if one’s number had been lucky,
whether it was for a section of public garden space or shoes.37 The food problem was
as severe in Roubaix as Lille. When the German closed the Belgian-French frontier,
the effect was to reduce to an “insignificant trickle” the profuse stream of foodstuffs
that Roubaix imported from Belgium.38 The city became reliant upon food and
supplies brought in by the American Relief Commission. It opened a food depot, run
in cities such as Roubaix by local committees. These committees issued vouchers for
basic items, and people lined up at the depot to hopefully attain their allotted rations
of items such as rice, lard, coffee, bread, and occasionally condensed milk, and small
amounts of sugar.39 The newspaper informed readers of when the Commission had
various items available, but did not hint at the corruption that plagued the system at a
local level.
A seven-part series running from January through March 1918 about how to
detect fake vouchers also began under the “Notices from City Halls” banner.40 A hint
given in the February 6, 1918, issue advised readers to accept no vouchers bearing the
name of the commune of “Lersvin,” since no commune named Lersvin existed. The
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newspaper also shared other critical facts, such as when water became unpotable and
people had to boil it to ensure they would not become sick, under “Notices from City
Halls.”41 It would not be melodramatic to state the news under this heading was vital
to the existence of many people.

Theatre, Sports, and Other Distractions
The Roubaisian poet Amédée Provost rather harshly described his city as a
town “without an artistic past, without beauty, and without history.”42 The people of
Roubaix proved Provost wrong at least on the first part by working diligently to
continue the cultural life of the city to the extent possible. During its first year of
publication, the Bulletin de Roubaix featured regular news under the headings
“Theatre Chronicle,” and “Sports Chronicle.” These sections added a flavor of
normalcy to the otherwise survival-based focus of the paper. Starting in the fifth
issue of the paper readers could expect under the section-title “Roubaix Matinées,”
theatre reviews, performance schedules, and notices for up-coming performances.
The newspaper reported upon concerts to benefit the poor, including how much
money they raised. A newspaper writer deemed an early event a success, both
because of the quality of music played and because it raised over 778 francs for the
poor.43 While a few events raised money for the committee for the aid of prisoners,
most of the productions aided the poor, sick, children, and seniors. This was a
continuation of pre-war charity work. A dedicated religious and patriarchal
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bourgeoisie organized to protect working class families with a fervor that set Roubaix
apart from other industrial cities.44
The paper’s staff published reviews of performances in Lille by various
charitable organizations until the German occupiers forbade travel between the two
cities without an expensive and hard-to-obtain pass, but coverage of Roubaix events
continued. At times coverage was quite extensive, one time even taking up
approximately a quarter of the paper.45 Between late October 1917 and early March
1918, only one edition carried any theatre news.46 Then on March 9, and March 13,
1918, the newspaper included a long, two-part article on the history of theatre in
Roubaix. Jacques du Hutin chronicled the history of theatre in Roubaix back seventyfive years, specifically noting the city’s rich history in amateur theatre. He wrote that
theatre was important to the working class, who toiled thirteen or fourteen hours a
day and that during the 1860s even the mayor supported the amateur troop.47 This
was the last time “Theatre Chronicle” appeared in the paper.48 The article seemed
almost an homage to the theatre work described in the newspaper, which combined
artistic lessons and performances, with the proceeds going to charity. It disappeared
with no explanation as to whether the newspaper staff simply chose to devote the
paper’s limited space to other information, or if theatre events stopped occurring in
Roubaix.
Sports coverage followed a similar path to that of theatre coverage, although
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editors did not formally head this material “Sports Chronicle” until the thirty-eighth
issue. Reporting of the results of football matches (i.e. American soccer) began in the
sixth issue of the paper. Until the ban on travel, coverage included multiple cities’
teams, including ones from Roubaix, such as the Racing Club de Roubaix, Lille’s the
Étoile Club Lillois and teams from Tourcoing, including the Association Sportive
Tourquenoise and l’Union Sportive Tourquenoise. 49 Like theatre performances, there
could be a charitable objective to these events; at least one tournament benefited
charity during the occupation.50 At least two of the teams, the Racing Club de
Roubaix and the Union Sportive Tourquennoise were semi-professional teams before
the war, playing other national teams in the Union de Sociétés Français de Sports
Athlétiques. Established in 1895, the Racing Club de Roubaix was USFSA champion
in 1902, 1903, 1904, 1906, and 1908. According to the International Federation of
Football History and Statistics, these teams had ties with teams in Britain and
Belgium, as players moved from area to area.51 The website also notes that several
players from these teams fought and lost their lives in the war. It appears that the
players that remained played local exhibition charity games. It is possible that the
Etoile Club Lillois was comprised of players from the two Lille-based USFSA teams,
the Olympique Lillois and the Iris Club Lillois. It is unclear how there were enough
men to play on these teams after so many men mobilized for war before the
occupation, perhaps the team relied on older and younger men.52
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All sports news, like that of theatre, could be erratic, and it disappeared for
forty-three installments, beginning with the May 2, 1917, issue. Sports coverage only
appeared three more times during the life of the Bulletin de Roubaix, with its last
appearance being coverage of a Roubaix-Tourcoing match, on June 8, 1918.53 Such
as the case with the theatre productions, it is unclear whether any games took place
after this date and the newspaper simply did not cover them.
This was not the end of all sports -and entertainment- related news pieces.
Starting four issues after the erratic sports coverage ended, the paper began running a
column entitled “Recreational time-passers.”54 This seven-part series discussed
various moves in the board game of checkers, with illustrated photos to demonstrate
them.55 Incorporating such mundane items as pretend checker matches in a paper
whose editors frequently lamented the lack of space they had to publish news was a
trend that developed during the second half of the paper’s run. Newspaper editors
frequently relied upon “filler” items, written to plug news holes.56 One could imagine
that under German occupation, when censors so freely rejected sentences and stories,
inoffensive filler items would have been even more useful.57 The newspaper included
a great number of non-news pieces; often of such a length and in such great frequency
that these items’ role was to do more than fill minor gaps. From the very beginning,
the Bulletin de Roubaix published what today’s media consumers would dismiss as
“fluff” pieces, which did not carry any intrinsic news value. The second issue of the
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paper included a poem about Christmas dedicated to mothers and their little
children.58 Three issues carried the lyrics to a ballad about a woman obtaining
supplies.59
One interesting trend in the publication of non-news in the newspaper was to
highlight a certain small nearby town, neighborhood, street, or natural landmark and
provide a brief history explaining how it got its name. This occurred seven times,
with subjects including Barbieux Park, Tilleul and Cartigny Streets.60 Jacques du
Hutin’s name appeared on the by-line of three of these articles, while the others
carried no indication of authorship. In Lille, the Germans went so far as to change the
names of the streets and squares to reflect their authority, but chose not to in
Roubaix.61 Allowing these articles suggests that the Germans were not trying to use
the Bulletin de Roubaix as a propaganda weapon, but at the same time, they did not
haphazardly choose what sites to highlight. In the April 17, 1918, issue of the
Bulletin de Roubaix, an article appeared by Jacque du Hutin occupying the entire
second column of the first page. Entitled “The Cradle of Roubaix,” the article traced
the history of the Trichon, a large creek running through Roubaix and Tourcoing.62
Most of the article focused upon the early history of the creek, tracing it back to
ancient Rome. The article noted that scholars believed four different groups of
people lived near or utilized the Trichon, including Germanic tribes.63 This article not
only tied the area to a time before the countries of France and German existed, it
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implied that the French were not the only ones with historical ties to the area.
Somewhat of a “fluff” piece, the historical information included was so general that it
was not incorrect but also not meaningful. Another article, author unknown, stated a
reader wrote in curious about the etymology of the name “Roubaix.”64 Again, in this
briefer article, this time situated on the second page of the newspaper (an issue
produced on pink paper), the history lesson dates back hundreds of years, to the
eleventh through the thirteenth centuries. People spelled the name of the city over
fifteen different ways during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with Roubaix and
Rosbacum being the most frequently utilized. By the thirteenth century the number of
forms of the name was down to nine, with Roubaix eventually emerging as the
accepted name.65
In non-occupied zones during the war, filler stories in newspapers usually
were comprised of patriotic “fluff.” Here it seems the editors chose filler pieces
because they were non-controversial distractions. By June 1918, it appears part of the
newspaper’s mandate had become to distract the population from both their own
miserable existence and the obvious signs of growing German weakness. Five issues
during this time carried benign scientific articles on subjects including an overview of
the human heart and the potential for making artificial rain.66 One edition provided no
current information beyond “Notices from City Hall,” with the remainder of the paper
filled with articles on how to read a barometer and bird wakeup times.67
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One run of apparently frivolous articles was a nine-part series on the
characteristics of various shepherd dogs.68 It is worthwhile to examine this long series
on shepherd dogs, as at first glance it appeared a rather innocuous topic. Most people
have some warm sentiments towards dogs, and even those who do not, hardly
consider them a controversial topic. However, in occupied Roubaix, the subject of
dogs was contentious. Ruth Wright Kauffmann interviewed a Madame Reboux (it is
unclear whether this was the same Madame Reboux that worked for Le Bulletin de
Roubaix) after she escaped after living in occupied Roubaix for twenty-six months.
Madame Reboux told of the repercussions of the German occupiers placing a fortyfranc tax on each domestic dog, “…In our part of France everyone loved his dog…the
injustice – the impossibility; forty francs in a starving town… so we all consulted
together and acted. The next morning, the Germans saw floating, drowned in the
canal, the bodies of every dog in our part of Roubaix. And wrapped over the body of
each dog was a French flag.”69 Under “Acts of German Authority,” the Bulletin de
Roubaix warned readers that the Germans forbade killing one’s pet dog if they were
unable to pay the tax.70 Furthermore, the series focused upon the group of dogs most
associated with specific countries. In medieval Europe, regions developed local
herding dogs to fulfill their own unique needs. With the rise of nationalism in the
nineteenth century, it became important to some to have a respectable sheep dog
representing one’s own nation. Noting the popularity of Scottish collies at the end of
the nineteenth century, German dog aficionados aimed to develop their own shepherd
68
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dog by combining various local types. Two men, Max von Strephanitz and Artur
Meyer bred the modern-day German shepherd in 1899.71 This series discussed the
German shepherd alongside those types that inspired their breeding, including the
English collie and Belgian sheepdog. While dogs had a long history in northern
France, working both alongside families and enjoying their leisure time, no one breed
of dog was especially associated with the area.72 Moreover, this series appeared in
June and July 1918, and in August, the war decisively turned against Germany.73 It is
uncertain whether this series was simply meant to distract the population, or came
from a German directive to rub salt in a citywide wound.
Like the Bulletin de Lille, the Roubaix newspaper carried another non-news
section, an advice column. Starting late in the summer of 1917, people wrote in with
questions to which the editors provided answers. The newspaper’s editorial staff
warned people that they must provide their name and address if they wanted their
letter to be printed. Like respondents to a similar column in Lille, many people
seemed concerned with laws regarding leases during wartime, and there was at least
one article involving bigamy.74 During peace time bigamy was a rare crime in France,
because it was an extremely difficult offense to commit without authorities
discovering the crime.75 However, in periods of catastrophe, such as war, normal
modes of communication break down, allowing potential bigamists to go unnoticed.
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Combined with the weakening matrimonial ties and the governments’ focus upon
other matters, war has historically been a time of increased bigamy.
Cooking with limited supplies was also a recurring theme in “Minor
Information Requested,” including advice on how to salvage potatoes that froze
accidentally.76 Apparently, there also existed a heavy demand for abstruse, general
information on topics such as the history of Titus and Romulus, how to train a parrot,
and a description of a troubadour.77 Such trivialities may have been fabricated by
editors to distract readers; certainly they must have irked some, as by June 1918 few
people in Roubaix barely had enough to eat, let alone the means to be concerned with
training an exotic pet. Along with the advice column, this information was similar to
the women’s sections of many newspapers before the war. Such sections contained
relationship advice, recipes, and fashion trends.78
“Acts of Decency” started appearing in the Bulletin de Roubaix in its tenth
issue. Sometimes it appeared under “Acts of City Halls,” and sometimes under its
own banner, but the type of stories featured remained constant. The moral was
manifest: hardship is not an excuse for dishonesty, even if that dishonesty is that
passive type of not returning found objects. Almost every example reads like that of
a young woman from Tourcoing who returned 700 francs she found after mass in
church despite the fact that her husband was extremely ill and that they were
completely without resources.79 The amounts might have varied, and sometimes the
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lost items were ration cards, vouchers, or jewels, but the basic tale was the same. One
has to question the intelligence of one article that gave the name and address of a
woman who lost her wallet with the substantial sum of 600 francs in it, and had it
returned to her, potentially pointing out to the desperate or unscrupulous a potential
robbery victim. During a time of great need, “Acts of Decency” may have been an
advertisement for the dishonest but common behavior of robbery. While this may
have been a risk posed by the regular column, the public lauding of honest people
seemed intended to encourage integrity during a time when morality became a
malleable concept. If one’s conscience was not enough to ensure honesty, perhaps the
possibility of brief celebrity might encourage decency, as the names and addresses of
the good samaritans graced the newspaper’s pages. Juxtaposed against these stories,
crime was a crucial concentration of the paper, as its regular feature, the “Judicial
Chronicle,” demonstrated.

Civilian Court Coverage
The first “Judicial Chronicle” appeared in the twentieth issue of the Bulletin
de Roubaix and from that point on it was a common segment of the paper. It
contained highlights from the Correctional Tribunal of Lille. Before the war broke
out, the French judicial system consisted of a comprehensive court system at various
levels, embodying the goal of the revolutionaries of 1789 of easy accessibility to
justice for most French citizens.80 In the national criminal court system, (as opposed
to the civil court system, or specialized courts, including labor, commercial and social
security courts) there were several hundred police courts (tribunaux de police) that
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heard cases that in Anglo-American procedure would be classified misdemeanors and
over a hundred higher courts (tribunaux correctionnnels) that heard felonies that
merited a prison sentence of less than a decade.81 The Correctional Tribunal of Lille
was one of the latter courts, and heard important criminal cases for the area, including
Roubaix and Tourcoing. Timothy Pooley notes, in time of prosperity it mattered little
to the cities of Roubaix and Tourcoing that the Préfecture, Palais de Justice, the
Cathedral, and University were all in Lille, with the other two cities relying
exclusively economic vocations.82 Occupation made having these regional institutions
in Lille problematic for the people of Tourcoing and Roubaix.
At first, the reports of the Correctional Tribunal’s activities in the Bulletin de
Roubaix were somewhat current. For example, the March 14, 1917, issue carried
cases heard on March 3, 1917. However, the newspaper soon fell behind, and by the
end of November 1917, the newspaper was only reporting on cases from July 1917.83
Eventually the paper skipped four months worth of incident reports to become more
up to date.84 It appears that the editors of the Bulletin de Roubaix especially selected
cases concerning people from the area. Thus, the newspaper published the
condemnations of residents of Roubaix and Tourcoing in the March and April 1917
issues.85
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Most of the published cases centered upon people charged with cheating their
fellow citizens when selling wares, people defrauding the aid systems, child, and
spousal abuse, and stealing. For example one woman in Roubaix stood accused of
selling fake cleaning products, another with selling adulterated milk, and a third
woman in Lille received a fifty franc fine for adding flour to extend the mustard she
sold.86 The penalty for taking undeserved military allocations was much greater, as
one person earned a three-month prison sentence for their deception.87 The newspaper
paid special attention to cases dealing with the mistreatment of children, such as the
one of the Tourcoing woman sentenced to six months in jail for abusing her
children.88 An eyewitness wrote at the time that, despite the temptations of crime,
which were great for the mostly idle and needy population of Roubaix, there were
very few civilian offenses against either French or German law committed by the
inhabitants of Roubaix.89 Witaker suggested the “bridled savagery of the German
gendarmeries” provided the people of Roubaix the inducement to keep within the
law,90 perhaps even extending to French matters.
It is clear that people read the “Judicial Chronicle,” and looked down their
collective noses at the persons making the lives of their fellow citizens of the
occupied zone harder through dishonest acts. On four separate occasions blurbs
under the heading “Namesakes” appeared, stating that a person mentioned in
connection to a court case was not a relative of a local family. For example, Edmond
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van Lede, a painter and tapestry maker, wanted everyone to know that he was no
relation to the van Lede condemned by the correctional tribunal of Lille.91 In another
example a woman whose name only sound liked that of a convicted man wanted to
put an end to the confusion that she was a relation of someone who had stolen
harvested food.92 These responses to the crime reporting section of the paper suggest
that readers believed this part of the Bulletin de Roubaix was a credible source of
information. The activities of the Correctional Tribunal of Lille were a rare example
of Frenchmen exerting control over their own community. It made fiscal sense for
the German occupiers to require the French court system to continue to oversee
relatively minor infractions. However, it is surprising that German censors allowed
the editors of the Bulletin de Roubaix to publish the Correctional Tribunal’s
decisions, as this practice undermined the image the Germans wanted to create of
themselves being the sole source of authority in the occupied zone.
Very late into the newspaper’s publication, it began to carry additional crime
reports under the titles “Local Chronicle,” and “Roubaix Justice of the Peace.” The
“Local Chronicle,” which appeared in all but four editions between July and October
1918, told of crimes committed, as opposed to stories of people arrested and
sentenced. In one article, the writer told of vegetables stolen from someone’s
backyard garden.93 It is surprising that the German controllers allowed this section in
the paper, as it revealed that people were committing crimes, including violations of
the German-imposed curfew, and those crimes were going unsolved. These few
articles undermined the appearance of the omnipotent German authority that the rest
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of the paper attempted to convey.
The “Roubaix Justice of the Peace,” was not a successful endeavor for the
newspaper. Appearing only twice in its pages, the first article told of a disagreement
between two neighbors and the damages that the court declared one side deserved.94
The second installment had to provide a clarification for the first after one of the
neighbors filed a complaint with the newspaper about the misrepresentation of the
events. The role of the justice of the peace was to arbitrate disagreements before they
escalated and became the purview of a civil or special court. These two late additions
to the newspaper did not replace coverage from the Lille Tribunal but ran alongside
it, making the Bulletin de Roubaix very heavy with news of crime and retribution, but
giving the impression that the Germans did not control every aspect of communal life.

Conclusion
The Bulletin de Roubaix did not provide a great deal of information and news
about the current state of political and military affairs in Roubaix or in the larger
world outside the occupied zone of France. If a hypothetical Roubaisian remained
truly sheltered within their home, with only the Bulletin de Roubaix as a source of
information, that person would not even have known the Germans were showing
signs of losing the war prior to the very last edition of the paper, printed November
16, 1918, a month after the last German-controlled issue was published. The tone of
complete German domination remained until the last German-published issue, in
which the editors had to acknowledge that Allied troops had bombed Lille, Roubaix,
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and Tourcoing.95 However, the people of Roubaix knew that the end was fast
approaching for their German occupiers. As Philip Gibbs reported for the New York
Times in October 1918, the Germans could not hide from the civilians that their
system of control was breaking up as “their horses became so thin and starved that
even in the streets of Lille they used to drop dead …[the German soldiers] became
pinched and pallid.96 Reporting in the Bulletin de Roubaix did not reflect the
Germans’ weakening position. Readers knew the paper did not reflect the truth of
what was happening in their city.
Very little news from outside the occupied zone permeated the Bulletin de
Roubaix’s pages. While this newspaper attempted to fill the void left by local, rather
than national newspapers, the lack of reference to international events is noteworthy.
Other than news of executions in German-occupied Belgium, the number of articles
providing news of the war numbered less that five. Readers, for example, learned of
the German and Austrian victory against the Italians on the Isunzo that was part of the
Italian collapse in the Battle of Caporetto during the fall of 1917 and of the peace
talks in Brest-Litovsk that would lead to the Russians exiting the war.97 The
information and tone in these examples correspond with the coverage the events
received in La Gazette des Ardennes. The newspaper vaunted the Russian exit from
the war with such jubilation as to sound like victory for the Germans was certain,
while not mentioning the American entrance into the war. The article described the
Austro-German success in crossing the Isonzo River and taking the town of
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Caporetto, but did not include their use of gas shells to achieve it.98 The article did not
have to exaggerate the Italian divisions’ breakdown. Other than these two articles
clearly aimed at illustrating German dominance in the war, the newspaper included
no stories about battles or diplomatic activities. Early in the publishing of the paper,
one article estimated and discussed the free French harvest and another discussed the
treatment of French prisoners of war held in Germany.99 Both these stories were
reprints of articles from German-controlled papers in other occupied zones, although
the French harvest article was originally from the Journal Officiel de Paris.100 A few
obituaries of important French figures in unoccupied France, such as the musician
Claude Debussy, also made rare appearances in the Bulletin de Roubaix.101 However,
this dissertation’s contention that more news filtered into occupied France than
formerly supposed, does not rest on what information was available through this
particular paper – other sources support this assertion.
The Bulletin de Roubaix played a limited but important role in informing its
isolated readers. It notified them of the German authorities’ ever-changing rules and
regulations and what help was available to them in the form of rations and
allocations. It did not consistently attempt to terrorize and demoralize the populace as
the Bulletin de Lille did, but rather at times tried to distract people with
inconsequential articles on things such as the habits of swallows.102 For a long while
the paper did serve as a tenuous connection between Lille and Roubaix. This
newspaper suggests the disconnection and isolation between Roubaix – Tourcoing
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and Lille was not as great as sometimes imagined. Le Bulletin de Roubaix maintained
an office in Lille, and provided free home delivery in that city when readers requested
a three-month subscription.103 The paper published the tramway timetable until the
Germans invoked rules making travel between the two cities extremely difficult and
included news about the theatre in Lille for a while. Some news from the bigger city
also came also through in the form of advertisements and tidbits of news in the
Judicial Chronicle. Indeed the Bulletin de Roubaix appeared to provide a somewhat
modest connection to the outside world. Of course, one must remember the
newspaper portrayed life in occupied Roubaix and Tourcoing as the German
occupiers wanted people to see it.
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Chapter Six:
La Gazette des Ardennes

People in occupied France received the largest percentage of their news from La
Gazette des Ardennes. Published from November 1, 1914, through October 21, 1918, La
Gazette provided regular, voluminous, in-depth coverage of the war and international
affairs several times a week. An advertisement for the newspaper proclaimed that it
carried official communiqués from Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the names of
prisoners of war held in Germany and regional news from different areas of the occupied
zone. It claimed to provide “all daily news concerning the European war.”1 The paper
was widely read. At its height, the publishers claimed a circulation of 175,000 per issue.2
Deborah Buffton notes that this was a dramatic decline in circulation compared to prewar newspapers. In the tri-city area, numerous newspapers enjoyed a wide circulation
just before the war, with L’Echo du Nord alone selling over 180,000 copies per day.3
However, she also explains this did not mean La Gazette des Ardennes was relatively
ignored by the occupied populace. Some people may have avoided the newspaper due to
a distrust of news through German sources, but people also shared copies of the paper
due to financial considerations, leading to a higher level of readership than circulation
numbers suggest. The paper cost 5 centimes, or 10 centimes with prisoner of war lists. It
became available in the tri-city region around December 1914, with many places to buy it
in the cities, including bookstores and post offices. By mid-1915, an official German
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ordinance prohibited the reading of any newspaper except the Gazette des Ardennes,
Bulletin de Lille, or the Bulletin de Roubaix.4
La Gazette des Ardennes celebrated its one-year anniversary by reminding its
readers that the German authorities’ kindness created this newspaper to bring them truth
and justice in a time characterized by misinformation.5 While the occupied population
read this paper, they did not believe it to be a beacon of truth in a world of lies. To the
contrary, one reader noted that to understand what was really happening in the war, the
truth had to be “discerned” from La Gazette des Ardennes.6 People read it with
resignation. Articles were longer and hence allowed more leeway for the insertion of
propaganda in La Gazette des Ardennes as compared to Le Bulletin de Lille and Le
Bulletin de Roubaix. Unlike these other newspapers, which included a great deal of nonnews pieces, hard news pieces comprised most of La Gazette des Ardennes. Describing it
as “Boche poison,” one reader stated that the paper’s raison d’être was to compromise
the spirit of the invaded and to detach them from the rest of France. He stated, however,
that no one was being intoxicated, and the crass message of the paper instead inspired a
spirit of sacrifice among the occupied.7 The French in the occupied zone had such a low
opinion of the occupying Germans, a fact the Germans themselves admitted in the pages
of Liller Kriegszeitung, that it is not surprising that a newspaper produced by the
Germans was not respected.8 Thus, the aim of the newspaper, to reduce French hostility
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and prepare northern France for a future characterized by close ties to Germany, was an
ambitious one.9
After a brief overview of the administration and the mechanics of the publication
of La Gazette des Ardennes, this chapter examines what information this newspaper
provided to the people of Lille, starting December 27, 1914, and shortly thereafter the
people of Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Essentially the Gazette des Ardennes provided its
readers five categories of news: 1) war news, including information from the battlefront,
lists of prisoners and the dead, and submarine and zeppelin activity; 2) news about
unoccupied France; 3) negative information about Germany’s enemies; 4) information
revealing an obsession with the Parisian press; 5) positive news about Germany. These
five themes, along with an examination of serials and advertisements in the newspaper
reveal that a great deal of information was available through this paper, but almost all of
it came with a dose of bias.

Administration and Publication

La Gazette des Ardennes was a military enterprise, under Section IIIb of the
general staff, and its head, Colonel Walter Nicolai.10 Captain Fritz H. Schnitzer directed
the newspaper, but he was not a journalist and quickly sought a journalist as editor of the
newspaper. After two failed attempts utilizing amateur journalists, Gaspari and
Teschemacer, the newspaper found its permanent editor, René Prévot. Prévot, the Paris
correspondent for the German newspaper Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, was born in
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Alsace but became a naturalized German and married an Austrian woman.11 He wrote
French fluently while fully supporting German war aims.12 He was an excellent editor.
One French reader living through the occupation described the newspaper as carefully
edited, hence perhaps reinforcing the impression that Germany would eventually win the
war. 13
The newspaper referred to the editorial staff but never offered names, whether to
conceal the Germanic identity of most of its staff, or to protect the few French
collaborators. The newspaper publishers attempted to recruit French journalists, most
often with little success. Some French prisoners held in German camps agreed to write
for the paper, such as sub-lieutenant Roger Hervé, who wrote three articles advocating
French pacifism. In 1919, the French military sentenced him to death for treason, along
with two others, for writing these articles, a sentence later lessened to twenty years forced
labor.14 Prévot asked local commanders and municipal commissions to find potential
journalists among the occupied people. Most Frenchmen refused, and the few that did
write for the newspaper usually chose to write under pseudonyms. Interestingly, three
reporters whose identities post-war authorities determined faced charges of gathering
evidence for the enemy after the war.15
The Germans easily obtained the printing equipment needed to publish La Gazette
des Ardennes: they confiscated it from the Révil du Nord.16 The German editors obtained
paper first by requisitioning it from closed down French printers, and then through
11
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membership in a German confederation for the distribution of printing paper.17 The look
and frequency of publication of La Gazette des Ardennes changed during its lifespan. It
started as a small newspaper, measuring 26cm by 36cm, but starting in April 1915, it
changed to the “more French look” of 44cm by 56cm. La Gazette featured a four-column
format until 1918, when it changed to six columns. From November 1914 until March
1915, the paper published only on Saturdays. In April 1915, publishers added a
Wednesday edition. In October 1915, the paper started publishing on Tuesdays,
Thursdays, and Saturdays. By April 1916, it became a four-day a week publication,
adding Sundays to the rotation. Finally, in January 1918, the paper began publishing
every day except Mondays. The publishers of La Gazette des Ardennes produced three
different editions of the paper. There was the regular newspaper that went from once a
week at its inception to six times a week by 1918, a weekly recap version containing the
major articles of the past seven days, and an illustrated version.18 The illustrated version,
offered a few times a month, was a beautiful publication, extravagantly illustrated with
photographs of both shelled French villages and pristine German landscapes. Helen
McPhail remarked that the underlying message was unstated but clear: Germany was
clean and beautiful, while France was suffering at the hands of interfering allies.19
Propaganda distribution was the main purpose of the newspaper, but the Germans also
expected it to make money. At first, it was not profitable, instead relying upon funding
from Section IIIb. However, in 1916, it began restricting the number of free copies given
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away and left lying around and later the paper added advertising. By 1917, the newspaper
began showing a profit.20

War News
Official communiqués were the single greatest source of war news in La Gazette
des Ardennes. German communiqués offered a great quantity of detailed information; the
question from occupied French point of view was simply could they be trusted. An
example of a German communiqué from 1915 informed readers that en route to SaintJulien-Ypres, the Germans continued their attack and progress, capturing three British
officers, sixty soldiers, and one machine gun.21 This communiqué demonstrated the
German propaganda technique of focusing upon details rather than the larger picture that
was less flattering to them. This capturing of three British officers, sixty soldiers, and one
machine gun was a small part of the Second Battle of Ypres, a significant offensive that
occurred from April 22 until May 25, 1915. La Gazette reported the German successes of
late April in late May, with detailed articles leaving out only one major detail: the
German use of poisonous gas in the attacks. As battles such as this one lasted for weeks
and caused tens of thousands of casualties on both sides, each side could find discreet
victories within the larger campaign to focus upon. Another official bulletin in the same
newspaper reported an earlier German success near Ypres on April 22, 1915, during
which the Germans took 110 officers and 5,450 men prisoner.22 In general, coverage of
fighting at Ypres was delayed but extensive. The German military aim was to flatten out
the Ypres salient and cause serious setbacks for the Allies before the Germans transferred
20
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a large number of their men to the Eastern Front for a planned Gorlice-Tarnow offensive
against the Russians. While the above-mentioned two communiqués were accurate in
terms of the scanty information they provided, they neglected to mention the Germans
utilized poison gas to gain the advantage in fighting the Second Battle of Ypres. The
Germans used commercial gas cylinders to release substantial amounts of deadly chlorine
gas into the enemy’s trenches.23 On April 22, 1915, German troops near Ypres opened
6,000 cylinders and released 168 tons of chlorine gas, which wafted into French lines
held by Algerian troops.24 In avoiding the topic of gas, the editors of La Gazette des
Ardennes did not have to share with its readers that the German army had violated the
1907 Hague Convention, which banned the use of asphyxiating gases.25 As well, the
editors of La Gazette also chose not to inform readers that this success surprised the
Germans, who were not prepared for it, and lacked sufficient reserves to exploit the
breakthrough the use of gas allowed.26
French communiqués printed in La Gazette reported of successes or failures in a
certain area in more general terms, usually without offering specifics. War bulletins at
times simply read “nothing to report,” giving the impression that no information was
omitted. All powers’ communiqués contained no neutral language. Hence, both the
authors of German and French bulletins referred to themselves as “us” or “we” and the
other side as “the enemy.” The newspaper included French communiqués reporting lesser
victories. For example, the May 24, 1915, issue reported that the French handed their
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enemies a loss as they took several trenches in front of Iletsas.27 On the surface, this
communiqué seemed to report a relatively minor French victory. In fact, the taking of
trenches near Iletsas occurred during the last days of the Second Battle of Ypres, after the
Germans utilized gas. The French forces regrouped after the gas attacks to take these
trenches, a truly significant event. Of course the editors of La Gazette des Ardennes
never provided context to French victories, and could not have done so in this case
without reporting the use of poison gas by the Germans.
In the March 15, 1915, issue, the newspaper included four pages devoted to the
winter battle in Champagne. Remembered to history as the First Battle of Champagne,
the battle was an allied offensive in the Champagne and Artois regions aimed at pushing
back the vast pocket of German lines bulging into central France between Reims and
Verdun. The editors of La Gazette relished General Joffre’s lack of success as he
attacked the area between Reims and Verdun. By all accounts, this battle, which lasted
from December 20, 1914 until March 17, 1915, was a complete failure for the French.
France gained only a few unimportant hamlets during this battle, but lost a great number
of men.28 Two pages worth of French communiqués demonstrated how French publicists
focused upon small victories while ignoring the lack of major progress. As the French
military and media also utilized censorship to contour news for the French home front,
the editors of La Gazette placed French propaganda on display.
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A report from autumn of that year noted that despite a violent counter-attack in
Champagne, the French held their position.29 This skirmish was part of the Second Battle
of Champagne, which raged from September 25, 1915 until October 16, 1915. This battle
General Joffre’s planned “great attack” that aimed to exploit the numerical advantaged
afforded the Allies by the German decision to concentrate their forces against the
Russians in 1915 as the Allied forces outnumbered the Germans by eighteen divisions to
seven divisions along the Champagne front.30 The French aims were to rupture the
German front, severing their supply lines around Attigny and Douai, and thereby forcing
a German withdrawal from the Noyon sailent and provide relief to the hard-pressed
Russians as the Germans moved troops back to the Western Front to respond.31 The
French did secure a small salient against the German Third Army at Perthes Woods and
British troops pushed the Germans back to secondary positions east of Loos. However,
these small gains came at the cost of huge British and French losses in terms of men, and
as the fighting continued and German reserves began to reach the battle, the French
offensive stalled.32 The offensive gained approximately fifteen square miles, penetrating
two and a half miles into German-held territories at some points. This advance cost
144,000 French casualties, with the Germans sustaining 85,000 casualties.33 Almost a
month before that French communiqué appearing in the newspaper, La Gazette des
Ardennes featured a front-page map of the Second Battle of Champagne, demonstrating
French and British gains and losses. A crude, hand-drawn map, correctly demonstrated
the area gained by the French, but the note underneath made it clear the true cost of
29
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gaining that land. The editors reported that by September 30, 1915, the French had
gained twenty-four kilometers of land, but at a cost of 100,000 soldiers lives.34 French
casualties at Champagne in September and October 1915 reached 143,000.35 In this
instance, the news for the French was bad enough that the editors of La Gazette des
Ardennes could simply report the truth and expect that without embellishment it was
enough to demoralize people in the occupied zone.
As in the coverage of the Second Battle of Champagne, French communiqués
were frequently a few days older than German ones, and they were not exact replicas of
what the French military emitted. The publishers claimed that they wanted to print French
and German communiqués from the same day alongside each other, but the French
communiqués arrived too late, hence they used translated neutral communiqués, but even
those could only be published a few days later.36
Coverage of the Verdun fighting began in late February 1916. Extensive
reporting ran from mid-March 1916 through the first week of April. At least four issues
included coverage beyond war bulletins in another article entitled, “War Happenings:
Around Verdun.”37 This early coverage focused upon the success of the German attack
against the western face of the salient. As German efforts petered out towards the end of
June, so did La Gazettes des Ardennes’s coverage. As Andreas Laksa notes, the last few
references to Verdun could only focus upon failed French attacks, rather than proclaim
German success.38 Readers of La Gazette learned of early German successes, but not how
34
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at the end of the slaughter, the battle lines were close to their starting point.39 No mention
appeared in the newspaper explaining how the French forces held their own because
General Pétain made improvements for conditions of the troops, which rallied French
morale. The number of French soldiers killed made the pages of the newspaper.
However, the fact that during this battle, which historian William Martin notes has come
to represent an act of European fratricide, an almost equal number of Germans died or
went missing did not.40
Not surprisingly, the other great battle of 1916- the Somme – received less
coverage than Verdun (Verdun began as a German offensive, the Somme was a British
and French offensive).41 Indeed, the within the pages of La Gazette it was always referred
to as “the great allied offensive.” Coverage focused upon the brutality and aggressiveness
of the British (and at times French). Treatment of other battles usually included a tally of
area and prisoners taken, deaths and injuries. Somme coverage provided little of this,
interestingly, considering that the Allies casualty rate was high, with 90,000 Frenchmen
killed or wounded during the first month of fighting alone.42 More than a month before
the Somme battles ended in November 1916, coverage all but disappeared. In describing
all media coverage of the Somme, historian Martin Gilbert demonstrates that reporting in
La Gazette des Ardennes was not out of line with other areas. He writes that the detail of
the agony and misery were to a great degree withheld from the public everywhere and
39
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when it was reported, “Every bloody encounter was portrayed as a victory, every terrified
combatant as a hero…”43
The editors delayed providing news of the German offensive of March 21, 1918,
because the newspaper’s controllers wanted to present it as a fait accompli, with coverage
beginning March 28, 1918.44 Coverage of the offensive (when it was going well for the
Germans) included detailed maps and data about prisoners taken. While historians would
later claim the Second Battle of the Marne turned the tide of war as initiative was wrested
from the Germans, newspaper coverage focused again upon specific German successes,
blurring the truth of the larger picture. 45
Eastern Front coverage was extensive. Until the Russian exit from the war, its
military failures were fodder for the Gazette. In particular, it frequently reported the large
number of Russian prisoners taken.46 On a few occasions, La Gazette provided graphs to
illustrate German successes on the Western Front. One map, superimposed with a bar
graph, compared the square miles of enemy territory conquered by each warring nation.
The amount of German soil held by France was insignificant compared to French and
Belgian land held by the Germans.47 Another chart, this time accompanied by drawings,
visually declared the portion of French industry in German hands, which included 90% of
the country’s iron, 85.7% of its brute steel, and 43% of its total industry.48 La Gazette des
Ardennes also provided information that was not news, but useful to understanding the
war. Towards the end of 1915, it began offering detailed maps, such as a relief map of
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southern Serbia, which would help readers understand key elements of the war.49 Such
information was relevant but smacked of propaganda due to the selection of maps. The
relief map of southern Serbia is case in point as the newspaper editors published it within
a month of Bulgaria joining the Central Powers attack on Serbia on October 11, 1915. At
the outbreak of the war, the Bulgarian government declared neutrality and both sides
offered it incentives to join the war on their sides, as Bulgaria’s army was a sizable force
and the country occupied a strategic position in the Balkans.50 By the summer of 1915, it
appeared that Germany was in the stronger military position, and King Ferdinand and
Premier Radoslavov of Bulgaria decided to enter the war on Germany’s side.51 When
Bulgaria entered the war, many assumed it meant that Germany would win the war
within months. The map was a complementary piece to several articles lauding
Bulgaria’s entry into the war on Germany’s side, which many saw as a major foreign
policy failure for France and a coup for Germany.52 La Gazette also published maps
whose potential for bias lay within the information included and excluded, especially
during the last year of the war. These maps were often of German offensives, showing
German gains at their height and not juxtaposed against maps of French gains.53
Lists of captured, injured, and dead French soldiers permeated La Gazette des
Ardennes and the newspaper’s staff utilized them as powerful propaganda. The
newspaper editors presented these lists as information that the French government was
withholding from its people, information that the German government shared because it
49
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understood the hardship of civilians who did not know if a loved one was injured,
captured, or even alive.54 The paper claimed it was “French vanity” that would not allow
the French government to admit it had lost 250,000 soldiers as German POWs.55 While
this statement inaccurately depicted the French government’s actions as unusually
deceitful – all the warring nations treated prisoner of war numbers as confidential
information – the 250,000 French prisoner of war number appears very close to accurate,
as by early 1915 the Germans held 245,000 French prisoners.56 Journalists in one issue
accused France of literally trying to hide the large number of the injured – both in terms
of reporting them and allowing them to receive treatment in the normal military medical
system.57 The French military had faced criticism of their care for wounded soldiers
before, from no less a source than the country’s future leader. Senator Georges
Clemenceau disparaged the shortcomings of the French military medical system in the
newspaper he edited (l’Homme enchaîné) after he observed injured soldiers left untreated
on a railroad train.58 However, it was during the war that the French army developed the
triage system of casualty clearance that is still the basis for the treatment of wounded in
military and disaster situations today, leading to vast improvements in survival rates as
compared to the Crimean War.59 Leaders in both countries deemed such news about
prisoners of war and wounded soldiers damaging to home morale, hence German
newspapers did not print such information about German soldiers. By including such
information in the Gazette, its editors could claim to be providing a service, while at the
54

La Gazette des Ardennes, January 8, 1915.
Ibid., April 2, 1915.
56
Priscilla Mary Roberts and Spencer Tucker, eds., World War One: A Student Encyclopedia (SantaBarbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006) 3: 1462.
57
La Gazette des Ardennes, May 10, 1915.
58
Heyman, 131.
59
Theodore H. Tulchinsky and Elena Varavilcova, The New Public Health, 2nd Ed. (Burlington, MN:
Elsevier Academic Press, 2009), 22.
55

175
same time inserting demoralizing information. The newspaper’s circulation increased
dramatically when it began printing the names of French prisoners of war and their
locations.60 The Gazette printed over 500 lists of captured French soldiers’ names,
supplemented by other lists, such as “French soldiers killed at Gallipoli,” and “French
killed by friendly fire.”61 Extremely painful for readers, these lists proved unreliable at
times. As Deborah Buffton notes, many a reader found a relative’s name on the prisoner
of war or dead list, only to find out later he was alive and free.62 If editors sought to shape
French opinion with casualty lists, they had the same goal in their news of the sea war.
German pride in their submarine capabilities revealed itself almost daily in the
pages of La Gazette des Ardennes. The author of one article examined the morality of
submarine warfare; unsurprisingly he concluded that submarine attacks were indeed a
valid form of warfare.63 At first most submarine news came under the sub-section,
“Diverse News,” but by 1917 a sub-section devoted entirely to submarine action became
a frequent feature. Its author told proudly of German submarine activity around Liverpool
and even off the coast of North America.64 Monthly recaps tallied German submarine
successes. For example, the June 26, 1918, issue noted that in the month of May German
subs sank 614,000 tons of Entente ships.65 This number was most likely an exaggeration,
harking back to the apex of submarine success in April 1917. During that month,
German submarines destroyed 155 British vessels, equaling 516,394 tons, with mines
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sinking fourteen ships equaling 28,888 tons.66 The editors of La Gazette proclaimed with
satisfaction that German submarines destroyed enough tonnage carrying supplies to affect
the English bread supply.67 This was not hyperbole; Britain came within six weeks of
starvation. The United States Ambassador to Britain, Walter Page, commenting on the
German submarine attacks on the British food supply, stated, “what we are witnessing is
the defeat of Britain.”68 However, Allied shipping losses fell dramatically by the end of
1917 and continued to fall during 1918, making this statement outdated and no longer
true. A fall in Allied shipping losses and higher submarine losses were a direct result of
the Allies adopting a convoy system of grouping ships together, which offered great
protection as escorts could counter-attack against submarines.69 La Gazette des Ardennes’
coverage of submarine action did not reflect this decline in its success, as the
newspaper’s editors were still reporting submarine attacks as late as September 18,
1918.70
Zeppelin attacks were also a popular focus of La Gazette des Ardennes. Readers
read up-to-date reports of aerial attacks on both London and Paris.71 Most of the coverage
of zeppelin raids occurred in February through April 1916, with one article noting current
British defense systems could not curtail zeppelins.72 The fifty-one German zeppelin
raids on England did instill fear in the British civilian population, killing 1400 people,
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and wounding 5000 more.73 While the British defense system was unable at first to deal
with the air raids, it quickly developed effective antiaircraft defenses, including
incendiary bullets that rendered zeppelin raids ineffective and expensive.74 Not
surprisingly, the editors of La Gazette chose not to report the waning success of zeppelin
raids, but mention of zeppelin attacks did taper off, as opposed to submarine coverage.
Such regular reports of submarine and zeppelin attacks would do little to ingratiate the
Germans to the French in the occupied zone, but surely aimed to propagate the message
that Germany would win the war.

News about Unoccupied France
La Gazette des Ardennes contained news from unoccupied France in most issues,
frequently under a section entitled, “French News.” This is somewhat surprising since the
Germans endeavored to isolate occupied France and create in it a sense of separateness
from the rest of France.75 However, some of the news reported followed this agenda of
making unoccupied France, particularly Paris, seem alien. One article entitled, “A
Parisian Night,” depicted Parisian society, especially its upper echelons, as treating war
like an abstraction.76 While at a grand party, guests lament the tragedy of war while
supping on fine food and drinking wine. The editors in including such a scene clearly
aimed to raise the ire of those suffering in occupied France.
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Not surprisingly, most of the news coming out of unoccupied France printed in La
Gazette des Ardennes was bad. Short blurbs of bad news often appeared in the paper,
such as one about a fire ravaging the Moulin Rouge, and another about Crédit Lyonnais
lowering its dividends.77 The newspaper also included several articles proclaiming
France in the clutches of various calamities. One alleged that a population crisis
stemming from low marriage and birthrates was exacerbated by the loss of life on the
battlefield, and was leading France down the dangerous road to depopulation.78 Coupled
with the additional loss of population in occupied territory, one article declared the
French race in crisis.79 According to the paper, France was also in the middle of an
agricultural crisis and a transportation crisis.80 The editors of La Gazette blamed the
agricultural crisis on the French government not setting regulations for either food
production or consumption. Indeed, the editors of La Gazette were relatively accurate in
this long article, with the propaganda element being the claims of German governmental
success in regulating food. The French government hesitated in enacting controls over
prices and supplies, and this combined with German occupation of some of the most
productive farmland, did leave the country unprepared for the long conflict.81 The article
did not mention that the French populace was not facing starvation; the French
government instead purchased large quantities of cereals from foreign markets to deal
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with the deficits.82 A lack of carts and wagons to move merchandise unloaded from ships
and resultant backlog at French docks was the transportation crisis discussed in the pages
of La Gazette. The German-controlled newspaper cited an article by Marcel Cachin (a
SFIO member, elected to the Chamber of Deputies, who rallied to the war cause) as its
source. While getting goods off the docks was a legitimate problem for the French
government, the story also demonstrated that goods were still flowing into France, and
French censors allowed a domestic newspaper to publish the article from which the
editors of La Gazette lifted the piece.
Of all the crises, it was coverage of the economic crisis in unoccupied France that
received the most newspaper space. In late 1915 and early 1916 the newspaper began
reporting how expensive life was in France; by mid-1917 it was declaring France as
unable to escape an economic crisis.83 Life indeed had become more vastly more
expensive; the cost of living in Paris increased approximately 300 percent between 1914
and 1918.84 There is no question that the war represented a huge shock to the French
economy. However, the timing of La Gazette’s article about an economic crisis seems
off. France’s GDP decreased sharply, but then it stabilized at a slightly higher level in
1916 and 1917, suggesting the economy was finding a new war-time equilibrium.85
Overall, people in Paris were pessimistic and nervous, La Gazette told readers.86
Parisians’ greatest concern was the economic situation, even more so than the actual war.
However, Jean-Jacques Becker suggests that they were more concerned with the cost of
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living than battles because of their supreme confidence that France was on the correct
side and would ultimately defeat Germany and its partners.87 While most of the facts
stated in these reports resembled the truth, the extent to which they were belabored, and
the exclusion of almost all positive news out of the rest of France created an
exaggeratedly gloomy caricature of unoccupied France’s well-being.
France’s political difficulties also received keen attention in the newspaper.
Political scandals, such as the Desclaux Affair, were great fodder for La Gazette des
Ardennes to prove how poorly things were going in the rest of France.88 The Desclaux
graft case was the perfect propaganda story for La Gazette. In January 1915, the French
government accused Colonel François Desclaux, a member of the Radical-Socialist
government and former chief secretary to Finance Minster Joseph Caillaux, of stealing
army supplies, and he received a sentence of seven years solitary confinement.89 Despite
the Union sacrée, military leaders at times accused the Radical-Socialist party of being
defeatists, and the French media suggested that the Desclaux case smacked of treason as
it undermined the military. La Gazette utilized the story to demonstrate that not everyone
in unoccupied France believed France could win the war.
No less than five substantial articles celebrated Declassé’s (a man known for his
anti-German sentiments) resignation.90 Théophile Declassé served in Viviani’s ministry
as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Declassé helped convince Italy to entry the war on the
side of the Allies, gaining him infamy in Germany. A former ambassador to Russia, he
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supported Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Straits, which greatly
undermined any chance of Bulgaria entered the war on France’s side. Declassé’s foreign
policy failure led to his resignation, which he offered on October 12, 1915, after Entente
forces entered Salonika.91 The writers of the articles in La Gazette wrote that they did not
want to discuss the internal politics of belligerent countries, but that the Declassé case
demonstrated that dissension within French leadership.92
Another political scandal the paper covered, this time in three long articles,
including one entitled, “The Mistake,” was the French government’s refusal to issue
passports to French socialists wishing to attend the Stockholm Conference.93 La Gazette
utilized yet another story, the vilification and arrest of Malvy to cast the French
government as authoritarian and to demonstrate internal dissension within the French
leadership as defeatism grew.94 Starting in 1914, Georges Clemenceau began criticizing
Louis-Jean Malvy, Minister of the Interior, for laxity towards defeatism. Despite these
protests, Malvy remained in position until August 31, 1917. In the winter of that year,
Commander-in-Chief Robert Nivellle advised Malvy to take action against antiwar
activity on the home front. Many military officers, conservative newspapermen, and
government officials blamed Malvy for the disastrous spring offensive, citing internal
defeatists as the cause.95 Clemenceau criticized Malvy for having left unfettered the
publication of the pro-German newspaper, Le Bonnet Rouge while being unduly
influenced by its editor, Almereyda. A nine-month trial by the Senate dismissed treason
charges against Malvy but found him guilty of negligence and banished him from France
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for five years.96 In May 1918, La Gazette’s editors furthered pushed the concept that the
French government was trying to silence any voices questioning the French war effort in
its coverage of the Bonnet Rouge trials. The Bonnet Rouge was a socialist and
Germanophile newspaper in France, which the government shut down in 1917, and
whose directors faced trial for treason after its editor committed suicide in jail. During the
trial, one witness testified to the similarity between the policy pursued by the Bonnet
Rouge and that of the Gazette des Ardennes.97 It was found that the newspaper leaders
were in the pay of the Germans and those left received sentences of five years hard
labor.98 La Gazette des Ardennes’s reporters, while relaying in great detail the facts of the
trial, made the defendants appear sympathetic, and stressed that the French government
silenced the newspaper for promoting peace and having differing views from the
government.99
In case all this horrible news coming out of Paris was not to enough to alienate
readers from the rest of their country, La Gazette des Ardennes reported to them that
those evacuated from the occupied zone received poor treatment once they reached
unoccupied France.100 Sadly, this statement was true in many cases, as civilians in
unoccupied France discriminated against refugees repatriated from the Nord, whom they
saw as taking jobs from locals (despite a labor shortage), and called “Huns from the
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Nord.”101 The newspaper informed readers that their suffering was not for some
humanitarian cause, but France’s uncontrollable desire for revenge and regaining AlsaceLorraine.102 La Gazette even provided a few editorial pieces delving into what it meant to
be French; of course, its editors’ answers were never ones to fill a French patriot’s heart
with joy. In “Is France Democratic,” and “The Balance Sheet of Republicanism and
Parliamentism,” La Gazette des Ardennes described France as flawed to its very core.103

A Negative View of Other Allies
Almost all news about France’s allies beyond that contained in communiqués
constituted propaganda aimed at demonstrating Allied problems or exploring the malice
of their military and government authorities. La Gazette des Ardennes’ editors fed readers
a constant diet of anti-British propaganda. They wrote that if they were in control of the
war, they would seek peace with France while continuing the war with their true enemy,
Britain.104 The propaganda against Britain was not of the subtle kind that would be
difficult to distinguish. The newspaper frequently insinuated that Britain wanted to annex
Calais. The editors noted that before writing about the British desire to commandeer
Calais they reflected for a long time, fearing that readers would believe they were trying
to create hatred among the French for the British.105 By June 1915, the editors appeared
to have lost all qualms about creating such fears. In an article entitled, “France the day
after the war,” they reported that during the next winter campaign England planned to
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take Calais, Boulogne, and Dunkerque with plans of keeping these areas after the war.106
In other articles editors claimed that England was conserving its forces, in order to fight
to the last Frenchman.107 This last statement touches upon the very essence of good
propaganda, as it takes a grain of truth and grossly distorts its meaning to Germany’s
advantage. The small British professional army, comprised of 160,000 soldiers, was
devastated by fighting in the early months of the war.108 By the end of 1914, voluntary
enlistments meant that half a million men were undergoing training to fight, but there was
a delay due to that training during which the French bore the major burden of the war in
terms of manpower. This concept of the British fighting to the last Frenchmen was so
powerful that the Germans would reutilize this exact phrase again during the Second
World War.109
During the four years of its publication, La Gazette des Ardennes’ editors
“educated” readers on the long-term enmity that had existed between England and
France. The newspaper included reports on long-resolved disputes, including the incident
at Fashoda and Anglo-French antagonism in the Orient.110 It harked back to battles over
Louisiana, Canada, the Indies, and Egypt to demonstrate that the two countries were
historic enemies. Editors advised readers that Britain duped France into believing it was
acting out of idealism in fighting the current war while power and colonial annexation
were its only true concerns.111 The paper frequently cited England’s woes with Ireland to
demonstrate the British lust for territory and its repercussions. From March 1916 until
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July 1918, several articles detailed unrest in Ireland and that country’s desire to break
away from British control. By July 1918, the newspaper declared Ireland a crisis.112 The
British Parliament had enacted the Irish Home Rule bill in September 1914, hoping to
make Ireland a non-issue during the war. However, Ulster Unionists and British
conservatives secured the concurrent suspension of the bill for the duration of the war.
Ireland, without ever facing conscription, contributed 200,000 troops to the British
military.113 However, during the second half of the war anger with the suspension of
Home Rule led to such great dissent – which quite frequently turned violent, such as with
the Easter Rising of nationalists in 1916 – that British troops had to be garrisoned in
Ireland to keep the peace. La Gazette’s editors provided a fairly accurate overview of the
situation in Ireland, giving the impression that the once mighty Britain now faced serious
problems on every front, and all its own doing.114 One editorial explained what the world
truly needed was continental solidarity against “the island.”115
La Gazette des Ardennes referenced both Russia and the United States. Andreas
Laska notes that until Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, La Gazette des Ardennes
paid little heed to it.116 The few references made were to the horrible conditions in the
mammoth country. The paper reported on its financial woes, its authoritarian
government, its ministerial crisis, and the poor quality of life in St. Petersburg.117 The
ministerial crisis generated particularly interesting coverage, as it utilized Foreign
Minister Sergei Sazonov’s pending dismissal to demonstrate the cost of Russia and
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France’s poor choices in the Balkans.118 The article compared him to Declassé, and the
page with the article just happened to also carry a map of Serbia. The article was a tad
premature however, as his actual dismissal only took place seven months later when he
angered the Tsarina by asking the Tsar to consider Polish independence after the war. La
Gazette also covered the Russian revolution, with at least four articles carrying the title,
“Russian crisis.”119 Editors accused the Allies of having not supported the obviously just
Russian Revolution.120
The American coverage in La Gazette des Ardennes changed dramatically after
the United States entered the war on the Allied side. While the newspaper did not attempt
to create animosity in its readers toward the United States, it did alter its opinion of the
country. Prior to its entrance into the war, the staff of La Gazette des Ardennes portrayed
the United States as a wise neutral, sometimes featuring articles by pro-German
Americans.121 Before the United States entered the war, it was a country deserving of
respect; afterward it simply became a capitalist machine concerned only with continuing
to sell its steel to the England.122 America, the powerful up-and-coming force, became the
“American mirage” in the pages of the newspaper.123 The paper reported American
military failures. Interestingly, the paper did not exploit the friction that existed between
the Allies and the United States, as much to the chagrin of the French and British leaders,
the United States insisted on maintaining a separate force on the battlefield, and refused
to simply be a replacement reservoir for the Allied armies.
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La Gazette des Ardennes frequently focused upon what it deemed the Allies’
unchivalrous wartime conduct. It claimed the French mistreated prisoners of war
deported to Africa.124 The paper also accused the French government of officially lying
when it publicly stated that Germany sold war booty.125 In editorials, the paper accused
the British of even more heinous actions. Claims of unacceptable British behavior
included allegations that the English violated Swedish neutrality by boarding one of their
ships without warning, and that an English naval ship sunk an innocent German fishing
boat.126 La Gazette characterized the British as hypocritical in their anger over the
execution of Miss Cavell, as they had executed females purported to be German spies.127
This claim is an interesting one, as history only famously remembers the French
execution of Mata Hari.128 On April 2, 1916, the paper made its most outrageous claim
when it published the charge that the British were trying to exterminate the German
people. The article stated that an American citizen claimed Winston Churchill stated that
the aim of the war was to exterminate the German people, which would happen within
months because “German manhood is rapidly disappearing.”129 The unnamed source
continued on to state that Churchill believed the German people would cease to exist
because most the men of martial age would have been killed in battle. People in France,
Germany, and Great Britain feared what such a huge loss of young men would mean to
their countries’ future population growth. This story implied the major battles, which cost
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hundreds of thousands of lives, were not for some greater victory, but part of an evil
British plan.

Obsession with the Parisian Press
The editors of La Gazette des Ardennes obsessed over the French press publishing
false news about the German occupation, a fact that reveals itself in most issues of the
newspaper. This fixation must have appeared all the more surreal to its readership
considering La Gazette’s relationship with the truth. La Gazette claimed the Parisian
press was trying to turn the world against Germany by printing lies, then distributing its
papers abroad or sharing articles with other newspapers in other countries.130 Almost all
the accusations thrown at the Parisian press in the paper were variations on a theme: you
tell lies. The paper described the situation as, “it is not the French people, but the press,
that tells these lies that are both malicious and ridiculous at the same time, lies that the
population of the German occupied provinces must recognize as such.”131 The paper
admitted that the Parisian press’s job included cultivating patriotism amongst its readers,
but that the animosity it spewed crossed the line to lies.132 It declared that the French
press simply followed the official orders of the government and military without any
legitimate concern for the public.133 The result was “Brainwashing, A French
Specialty.”134 It appeared that La Gazette attempted to create contempt for the intellectual
caste in unoccupied France, in particular for newspaper editors and journalists. Indeed,
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the author of the article noted that one could not judge the French people from its
press.135 French soldiers lamenting the war were one of the few French sources that could
be trusted, according to the paper.136 Of course, one could only trust soldiers’ writings
found in La Gazette (which were usually written by prisoners of war trying to garner
better treatment) because the French media faked soldiers’ letters.137 Sometimes the
writers of La Gazette hurled accusations at specific newspapers- frequently the Petit
Parisien - other times their scorn extended to all papers in unoccupied France, not just
those published in the capital.138
Specific points on which the La Gazette des Ardennes took issue with the French
press included what its editors saw as the false reporting of a widespread famine in
Germany. La Gazette’s editors may have disagreed with French accounts of food supplies
in Germany, but in general, they were accurate. The British blockade led to a twenty-five
percent decline in domestic agricultural production and thus to serious shortages in the
food supply, and the undernourishment of the German population.139 In the turnip winter”
of 1916-1917, when German diets relied on turnips to take the place of potatoes and
bread, food shortages led to increased infant mortality and stunted growth in children.140
La Gazette’s editors were also furious with accusations that the Germans were
committing atrocities, including stealing artistic treasures from occupied zones.141 In
general terms, the paper claimed that the French press consistently lessened the
importance of enemy successes, hence not providing people with an accurate description
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of the war.142 This distain for the French press did not stop La Gazette des Ardennes from
printing blurbs from it in almost every issue under the headings “In France” and “Mirror
on the French Press.” The snippets chosen, however, always focused upon negative news
for the French, or were edited to appear that way. While the Parisian press was La
Gazette des Ardennes’ focus, the paper’s staff also lambasted other countries’ media at
times. For example, the paper explained that before the occupation, the Belgian press
created fear amongst its populace, causing them to flee their homes, leading to greater
hardship early during the occupation.143

Positive News about Germany
La Gazette des Ardennes literally had a captive audience. While it was highly
unlikely that readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were going to become
Germanophiles, the newspaper attempted to convince them that Germans were not all
that bad. In doing so, the newspaper’s editors sometimes rewrote history. One article
contended that Germans were not a militaristic people; for example, imperial France
forced the war of 1870-1871 upon Germany, rather than Germany wanting war.144 Laska
notes that the paper portrayed German soldiers not as barbarians, but mobilized
students.145 The paper also attempted to demonstrate German circumspection and
thoughtfulness when it came to war. In editorials such as “Militarism,” and “An
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Examination of Consciousness,” the paper revealed that while the Germans were certain
of their righteousness, they too hated the effects of war.146
The Germany described in La Gazette was militarily strong. One report noted
that German lines on the Eastern Front were impregnable, while another showed the
German occupation of Warsaw.147 La Gazette printed in their entirety at least six
speeches by the Chancellor to the Reichstag, allowing readers to the feel the full force of
German nationalism.148 Compared to the nervous people of Paris, the paper portrayed
Germans on the home front as calm, having placed great faith in their soldiers.149 If
editors portrayed France as facing an economic crisis, they rendered Germany as on the
cusp of great economic expansion. A multi-part series, “German Economic Expansion as
Seen by a Frenchman,” detailed this expansion.150 Future economic strength of Germany
lay in three main factors, according to the article; 1) the German character traits of being
hardworking, methodical, intelligent, physically strong, and among the lower classes,
obedient; 2) their future population growth; 3) the form of politics, in which the middle
classes work hard at other endeavors and leave running the nation to a select group.151
The article also lauded Germany’s institutions and bureaucracies, whether it was
technical institutes preparing future industrial management, business schools, or
Germany’s system of embassies, which utilized economic specialists.152
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La Gazette des Ardennes frequently invoked the approval of neutrals as proof of
German justness. The paper included neutral opinion either as an article written
specifically for the paper by a neutral or as articles taken from other newspapers. Most
frequently, La Gazette cited Swiss and Dutch sources. Typical articles of this sort
included, “British Imperialism judged by a Swiss,” and “On the Ocean,” taken from the
Nieuve Courant of the Hague, which argued that Germany was the true naval power, not
England.153 The message appears to have been that readers could believe what these
articles stated since they came from neutral, supposedly trustworthy sources. Of course,
the fact that said articles had been handpicked by La Gazette was not lost on readers.

Serials and Advertisements
Serial stories and advertisements did not constitute news received in the occupied
zone, but they did provide some diversion in an area generally deprived of new reading
material. Over fifty serial stories appeared in La Gazette des Ardennes during the war.
Most serial stories appear to fit the informational trends that we have identified in the
pages of La Gazette. Some stories were anti-British. The paper’s editors frequently
selected pieces by notable French authors to represent this anti-English sentiment. The
first serial that ran in the newspaper was Guy de Maupassant’s “Our English Neighbors.”
The three-part short story mocks English culture, describing the people as horrible
singers, with unfriendly priests, and women looking as if preserved in vinegar.154 The
newspaper editors penned a three-part series, “What Would Victor Hugo Think of the
War?” Their answer was he would be shocked to think Europe’s two most important
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nations, France and Germany, would be pitted against each other; after all, Germany is
the continent’s heart, while France is its head.155 A two-part report by Max Osborn
detailed the damage done to Douai by British shells.156
Another article by de Maupassant, “The Prisoners,” portrayed a respectful
relationship forming between a decent German soldier and a young French woman he
meets as German troops moved across France during the Franco-Prussian War of 187071, demonstrating the common humanity of the two people.157 Another French writer
who had pieces featured in the paper was, rather surprisingly, the patriotic member of
L’Academie Française, Alfred Capus. The short story, entitled “Une Dette” was one of
Capus’s earlier works, and did not touch upon Franco-German relations.
The newspaper provided an audience to some lesser-known and foreign writers
as well: the full text of Swiss writer Joseph Bertourieux’s “The Victory,” was published
over ten issues from May 26, 1917, through June 24, 1917. Marcel Nadaud’s “The Flying
Poilu: A Story of Aerial Warfare,” was published as well.158 Others were historical
pieces, such as Alphonse Daudet’s four-part piece on the siege of Berlin and an unsigned
three-part series on Napoleon at Saint Helena.159 Karl May’s “The Corsaire,” unfolded as
a fifteen-part series in 1918. While most stories related to war, some were pure
entertainment, such as Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Rue Morgue,” which ran in nine parts
during January and February 1916. As Deborah Buffton notes, such stories offered “a
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brief respite from the grim realities of daily life” and made the paper a slightly more
appealing product to readers.160
Advertisements first appeared in La Gazette des Ardennes in early 1918. These
advertisements were different from those found in Le Bulletin de Lille and Le Bulletin de
Roubaix. The local newspapers featured a combination of classified ads and
advertisement by local businesses. Almost all the advertisements placed in La Gazette
were for items unavailable in the occupied zone even if the people did have the money to
purchase them. German companies, such as the Benz and Daimler car companies,
purchased most of the ad space. While they perhaps believed German soldiers were likely
to read the newspaper and would be a potential future market, most likely companies who
did business with the military knew buying ads was a great way to keep their largest
client happy. Some advertisements, such as those for the car companies, also provided a
visual propaganda boost. In ads for both automotive companies, sleek cars appeared
alongside German airplanes, suggesting the power of both.

Conclusion
Almost all sources, both contemporary and historic, agree that this newspaper had
no real success as a propaganda tool – people simply disregarded the message and took
whatever facts they could from it. It is doubtful readers believed any stories expressing
opinions on who was winning the war, such as the one that, in the summer of 1915, stated
that Germany was prepared for another winter campaign unlike France.161 The
propaganda in La Gazette des Ardennes was palpable: every issue read like a political
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blog trying to convince people of Germany’s justness and might while encouraging a
defeatist attitude amongst its readers in the occupied zone. This led many Frenchmen in
the occupied zone to refer to the newspaper as the Gazette des Menteurs.162 As one
American contemporary wrote, “Although [La Gazette des Ardennes] is diabolically
cleverly done, … it would take a stronger agent than the devil himself to inspire faith in
the Germans among their victims.”163 Without a doubt, the people in occupied France
were skeptical of German-controlled media sources, and skeptical people believe their
skepticism makes them immune to persuasion.164 While the readers realized La Gazette
des Ardennes’ editors published biased messages that may not have provided complete
protection from being slightly influenced. It would be difficult to definitely say what role
La Gazette played in the rising and falling morale of the French people in the occupied
zone. That most people in the occupied zone claimed not to trust it as a source of
information is certain.
Despite the manipulation of news, whether through editing or selection of pieces,
or publication of clearly biased articles, this newspaper did provide people in Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing with a great deal of information. La Gazette offered readers
updates on battles, news from France, and the rest of the world. Readers could easily
extract news out of La Gazette, provided they took it with the proverbial grain of salt.
It is worth noting that people in unoccupied France were not receiving unbiased
news either. Their news was simply chock-full of French propaganda, rather than
German propaganda. While still edited and censored, it was done to create feelings of
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hope rather than despair. Of course readers everywhere during the war were left
wondering what news was not being included – a sensation that surely was the root cause
behind so many lamentations in the occupied zone about the lack of news. Most likely
Marshall McLuhan’s statement “the medium is the message” was true in the case of La
Gazette des Ardennes. Even relatively positive news allowed in via war communiqués
seemed tainted by the medium. Conversely, perhaps even negative news received
through the clandestine press or dropped papers may have been seen as positive.
Although La Gazette was the most consistent source of news for the people of the
occupied zone, they hated it. The newspaper Le Progrès du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais
celebrated the “death” of the La Gazette with great glee.165
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Chapter Seven:
German Imported Belgian Papers 1:
La Belgique

Belgium shared northern France’s unfortunate fate of falling under German
occupation early during the First World War. By December 1914, ninety percent of
Belgium was under German control – a situation that would last more than fifty months
for the seven million who had to learn to live with the harsh repression of occupation.1
During the first days of the occupation, Belgium’s press was unable to function, and any
available reports came from German press correspondents and army combat
correspondents that traveled with the invading armies.2 German authorities completely
quashed the Belgian press within the first weeks of occupation and subjected it to severe
censorship.3 While most Belgian newspapers rejected German terms and simply ceased
publication, some papers did reappear under strict German regulation. Sophie de
Schaepdrijver notes that the Belgians referred to these newspapers as the emboché press –
meaning media infested by the boche, an unflattering slang term for the Germans.4
Newspapers that reappeared after being “carefully expurgated and falsified by a rigorous
censorship” included Le Quotidien, Le Bruxellois, L’Echo de Bruxelles, Les Dernières
Nouvelles, La Belge, La Belgique, La Patrie, and L’Avenir.5 The Belgian populace
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regarded with suspicion such papers but still read them due to the difficulty in attaining
news. For varying lengths of time, the German occupiers chose to import three of the
German-overseen Belgian papers into occupied France.
Abbé August Leman, writing shortly after the war ended, remembered that the
German occupiers imported two Belgian newspapers into Lille during the first months of
occupation, La Belgique from Brussels and Le Bien Public from Ghent.6 However, the
German authorities soon deemed the two newspapers unreliable implements of
occupation and forbade them in occupied France after February 1915. Le Bruxellois, a
much less independent newspaper than the aforementioned ones, was available in the
cities of occupied France throughout most of the war. The Germans advertised Le
Bruxellois alongside the Gazette des Ardennes in the locally produced French
newspapers, such as the Bulletin de Roubaix. The German occupiers’ propaganda varied
between the areas they controlled; hence these imported Belgian newspapers provided
unique information as compared to the local German-controlled newspapers, supplying
international news, news of the war through communiqués, and insight into the lives of
others living under German occupation.
La Belgique began publication under German control on Thursday November 5,
1914, run by two Belgian stockbrokers of German origin, Josse Moressée and Martin
Ghesquière.7 Jean Massart insists that no existing Belgian newspapers agreed to publish
under German control, and that newspapers such as La Belgique were different entities,
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simply utilizing pre-war names.8 Usually a daily two-page paper, it was sometimes
expanded to three or four pages and quickly became occupied Belgium’s most widely
read newspaper.9 The first eight issues of the paper carried identical lead articles,
defending the editorial staff’s decision to produce a censored paper. The staff maintained
that the people were being deprived of their needed “daily intellectual ration,”10 and had
hence turned to black market foreign newspapers and taking extracts from papers that
have been greatly changed or almost invented.11 While the police attempted to find the
authors of these invented pieces of news, the article continued, La Belgique would
provide the people of Brussels a newspaper they could read with confidence, despite the
moral issue of working under German censors.12 German censorship did greatly affect
both the content and the tone of the newspaper. The German Governor of occupied
Belgium, Oscar von der Lancken-Wakenitz, described La Belgique as the Belgian
newspaper most ready to cooperate with the Germans, while trying to create an image of
maintaining its Belgian character and independence from the Germans.13 However,
unlike the Bulletin de Lille or Bulletin de Roubaix, there were news sources present in La
Belgique that were not purely German. The diffusion of this “outside” information in
occupied France allowed its people greater knowledge of occurrences outside their
territory than historians usually acknowledge. Therefore, it is important to examine what
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news penetrated occupied France via La Belgique and in what form. The newspaper
published official communiqués from both the Allies and Central Powers, albeit heavily
censored or altered. The Germans allowed some news from a non-German perspective in
the paper, conceivably to create the illusion that La Belgique was a relatively independent
newspaper. Minor pieces of good news for the British or French made it into the
newspaper, but rarely positive news with major ramifications. Perhaps the Germans
thought that readers would believe this was unbiased news, and that these minor reports
were the only good news for the Allies. At times, however, people working for the
newspaper, motivated by humor or patriotism, slipped by German censors the odd tidbit
the Germans would not have chosen to print.
A recurring article that counted how many days the war had raged provided recent
battle developments and analysis of current war events in addition to the communiqués.
Even beyond these articles and war analysis, international news not directly tied to the
war was a common feature in this newspaper. For the few months that German
authorities allowed it into occupied France, La Belgique provided news of what was
going on in both occupied France (but was not commonly known) and the rest of France,
from which the German zone was so painfully cut off. It also allowed its readers in
occupied France to gain insight into suffering that was going on elsewhere in Europe
because of the war, and also to learn the places where the situation was not as dire.

Official Communiqués
Due to the timeframe that this newspaper was for sale in occupied France, it
makes sense to focus upon its coverage of the First Battle of Ypres. Any Lilllois who
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read the third issue of La Belgique surely was thrilled to learn from a two-day old Paris
communiqué that in spite of violent German attacks the Allies had made good progress in
the Ypres region.14 It is extremely interesting that German censors allowed this
communiqué to pass, as it is an example of French propaganda. On October 31, 1914,
the Germans captured Gheluvett at noon, and this briefly appeared to be the turning point
in the first Battle of Ypres, as the town’s fall broke the BEF’s line and created the
possibility of a devastating flank attack.15 However, a counterattack forced the Germans
back and reestablished the British line. Over the next two days, the Germans captured the
strategic ridges at Messines and Wytschaele, causing the British and French to withdraw
from these ridges and concentrate their forces on the defense of Ypres.16 Revealing the
French positive spin on this situation may have been valuable to the German authorities if
readers in the occupied cities had any way on knowing what was actually happening in
Ypres and the surrounding area. With distrust of the Germans and confidence in any
positive news seeping in from other sources, it is unlikely the readership of Lille,
Roubaix, or Tourcoing would have doubted the French communiqué.
Readers’ renewed sense of hope might have been quickly diluted however, upon
reading the Berlin communiqué reporting that the Germans repulsed British and French
attacks near Nieuport without any difficulty.17 The German controlled newspaper omitted
to report that water tactically unleashed by the Belgians by opening the sluice gates of the
coastal dikes forced the Germans to withdraw from the area between Dixmude and
Nieuport, allowing the Belgian King Albert to keep a portion of his country out of
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German hands.18 Every issue of La Belgique issued between November 5, 1914 and
February 26, 1915, (the date that the paper stopped being available in France; the First
Battle of Ypres ended in mid-November, 1914) featured a section entitled “Official
Communiqués.”19 In most issues, this section contained on average twenty to twenty-five
blurbs, ranging in length from a sentence to a paragraph. In most editions, approximately
the same number of communiqués from the Allied and German sides was printed. This
general trend did have exceptions, however – on November 8, 1914, the paper included
triple the number of communiqués from the Germans and Austrians, but on February 8,
printed four Allied pieces and only one communiqué from Germany.20 The quality (in
terms of detail and relevance) and topics of the communiqués were approximately
equivalent from both sides, with the only notable difference being that Allied reports
were often more outdated by two-to-three days as compared to German and Austrian
reports.
La Belgique included communiqués from many of the countries fighting in the
war. Beyond the frequent statements out of Paris, London, Petrograd, Berlin, and Vienna,
the newspaper included communiqués from Delhi, Pretoria, Constantinople, Budapest,
Tokyo, Copenhagen (in neutral Denmark), Kapstadt (South Africa), Cetinje
(Montenegro), and Nisch (Serbia).21 Some communiqués originated from Bordeaux when

18

Burg and Purcell, 32.
The November 22, 1914 issue included this section, but had no news from any Allied sources, which
usually included news from Paris, London, and Petrograd. It was explained that no communiqués had been
received by the time they went to press that day, and that they were certain this was due to communication
difficulties.
20
La Belgique, Nov. 8, 1914, and Feb. 8, 1915.
21
Many of these governments’ communiqués were included in several issues of La Belgique. For a sample
of these communiqués, the Nov. 15, 1914 issue provides sound representation, as it included dispatches
from Pretoria, Constantinople, Budapest, Kapstadt, and Copenhagen. The Nov. 10, 1914 issue provides an
example of a Delhi dispatch, while the Nov. 17, 1914 issue included news from Tokyo and Cetinje. Nisch
dispatches can be found in the Nov. 21, 1914, and Nov. 26, 1914 issues.

19

203
the French government temporarily moved there from Paris, but they were relatively few
in number.22
Despite the variety of governments whose communiqués appeared in the
newspaper, the majority of dispatches originated from France, Britain, Russia, Germany,
and to a lesser extent, Austria. Robert Desmond, in his study of World War I journalism,
Windows on the World: World News Reporting 1900-1920, claims that the preponderance
of war coverage was concentrated on the Western Front of Belgium and France, while
coverage was less intensive on the Eastern Front.23 This does not hold true for coverage
in La Belgique. While it is true more news in the form of “Official Communiqués” came
from the Western Front, the difference between the amount of news from the Western
Eastern and Fronts was not that great considering how directly affected the lives of the
readers of La Belgique were by fighting in France and Belgium. When combined with
news in the “This Day in War” section (to be discussed subsequently) the Eastern Front
received a great deal of attention in this newspaper. One could speculate that this was
because the war on the Eastern Front was proving relatively more successful for
Germany, although the paper also included news of Russian success. What matters for
this dissertation, however, is that between November 1914 and February 1915, occupied
France received news from official communiqués from both major fronts of the war.
Some of the French communiqués were military communiqués while others
originated from the Havas agency. The content and style varied little between the two
sources. This is not surprisingly, as, in actuality, all French news from the front came
from the same source: the French military. This information was often-time misleading,
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made only the more disingenuous in La Belgique by German censors, who edited the
communiqués in the reverse direction of the original propaganda. Despite this, French
communiqués in this imported Belgian paper did allow occupied France to hear a
somewhat more distorted version of military facts than that received by their compatriots
in free France. They were given the same hope that “in general, the situation on the whole
front is very satisfactory for our armies,” when they were told the German attacks from
the direction of Dixmude and northeast of Ypres were pushed back.24 They could place
hope on an official report discussed in a Paris communiqué that stated during the week of
November 21-27 enemy attacks were becoming less violent at the same time Allied
counter-attacks were causing more serious losses for the other side (the Germans allowed
themselves to be referred as the enemy in Allied communiqués).25 The next month
another French communiqué reported that the Allies took an enemy trench west of the
Arras-Lille route that had been a major obstacle.26 Burg and Purcell described the entire
Western Front as having settled into a near-stasis of “trench warfare,” with only
inconsequential movements back and forth by this time.27 These communiqués let in just
enough information about unproductive days as well to make them appear creditable, that
they were sharing all information, and when nothing occurred, they reported that. A
November 11, 1914, Paris communiqué made the qualified observation that between
Nieuport and Lys the Allies had generally (italics inserted) held their position, and while
the Germans had taken Dixmude, the Allies were on the outskirts of the town.28 In the
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newspaper published two days later, a London communiqué admitted that near Ypres
both sides suffered considerable losses.29 When the First Battle of Ypres settled into
trench warfare around November 13, 1914, German casualties had reached 130,000 and
British and French casualties each numbered approximately 58,000.30 Readers in
occupied France would continue to receive battle news from La Belgique for three
months after the First Battle of Ypres.
Readers also received rare news about battle outcomes close to them, when they
learned Lille had been the jumping off point for a furious German attack that the French
communiqué claimed Allied forces not only pushed back but destroyed some of the
German defenses in the process.31 David F. Burg and L. Edward Purcell do not refer to
any such German attack, with their only reference to Lille being that the British sent a
force to attack the city on January 18, 1915, but the Germans successfully repulsed the
attack. Overall, the tide of battle during the first days of 1915 in northern France and
Belgium favored the Germans.32 It is plausible conjecture that the German-controlled
paper included this information to demonstrate the duplicity in some French
communiqués, as the people of Lille would most likely have known if a military attack
utilized their city as a base.
Printing the German and Austrian communiqués beside them revealed the
potential embellishments in the Allied communiqués. Just as the French communiqués
relied heavily on the Havas Press Agency, and the British relied upon Reuters, German
communiqués relied upon the Wolff press agency for many of its reports. German

29

Ibid., Nov. 16, 1914.
Burg and Purcell, 35.
31
La Belgique, January 10, 1915.
32
Allen L. Churchill. The Story of the Great War, Volume III (BiblioBazaar, 2006), 224.
30

206
communiqués read much like those of the Allies only suggesting Germany would
eventually win the war. One difference between the two sides communiqués was the
German preference for quantifying their victories. For example, harking back to the First
Battle of Ypres, a Paris notice in the November 13, 1914, issue stated that their side had
had a good day and made progress toward Langemark and Dixmude. The German
communiqué stated that east of Ypres they captured seven hundred French soldiers, along
with four cannons and four machine guns.33 The Germans also lent creditability to their
communiqués by allowing in such lackluster news as admitting that their attacks in
Flanders were progressing slowly, or that no change in the front was occurring because
frozen land and snowstorms were proving to be obstacles.34
On numerous occasions German and Allied news sources resembled wars of
words, as each side attempted to portray its efforts in the best light. One dispatch
countered Allied assertions that in Alsace the French retook Aspach-le-Haut and Aspachle-Bas. Rather, the Germans contended they had voluntarily left the first because it was
of no importance and the latter was still under their control.35 While Aspach-le-Bas was
still under German control, the Germans did not voluntarily leave Aspach-le-Haut, but
lost it to Allied forces. Later on that month, a Berlin dispatch claimed French and Russian
dispatches lauding the capture of twenty thousand German soldiers on the Eastern Front
was pure invention.36 On December 3, 1914, the Serbian First Army launched an
unexpected counterattack at the Battle of the Ridges surprising the Austrian – not
German – Sixth Army. After three days of battle, the Austrians retreated towards the
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Kolubara River, during which the Serbians captured forty thousand Austrian prisoners, as
well as large quantities of guns and ammunition.37
Usually the differences in interpretations were apparent as communiqués ran
beside each other telling different versions of the same battle. Rarely did communiqués
utterly contradict each other, as Allied and Central Powers’ stories each focused on
slightly different areas of the battle. Thus, both sides discussed the battle southeast of
Ypres in one issue of the newspaper, but while the French noted that the Germans failed
to take the Nieuport Bridge, the Germans focused on the fact that they had captured
prisoners.38 Again, neither side mentioned the opening of the sluice gates of the coastal
dikes to flood the area between the Yser and the railway extending from Dixmude to
Nieuport, the defining action of fighting near Nieuport.39 In almost every edition of the
paper both sides touted what they gained in a particular skirmish, with the only exception
being when one or both sides declared it had been a relatively calm day. Berlin notices
also provided coverage of Allied bombing of occupied areas, emphasizing the systematic
nature of their attacks and how they appeared to be indifferent that they were killing their
compatriots.40 There were rarely Allied communiqués that discussed these events. This
section of the newspaper did provide readers in occupied France with a great deal more
news about the actual battles underway, but it also surely must have left readers bemused
at what was actually happening. To clarify the confusion, the editors of La Belgique
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provided a daily column, in which they could write as “impartial observers” and share
their insight with readers.41

Day 93 – Day 207 of the War & Other International News
Starting in the second issue of the newspaper and running for the rest of the time
the Germans imported it into occupied France, the lead article’s title reflected how many
days since the war began (i.e. Day 93 of the war was November 6, 1914, Day 94 of the
war was November 7, 1914, etc.). This article, always the first one to appear in the paper,
provided analysis of war events and something akin to an editorial voice to the paper.42
Based on the communiqués, the editors of the paper scrutinized the situation and reported
upon it, much like reporters in non-occupied areas. After commenting that the
communiqués had followed their usual formula of stating that nothing was new, on day
97 of the war La Belgique’s editors noted that both sides testified to their small victories
in the same area northeast of Ypres. After examining these different viewpoints of the
same war front, the editors supposed that this war was greatly different from those of the
past – no one grand battle would decide a victor.43 They even went so far as to make
predictions, speculating in late November that the status quo in Flanders would not
change over the winter months.44 The stated aim of this feature was to offer insight into
the communiqués, which the paper blatantly called biased and confusing, pointing out the
failings in these reports created by censorship and propaganda. They recognized the
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nervousness of newspaper readers, stating that worried people existed not only in
occupied territories but also even in neutral countries such as Holland.45 In the day 161
article, editors observed that while the Allies reported they had voluntarily abandoned
sections of the trenches near Arras, the Berlin report claimed the Germans took the
trenches in a surprise attack that awoke the defenders from their beds. The authors
commented to their readers that such conflicting reports of the same event made
communiqués difficult to interpret and, implicitly suggested, to trust.46 A month earlier
the editors’ message had been much more explicit. It began by stating that the
communiqués from the Allied armies continued to be flawed, making it extremely
difficult to comment impartially on the day-to-day events of the war.47 It is most likely
lost to history whether they also believed German communiqués were also flawed; if they
did, that fact was not reported or was censored out. Nevertheless, the message remains
that La Belgique endeavored to appear to remain a dispassionate journal of news. Editors
stated that they understood it to be prudent during the difficult times of war that military
authorities censor truth and falsehoods, but because of that, official communiqués were
unreliable until confirmed from other sources.48 This section used communiqués and
some outside newspapers from all sides, attempting to piece the stories together. Thus,
readers in occupied France briefly received some attempts at accurate journalistic
coverage of the war. Even censored, this section provided greater detail about events
than historians long believed permeated the Lille region.
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This section of the newspaper provided extensive coverage of the Eastern Front,
which it described as unfolding in a particularly disconcerting manner.49 The
newspaper’s almost daily coverage included information about the Eastern Front, in
particular activities in Polish Russia, which was a very active battlefield in November
1914. The article often lamented that more news was coming out of Berlin and Vienna,
than Petrograd, not allowing the newspaper to confirm stories. During the First World
War, the Russian press had to submit to both military and political censorship.
Censorship in Russia was more severe than in any other warring nation, as its limited
tradition of freedom of the press only dated back to the 1905 revolution, after which the
press was relatively free to articulate its own position on foreign policy.50 Not
surprisingly, however, the two dispatches received from Petrograd in time for the “Day
110,” contradicted Berlin’s version of events.51 La Belgique’s editors even commented on
the tone of communiqués. They juxtaposed the laconic German communiqués from the
Western Front with the optimistic dispatches from Vienna after the Austrians took 15,000
Russian prisoners.52 Coverage from the Eastern Front was often hard to confirm, causing
stories to unfold over days rather than in one article. In “Day 117,” La Belgique reported,
with the caveat that the story had to be confirmed, that the Russians had won an
important victory on November 26, 1914 near Lodz.53 The reality was the Russians had
encircled a large number of German troops, but when the Russian leader Rennenkampf
failed to seal off the northern escape route, the Germans broke through and smashed a
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Siberian division to capture thousands of prisoners.54 By the December 2, 1914, edition
of La Belgique a story closer to the actual events began to emerge, and in the next day’s
paper, editors noted the German army’s success in an article that took up a large portion
of the first page.55 Towards the end of La Belgique’s importation into occupied northern
France, the newspaper began to include maps to help its readers locate some of the
obscure Eastern European towns that were now be featured in this section. In eight
issues, maps allowed people to better visualize the war news they were receiving from
the Eastern Front.56
War coverage did not end with the lead article of La Belgique. Approximately
half the issues received in occupied northern France included another article, providing
detailed analysis of a certain aspect of the war. Again, several articles dealt with the war
in Eastern Europe, and most read as if written by a neutral observer. While one article on
the war in Eastern Europe provided an obvious German slant, reminding readers that
hostilities between Russia and Austria and Germany began with a violent attack on
eastern Germany by the Russians, other articles provided rather detailed, unbiased, factbased looks at the composition of the Russian army, noting many of its strengths.57 Quite
frequently, articles provided a great deal of information, including the names of particular
side’s warships and their tonnage.58 Several articles examined the British military
situation, including topics such as retired British warships, the British naval budget, and
an examination of the British military, including their use of non-European soldiers
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(referred to as soldiers of color from India).59 While one could search for propaganda in
these articles and claim they contained bias against the Allied powers, much is open to
interpretation, with the articles containing no overtly prejudiced comments for the time.60
Thus, while an article on the Turkish and Russian fleets stated that the Russian ships were
inferior to other nations’ warships and that none could go faster than sixteen miles an
hour, many historians would claim that was simply a statement of fact rather than
propaganda against an Allied country. Under the pen name Ray Nyst, one or several
writers for La Belgique did write articles propounding the German cause. His articles
frequently encouraged pacifism. Pacifism was a German talking point that the authorities
hoped would convince occupied people to want to seek a negotiated peace. In contrast to
the Ray Nyst pieces, many articles read like neutral analyses, including a retrospective
published in January 1915, which chronicled the events of the first five months of the
war.61 Other articles considered the nature of war conducted in mountainous regions, the
role weather played in the war, and a lengthy discussion of trench warfare, including six
diagrams to illustrate key concepts.62 It would take an active imagination to discern any
propaganda or bias in these articles. One article in particular, whose author described the
destructive power of French bombs, even seemed to be pro-Allied powers.63
International news beyond the war received coverage in La Belgique. Most days
the paper had a section devoted to “Diverse Dispatches,” which supplied a few sentences
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on world topics. These sections came mostly from other newspapers and cited their
sources, providing readers with a small connection to news sources that the Germans
otherwise banned. Sometimes the newspapers included longer articles about world news.
Political turmoil in Italy was a frequent subject matter, as was the Mexican civil war and
the fall of Tsingtau in China.64 Not surprisingly, American events received a
disproportionate amount of coverage. Much of it related directly to the war, as snippets
and articles weighed facts in deciding to which side in the war the U.S. was leaning.65
Some articles on the United States simply reported facts without any slant, such as those
discussing American elections.66 It is highly probable that some news was simply
reporting on hard-to-learn-about current events that a responsible newspaper would want
to publish and that would lead news-deprived people in occupied zones to buy the paper.
Reports about the Bank of the Russian Empire placing five and half million rubles at the
disposal of cotton manufacturers to purchase cotton from Egypt and the United States
could hint that the Russian economy was having a difficult time adjusting to war time
needs, or could just be providing information.67 Another report stated that, according to
the Hague Convention, warring nations could not utilize the Panama Canal to replenish
their supplies.68

News about France and Insight into the Suffering of Others
“Happenings of the Day” and “Diverse Dispatches” were two sections of La
Belgique that frequently carried information about unoccupied France. However, the
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news provided was usually brief and at times haphazard in the level of coverage – minor
incidents could be reported in detail while major events occurring that day could be
ignored. An example of brevity occurred in the January 30, l915, newspaper, when, in
two sentences, it was noted that the French Chamber of Deputies would meet on
February 4, in the Bourbon Palace in Paris. The Chamber planned to ratify decrees on
finance, customs, and financial dealings with Austria-Hungry and Germany.69 However,
the newspaper did not report upon other routine meetings such as this one. French
political coverage was nothing more than random blurbs of information. The movements
of French President Poincaré received modest coverage, in particular his visits to the
front, such as when he went to Clermont-en-Argonne and Reims in December 1914.70 As
random as French news coverage may have been, items in La Belgique demonstrate that
at least until early 1915, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received some news
about the rest of their country. Lille and its surrounding areas were not completely
isolated from the rest of France in terms of news. While the amount of this news was
often paltry, to state it was non-existent would be an exaggeration.
A few articles may have even proved useful (beyond the importance people
placed on being informed) to the people of occupied France. They would have learned
about the treatment of people escaping northern France for Paris who did not have
financial resources or family members in the capital. Authorities quickly created a
floating village in Paris made of barges in the Seine to provide shelter for refugees from
Belgium and northern France.71 Created by a wood merchant named Liève, two barges
housed families, a third housed single men, and a fourth sheltered single women, while a
69
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fifth acted as a dining hall for all. La Belgique also provided the odd speck of news
happening around occupied France. Annette Becker notes that although news was not
abundant in occupied France, rumors were. People heard and read the news in the
version approved by the Germans, including military communiqués, and interpreted
them, while trying to distinguish any real news of Allied forces from the German
propaganda.72 In such an environment reading a Paris communiqué stating that just north
of Lille the Allies had pushed back two enemy-attacks must have been a received as a
gift.73 Other useful news relayed by the Belgian paper included lists of French prisoners
of war being held in Germany, and rules for communicating with prisoners of war via the
Red Cross.74
While it may have been hard for people in the occupied zone to reflect on others’
suffering, several articles in La Belgique revealed that different areas shared some degree
of adversity. The most obvious partners in suffering were the Belgians. Reading a
newspaper aimed at the Belgians, people in occupied France could see that the Germans
also expected others to pay war taxes, and live under strict rules of occupation.75 Despite
many of the shared rules and regulations, French readers might have also gained a false
sense that the Belgians were being ordered around in a kinder tone. German decrees in La
Belgique did not scream from the lead position in an intimidating bold print. Rather, they
usually appeared on the second page of the newspaper, often in the center of the middle
column. While Governor-General Moritz von Bissing often issued the orders in the name
72

Becker, “Life in an Occupied Zone: Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing,” 631.
La Belgique, Nov. 18, 1914. One might question why German censors would let such information into a
newspaper they controlled. Other articles one would assume the Germans to find poor reading material for
their occupied audience included details on how to pass light signals across distances (Nov. 23, 1914), a
positive discussion of Joffre’s energetic offensive (Dec. 23, 1914), and a historical review on the end of the
siege of Paris in 1871 (Feb. 4, 1915).
74
Ibid., Jan. 8, 1915 and Dec. 11, 1914.
75
Ibid., Nov. 12, 1914 and Nov. 16, 1914.
73

216
of the public good, authorities in occupied France did not apply this fig leaf to similarly
harsh rules.76 In occupied France, the Germans allowed different areas to have only
limited contact with each other, as the German occupiers isolated them into municipal
enclaves. So to see that this newspaper kept people in Brussels current on events
happening in other areas of the country (never mind all the news from the rest of Europe)
must have been a bitter pill for the readers of occupied France. On its second page, La
Belgique usually carried a section entitled “Life in Our Provinces.” People in northern
France who had to live without such news must have envied the Belgium neighbors. The
tone and lay-out of the German-controlled newspapers in Belgium may have been more
moderate than those produced in occupied France, but that did not mean the hardships of
life in occupied Belgium were any less. Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador to
Belgium described Belgium under German occupation as a place where, “the very air is
poisoned with militarism, one has a constant sense of personal discomfort…one cannot
voice one’s own thoughts.”77 Describing among other evils the torture of those who
refused to work for the Germans and the jailing of thousands on contrived charges, Larry
Zuckerman states, “Occupied Belgium was a forerunner of Nazi Europe.”78 If the Belgian
imported newspaper suggested any less to readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, it
was a misrepresentation of fact.
La Belgique informed its readers about how the citizenries of London and Paris
suffered during the war. Readers of La Belgique on November 24, 1914, would have
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learned that in London stores had to close by 8pm and no light could be visible outside by
police order. High society no longer held parties, as most of the great families were
involved with the Red Cross. Business remained calm during the day and at teatime
musicians still played in many restaurants.79 In Paris as well, the police prefect ordered
that restaurants must close by 10pm. and cafes by 8pm.80 La Belgique reported that the
Parisian population faced strict restriction on light usage to make zeppelin attacks more
problematical.81 People in unoccupied France were also facing shortages of white bread
and instead were eating brown bread; sugar prices were high (because most beet sugar
production occurred in occupied France) and coal was becoming scarce.82 Juxtaposed
against these hardships were stories that revealed some gaiety remained to life in the
French capital. La Belgique reprinted a fashion story from the French newspaper Le
Matin, noting that wool was the fabric of the season. The newspaper, in one of its few
attempts at transparent propaganda, suggested it superficial to concern oneself with such
trivial matters at such a dark hour.83
The other group that faced hardships equal to those in occupied France were the
men fighting in the trenches. As one article noted, the war was long for everyone, but it
was longer for the men in the trenches and the women and parents missing them.84 Hew
Strachan places the horrors of the trenches in context, noting that trenches created health
problems – particularly the ones dug out of the cultivated soil of Belgium and northern
France, which encouraged the rapid infection of wounds with gangrene – but saved
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lives.85 The quality of life varied between trenches, as some had wood floors and were
well built, while others were nothing more than basic mud-holes. Not only was life
dismal in most the trenches, with lice and rats spreading disease and soldiers standing in
cold, wet mud dealing with trench foot and frostbite, but the trench system allowed
fighting to be continuous.86 News of soldiers was the most coveted and often the least
available, unless the enemy captured them and their names appeared on prisoner of war
lists.

Conclusion
In Maxence van der Meersch’s fictional account of life in occupied France during
the Great War, Invasion, the importance, and deficit of news is a recurring theme. He
writes that since October 1914, “news from France had entirely ceased. A steel curtain
had been lowered between the occupied districts and the rest of the world. What was
happening to the French troops? Why was the German army being allowed to hold
ground here? How long would it stay?”87 La Belgique answered a few of these
questions. The German occupiers chose to import this newspaper into occupied France
for approximately four months, but a small percentage of the time under occupation.
During this paper’s brief sojourn in occupied France, it did provide snippets of news –
sometimes surprisingly candid news considering it was supposed to be a tool inhibiting
the hope in its readers. Readers received a broad spectrum of news, but coverage of most
topics was concise. One exception to this rule was submarine coverage. Like other
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German-controlled newspapers, La Belgique provided readers with extensive coverage of
German submarine news. However, this most likely was not a noteworthy element of
this newspaper’s content for French readers, as La Gazette des Ardennes already
provided all the submarine news an occupied Frenchmen could possibly want.
Despite its German censors, La Belgique provided glimpses of unbiased news.
Perhaps the German censors allowed this news through to lend creditability to the idea of
La Belgique still being a Belgian newspaper, separate from the German authorities. As
Sophie De Schaepdrijver notes, the propaganda in this newspaper was subtle, the
newspaper “…did not sing the praises of the Kaiser,” but aimed to quietly garner favor
for the occupiers’ position.88 This would be even more so the case in the less wellcontrolled imported Belgian paper, Le Bien Public.
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Chapter Eight
German Imported Belgian Papers 2:
Le Bien Public

Le Bien Public of Ghent began publishing under German control on October 14,
1914, when only two days prior it had been a Belgian paper decrying German aggression.
During the years preceding the war, Le Bien Public was a patriotic newspaper, with
German rather than French sympathies when reporting upon international affairs.1
Before the war, this newspaper opposed allowing the use of Flemish at the University of
Ghent, and the 1898 Loi d’Egalité, which legally placed French and Flemish on equally
footing throughout Belgium.2 The editors began this first issue under occupation with an
article entitled “To Our Readers,” in which they acknowledged the inevitably precarious
position of a patriotic Belgian newspaper that was continuing to print under German
rule.3 This daily newspaper’s editors expanded upon their position further in the next
edition, stating that they wanted to keep publishing as a Belgian, Catholic newspaper
whose new aim would be to give their readers a feeling of calm and confidence and
deliver useful, albeit limited, information.4 The editors discussed the obstacles they faced
gathering news, noting that they had to base coverage of war operations strictly on
official communications from various governments. While the German authorities
agreed not to impose any information on the paper, they did review it prior to publication
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and information could be censored.5 The editors stated their position bluntly: we can
follow the rules of occupation and German censorship and still be patriotic Belgians.6
The Germans forced Le Bien Public and L’Ami de L’Order from Namur (which
was not imported into occupied France), to reappear shortly after all Belgian papers were
suppressed. For a short time after it reappeared, the newspaper maintained its previous
practice of producing three editions a day. It was usually three pages in length, with war
and international news on the first page, sometimes spilling over to the second, and then
provincial and local information and advertisements on the second and third pages.
Despite being closely monitored by the German censors, and being used by the Germans
in occupied France, the Bien Public’s publication was often provisional and always
uncertain.7 In December 1914, the editors of the paper forewarned readers that they were
not confident the paper would continue publishing in 1915.8 This uncertainty appeared to
be a reflection of the editors’ mixed sentiments about publishing under German control.
Le Bien Public reported that Belgian journalists who fled to London and were publishing
newspapers in exile saw their colleagues who stayed and worked under the Germans as
quasi-collaborators.9 A historian of the Belgian press during World War I, Jean Massart,
described such papers as Le Bien Public as “professed” (as opposed to authentic) Belgian
newspapers.10 A lack of by-lines or statement of editors’ names suggests its staff did not
want their identities known, as some saw them as colleagues of the German authorities.
Such charges must have tried the staff of the newspaper, but they chose to continue
5
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working. They described the readers’ negative response to the newspaper’s initial
suspension as a sort of referendum that had deemed Le Bien Public indispensable.11
Hence, the newspaper did continue, and for the period that it was available in occupied
France, it did so without any further significant suspensions of publication.12
Resembling its imported counterpart from Brussels, La Belgique, Le Bien Public
temporarily provided occupied France with more information about the war and
international affairs than historians usually believed to have been available. The paper
provided official war communiqués, articles on international affairs not directly related to
the war, and war and cultural analysis. Even more so than La Belgique, the Ghent
newspaper provided news from unoccupied France. Indeed, Le Bien Public tested the
German censors more than other German-approved Belgian papers. It thus had a few
articles that probably slipped by German censors alongside blank spaces in the newspaper
clearly indicating the work of censors in excising material found objectionable in by
occupation authorities.

Official Communiqués & War Analysis
Coverage of military operations in Le Bien Public was quite irregular as compared
with La Belgique. In the beginning of the Ghent newspaper’s occupation publication, the
majority of war news presented itself as official communiqués printed under the heading
of either “War in France and Belgium” or “On the Eastern Front.” The German censors
did edit Allied communiqués, despite their promise to the readers only to suppress
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articles in their entirety, in order not to provide mutilated news.13 Despite this practice,
some positive reports from a French perspective did seep in to the newspapers early in
the occupation. On November 1, 1914, a Reuters account told of German attacks losing
energy in Nieuport and Arras, while also confirming that the Germans had suffered heavy
losses, including many wounded and dead. Incongruously, a Wolff dispatch appeared in
the same section that day, claiming German attacks south of Nieuport were continuing
with success and that had they captured eight machine guns and two hundred British
prisoners.14 Similar to the reporting in La Belgique, no mention was made of the Belgian
army flooding the area to slow the Germans. Sometimes dispatches from the two sides
disagreed with each other, but usually Allied and German communiqués focused on
different areas.
Starting in mid-December 1914, newspapers appeared without any war news.
These gaps in battle coverage continued into early January 1915. The newspaper staff
never included any explanation as to why battle coverage briefly ceased, but difficulties
either in attaining communiqués or with German censors were most likely to blame.
When the newspaper returned to publishing war news almost daily, it did so in a different
format. It switched journalistic styles, providing war news not in the form of
communiqués, but as articles under “Political Bulletins” that provided a synthesis of the
day’s communiqués. Much like the “This Day in War” articles found in La Belgique,
these articles, sub-titled “Military Operations” often cited their sources, and frequently
offered a comparison of French and German dispatches.15 These articles even critiqued
their sources, noting that after all these weeks reports start sounding alike – what really
13
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do these advances and retreats mean in terms of one side winning the war?16 Presenting
the information in this format gave different weight to different data. When Le Bien
Public simply printed dispatches, the reader determined what was relevant and what was
not. Now, journalists commented on reports, often prefacing them with statements such
as, “nothing very salient to report today, only the failure of one small French
offensive.”17 Furthermore, it was less perceptible when Le Bien Public omitted news of
military operations, because there was always other international news coverage under
the “Political Bulletins” headline. This style was short-lived however, and by February
11, 1915, Le Bien Public reverted to providing war communiqués, this time under the
title, “The War.” This would be the last detailed information on military operations
occupied France would receive from this paper, and the last few weeks in February
provided little in the way of war news; by the end of February the Germans stopped
importing the newspaper. War analysis complemented this haphazard coverage of
military operations.
Le Bien Public included at least eight articles of substance providing war analysis
during the time the Germans imported it into occupied France. While that was not
substantial number for a daily newspaper over four and a half months, these articles are
worth mentioning because they appeared in an arena believed to be receiving only a
modest amount of news. Very early in the newspaper’s importation into occupied France,
a report from the Times (presumably the London Times) correspondent in Bordeaux
compared French General Joffre’s style of leadership to that of Napoleon. Napoleon
found a weak spot in his enemy’s army, and attacked using all his force in that one
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position, whereas modern warfare no longer made that strategy viable. Instead, General
Joffre focused upon being intimately connected to several positions of combat at the
same time, driving rapidly in a car from point to point.18 The article was quite the feat of
German propaganda. It noted that the people of France loved Joffre and perceived him as
dynamic, but also stated he had actually done little as of yet to garner such devotion.19
The article was correct in noting that the people of France loved Joffre, as the people of
France saw him as the man who saved France at the Battle of the Marne. However, to
state he had done little to garner such devotion was German propaganda; after incorrectly
assuming that the main thrust of the attack would come through Alsace and Lorraine,
Joffre quickly readjusted his thinking and did indeed work a miracle, halting the Germans
at the Battle of the Marne and “effectively killing the modified Sclieffen strategy.”20
Towards the end of that month, the newspaper provided readers with a Marshal von
Hindenburg interview, taken from the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, in which he
discussed military strategy.21
Numerous articles provided a larger perspective of military affairs. An early
article speculated how long the war would last based on modern warfare (the journalist
assumed the war would be much longer than those of the nineteenth century but did not
guess four years).22 By January 1915, Le Bien Public had not published any updates from
the front for a while, but it did print an article about the economic ramifications of war. It
noted that unlike France and Britain, Germany had foreseen the war - and in particular
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the prolonged fighting – and that this had a profound impact on the countries’ agriculture,
commerce, and finance.23 For those unfamiliar with war events, the editors published a
long article in January 1915, providing a month-by-month recap of the episodes leading
to war and the actual battles fought, from June 28, 1914, until December 31, 1914.24 If
this particular issue reached occupied France, the people there must have considered it a
treasure trove of information, as news of the last three months of the year had been
sporadic. Five days later, the newspaper published a straightforward account of the Triple
Alliance’s history, including the text of the 1879 Austrian-German treaty.25 The article
acknowledged Italy’s neutrality, noting that its non-participation in the war was
explainable, as the Triple Alliance was purely defensive in character. However, the
article noted that the Germans remained quietly expectant that Italy would eventually
enter the war on the German side; instead, Italy declared war on Austria on May 20,
1915.26
The newspaper included several articles about the strength of the belligerent fleets
(Germans allowed themselves to be referred to as both the belligerents and enemy in
certain pieces). In mid-January 1915, Le Bien Public’s editors managed to publish an
article detailing the potency of the Allied fleets, providing details about the number of
ships both the British and French had available for fighting.27 To laymen, the strength of
the Allied fleets must have seemed encouraging. Overall, Le Bien Public did not provide
much coverage of battles and the movement of troops, despite for a time carrying a
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recurring article entitled “The French and Belgian Front.” What this newspaper did grant
readers in occupied France was a substantial amount of international news outside the
immediate confines of the war. It also provided ample discussions of the cultural and
political ramifications of the war.

International News & Analysis
International news came most frequently in the form of quick blurbs under the
headline, “Political Bulletin.” Much like La Belgique, this newspaper provided a wide
variety of news about numerous places. For the brief time the Germans imported it into
France, Le Bien Public did provide a consistent source of international news. While most
articles were brief – usually a paragraph – there was regular coverage of world affairs.
The importance of places and events the paper discussed appears apparent. The two most
important neutral countries from a German perspective, Holland and the United States,
received abundant reporting. This focus on Holland, which shared a border with Belgium
and was an important source of pre-war goods, and the United States, whose potential
entrance into the war was a vital concern, accompanied coverage of politics and opinion
in other neutral countries, especially Italy. The newspaper staff frequently reported upon
the Allied powers and areas under their influence, such as South Africa, that hinted at the
well being of the British Empire. The newspaper provided ample coverage of the Roman
Catholic Church and the Pope’s role in the war, not surprising for a professed Catholic
newspaper.
Starting early in the newspaper’s censored publication, Holland was a key focus,
to the extent that a semi-regular article, “In Holland,” was a frequently-seen sub-title
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under “Political Bulletins”. Beginning in late October 1914, readers read about relations
with their neighbor to the north that was untouched by invasion. This issue even included
a second article “Holland and the War,” which reprinted an official German declaration
from M.P.J. Troelstra stating that Germany would not violate Dutch independence. 28 A
topic naturally discussed was the situation of Belgian refugees in Holland, who numbered
in the hundreds of thousands.29 During the German siege of Antwerp in October 1914,
approximately one million Belgians fled across the Dutch frontier, increasing the
Netherlands population by one-sixth.30 The newspaper did not mention the German
soldiers who also sought refuge from the war in Holland. In early November, the paper
ran an article that methodically analyzed the economic consequences of the war for
Holland and the military measures the war forced it to take.31 Dutch neutrality was also
thrashed out frequently in the paper. A longer article in November covered this subject,
as well as German laws regulating the Dutch-Belgian border, and the implications of
Dutch neutrality on Belgian refugees living there.32 This article appeared a few months
prior to the Germans, expenditure of huge effort and much money to build a lethal
electric fence along three hundred kilometers of the Dutch-Belgian border to disprupt
Allied intelligence operations based in Holland (and prevent the escape of Belgians).33
Two articles discussed the effect of the British blockades on the Dutch and world
28
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economies, including “The Dutch Crisis,” which spoke to the economic hardships faced
there due, in part, to the blockade hindering trade.34As Maartje M. Abbenhuis describes
it, during the war Holland felt caught between the devil (Germany) and the great blue sea
(ruled by Britain).35 Le Bien Public provided news of the hardship caused by the great
blue sea, but not the devil. The Dutch government protested against the British blockade
measures such as interfering with the rights of neutral citizens to unhindered trade. When
such protests achieved little, the Dutch adjusted their trade practices and formed a
Commission for Trade, which was on very good terms with Britain.36 The effect of the
war on Dutch agriculture was the subject of yet another article that portrayed Holland as
suffering along with Belgium.37 The image of Holland struggling in similar fashion to the
occupied zones continued into the next year, with the first paragraph under “Political
Bulletins” describing censorship in the Dutch press, noting that it did not really affect
Dutch newspapers.38 In reality, the Dutch government censored its press, but not
universally and never consistently. When the war started, the Dutch government asked
newspaper editors to refrain from endangering neutrality by praising or condemning any
of the belligerents.39 In February, just a few weeks before occupied France stopped
receiving Le Bien Public, the paper reported that Holland was mobilizing to armed
neutrality.40 The report did not state that throughout the war the Dutch feared invasion,
especially from the Germans.
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The United States, as a rising world power, garnered international attention before
the war started. With its declaration of neutrality during the first part of the war,
however, both sides were vying for its support, and coverage of events occurring across
the sea increased. Even within the short time span occupied Frenchmen had access to Le
Bien Public, one could see a proliferation of stories focusing on the United States. An
early snippet of news told of a bomb exploding in a Bronx courthouse, aimed at a Judge
Gibbs who had been doling out harsh sentences.41 This story seems to have been included
merely because of its shocking elements. Most articles about the United States either
provided insight into its political climate or focused on the relationship between it and
England and potential rifts building between the two.
President Wilson’s attitudes towards the war were of such importance that in
January 1915, Le Bien Public published a two-issue serial on the topic.42 Earlier, it had
reported upon his official protest in regards to the bombing of open cities.43 The January
21,1915 issue also included pieces about a proposed amendment to American
immigration laws excluding illiterate immigrants from entry to the country, and Senator
Lodge’s demand for a commission to examine if the United States was sufficiently
prepared if it had to enter the war.44 The paper provided a few sentences on the Senatorial
elections.45 Immigration law also received continuing coverage, including when President
Wilson utilized his veto power to cut down a bill.46 Le Bien Public also supplied an
examination of America’s relations with both Mexico and Argentina.47 Most political
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articles about the United States, however, focused on whether it would enter the war,
including items on American neutrality, the build-up of the American arsenal, including
its aerial fleet, weaponry, naval projects (in particular its submarine program) and the
Ship Purchase Bill.48 The Ship Purchase Bill was Secretary of the Treasury William G.
McAddo’s attempt to deal with the disruption of shipping that jeopardized American
exports. The legislation called for the creation of a government-owned corporation to
purchase and operate ships on overseas trade routes. President Wilson supported the
legislation but Congress balked at the idea, claiming it was expensive and socialistic. The
bill was prepared shortly after the outbreak of war, but had to be introduced to Senate
several times, and with numerous modification before passage in May 1916. The final
bill limited the existence of the Shipping Board to times of “national emergency.”49 The
Ship Purchase Bill issue revealed the differing political opinions in the United States
during the war. Any person in occupied France who was fortunate enough to have read
all these issues of Le Bien Public would have had a solid understanding of the American
political outlook toward the war.
The United States and England enjoyed close ties. Readers discovered in early
January that Dr. Hexamer, president of the American Association of University
Professors founded that year, had organized meetings protesting the overtly anglophile
attitude of the American government.50 Various articles concentrated upon the potential
of increasing estrangement between the two countries. When the United States protested
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British enforcement of their blockade, including the British seizure of leather and olive
oil from neutral countries on the grounds that the destination of the products was enemy
territory, it received coverage.51 However, the newspaper also reported upon British
assurances sent via their Washington ambassador to the United States that the British
navy would not slow down American ships in the search for contraband.52 Le Bien
Public included even petty incidents of strife between the two countries. For example,
when a Canadian duck hunter accidentally killed an American duck hunter near Lake
Erie in the British dominion of Canada, the very overblown headline in Le Bien Public
read “Incident on Anglo-American Frontier.”53 It would be an understatement to assert
that the newspaper provided detailed coverage of the two countries’ relationship.
Coverage of neutral countries’ internal politics was a stable fixture in this Ghent
newspaper. Stories pertaining to Italy were especially prevalent. The Italian earthquake
received substantial coverage in both Le Bien Public and La Belgique because of its
enormity. Occurring on January 13,1915, this major earthquake in the Abruzzi province
affected fifty-four communes, leaving 25,000 dead and another 100,000 people
homeless.54 One of the first articles on Italy to appear in the German-censored Le Bien
Public was a Wolff report examining Italian neutrality and the internal struggle gripping
its politics.55 Readers in occupied France were relatively well informed on Italian politics,
being able to follow its ministerial crisis and then learn about its new cabinet.56 Once this
new government emerged, further pieces detailed the nature of the country’s neutrality
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and its military preparedness.57 When Italy did enter the war on the side of the Allies on
April 26, 1915, (after the French occupied zone stopped receiving Le Bien Public) war
deeply divided the country.58 In early 1915, when occupied France was still receiving this
newspaper, the question of intervention was dividing the Italian left, with many socialists
being identified by the population as defeatists for their position of neutrality, while many
others on the left, including revolutionary socialists like Benito Mussolini supported the
war effort.59
Articles were also included in the paper focusing on Romanian neutrality, and the
Portuguese political crisis and neutrality.60 One article quoted Nika Petreseu, a
Romanian Professor of law at the University of Louvain. He stated that Romania did not
want to become involved in the war, in part because of Russia’s bullying tactics in 1878,
after the two countries fought together against the Ottoman Empire, taking Plevna by
siege.61 Petreseu continued on to state that not only did Russia’s ingratitude push
Romanian into the Austrian sphere of influence and made him realize the potential
dangers Romania faced from Russia if the Austria and Hungary lost the war, but it also
made the country not want to enter into war unless its vital interests were endangered.62
This article not only implied the untrustworthiness of Russia, from a neutral, but
suggested Romania was leaning towards Germany’s side. Romania had recently renewed
a treaty of alliance with the Central Powers, and its ruler, Ferdinand of Hohenzollern, was
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a member of the same royal family as Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II. Despite these ties,
Romania entered the war against Germany in June 1916, after Russia promised to back
Romanian claims to predominantly Romanian-inhabited Transylvania, the Banat, and
Southern Bukovina.63 Coverage of the Portuguese struggle with neutrality did note that
Portugal already had a treaty with Britain, and focused upon Portugal’s hesitation to enter
the war, rather than suggesting it might do so on the German side.64 Germany declared
war on Portugal after Le Bien Public was no longer available in the French occupied
cities, in March 1916, after Lisbon agreed to the British request to seize German vessels
detained in Portuguese ports.65
In one issue alone, the paper carried brief blurbs under the heading “Political
Bulletin,” giving updates on Swiss, Italian, Romanian, and Bulgarian neutrality.66 In
December 1914 and January 1915, articles entitled “The Role of Neutrals” and “Neutrals
and the War” provided an overview of their role in the war.67 One of their roles was to act
as intermediaries, as did two Swiss delegates when they visited and reported upon
prisoner of war camps in both France and Germany.68 Readers in occupied France who
had the chance to read this paper were knowledgeable and up to date on the position of
many neutral powers up until February 1915.
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Coverage of the English home front, as well as those of her dominions, was
extensive in Le Bien Public.69 Considering the role of the German censors, it was not
surprising that most of these stories painted the Allied countries in a bad light. The South
African riots received extensive coverage, demonstrating the volatility of one of
England’s most important spheres of influence.70 The Union of South Africa supported
the British war effort, but Prime Minister Botha underestimated Afrikaner resistance to
fighting for the British, as they remembered the destruction and harsh concentration
camps the British utilized during the Boer War, as well as Germany’s support for the
Afrikaners during that war.71 The riots were apart of a larger Afrikaner uprising partly
directed against military service for the empire.72 The insurrection in Egypt also received
coverage, as did a bomb explosion in a police station in Calcutta, India.73 A short blurb
told about the uprising in the British protectorate of Nyasaland (now Malawi) when a few
tribesmen revolted against British colonialists stationed there.74 Reports on England
proper focused on its domestic woes caused by the war, such as its faltering economic
health. Two articles but ten days apart told readers in late autumn of 1914 that despite
taxes having been raised on several items, including beer and income, the British still
needed a loan from the treasury to pay for the war.75 Troubles with coal production in
Yorkshire received treatment, as did the looming menace of strikes, and the sharp
increase in overall prices across England. 76 A British economic story particularly
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germane for Belgian readers appeared in the last issue of 1914, entitled “The Problem of
Refugees in England.” It reported that Belgian refugees in England were having a
difficult time procuring jobs, as employers judged that hiring them would undermine the
indigenous workforce.77 A German proclamation, uncharacteristically in the lead
position, claimed the British were taking severe measures against German and Austrian
residents in their country.78 Perhaps the German authorities encouraged the newspaper’s
editors to lead with this story because it was true. On August 5, 1914, Parliament passed
into law the Alien Restrictions Bill as an emergency measure, giving the Home Secretary
total control over all aliens, requiring aliens to reside and remain within certain parts of
the country, and enabling their deportation without trial.79 The Alien Restrictions Bill
made German and Austrian nationals extremely vulnerable in Britain, as the British
government utilized this legislation to expel and intern the majority of Germans in Britain
by the end of the war.80 Of the approximately 75,000 people classified as enemy aliens
during the war, the British government interned roughly 32,000 and repatriated 20,000.81
As a professed Roman Catholic newspaper, Le Bien Public provided Catholic
occupied France with some coverage of Vatican affairs. Twenty-one days after its
occurrence, the newspaper covered the death of Cardinal Ferrata, the former papal nuncio
to Belgium and France.82 By mid-November, the newspaper was running stories under
the title, “The Pope and the War.”83 The second article under this title paraphrased Pope
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Benedict XV’s telegram stating Vatican neutrality.84 The Vatican stance was actually one
of absolute impartiality, which, as opposed to neutrality, forbade public moral
determinations.85 It was certainly good propaganda for the German authorities to tell
Catholic Belgians that their religious leader was not taking sides. Three weeks later, the
newspaper published two articles about his encyclical letter relating to the war.86 Ad
beatissimi apostolorum appealed in a loving tone to both sides, stating that the ruling
states had ceased to observe Christian wisdom leading to the war and beseeching both
sides to find some others means of resolving their differences.87 Readers also read of the
Pope’s pleas for a Christmas truce, before both sides ultimately rejected the idea.88 Two
days before Christmas Le Bien Public published both a letter from Pope Benedict to
Cardinal Mercier (Archbishop of Malines who opposed the deportation of unemployed
Belgian men to Germany), and an article about the religious spirit in internment camps.89
The January 2, 1915, edition of the paper discussed the Vatican’s relationship with
France.90 Discussing the gradual weakening of Church influence in France was discrete
propaganda aimed at the still religious Belgians.91 In a later issue, a paragraph of the
paper examined the Vatican’s relationship with the Quirinal (the Italian civilian
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government).92 Another article recounted the Pope’s visit to those injured in the Italian
earthquake and the comfort he provided them.93
The newspaper provided religious coverage in broader terms beyond the Vatican
as a political entity. Mid-way through the period of the paper’s importation into occupied
France a regular feature entitled “Press Review” provided an editorial section to the
newspaper. One article placed the blame for the war on the Catholic Church for not
forbidding Catholic Austria from starting the war (somewhat ignoring the realities of
Church power in the twentieth century).94 A later “Press Review” lauded the revival of
religious sentiment throughout Catholic Europe, noting the comfort it was bringing
people during trying times.95 One piece, “The Mysterious Law,” questioned why God
was not intervening to end the suffering caused by the war, with the author’s answer that
the natural state of man is to work and suffer96
Some international news pieces appear to be included purely for their inherent
interest. No less than fourteen issues of the paper mentioned the erupting Mexican civil
war. Two articles talked of Noble Peace Prize winners, one piece confirmed that Mount
Vesuvius was becoming active, while additional pieces discussed South American unrest
that only marginally could have an impact on the European war. Le Bien Public provided
a wide array of international news coverage. If a small amount of that information
managed to filter into occupied France, then from October 1914 till February 1915, the
area received more world news than is usually recognized.
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Le Bien Public extensively covered the international pacifist movement, with at
least six articles devoted to the topic, not counting those pertaining to the Pope’s attempts
to broker a peace. At first readers learned that it was not a very large movement, but the
reporting continued.97 Most of these articles provided little to revitalize hopes for peace,
and one article explained that, while there was a widespread desire for peace, the flood of
violence spread across Europe for profound reasons and could not end until something
was achieved.98 Le Bien Public reached back to peace conferences held at The Hague in
1899 and 1907, noting that the general public knew little about the results, which were
supposed to help avoid such a war.99 The newspaper even discussed the concept of
pacifism at an academic level, as one article provided the opinion of Charles W. Eliot,
President of Harvard University from 1869-1909, that a federation of European states
was the only way to ensure peace.100 It is interesting that the peace movement received
this much coverage, as one editorial in Le Bien Public called it an “inopportune
controversy,” and opined that this was not the time to undermine the German war effort
by talking about peace.101 Other broad, war-related, topics discussed in the newspaper
included the role of women in the war, the effects of so many deaths on the family
structure, and the relationship between war and art. Articles that analyzed international
trends offered substantial discussions of the effects and nature of war that would later be
lacking in news received in occupied France, even examining loftier topics such as
human progress and the war.
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News about France

As we noted, history remembers occupied France as starved for news from the
rest of the country. As Deborah Buffton states in her dissertation, people living in
occupied France compared their nutritional depravation to their knowledge
depravation.102 Hence, the news about France they did receive from Le Bien Public must
have been welcome, even though it frequently focused on France’s woes. At least
fourteen articles reported on news from unoccupied French unrelated to the battlefront.
Readers learned that three German airplanes flew over Paris, and that a German zeppelin
dropped six bombs on Paris in late October, killing eight people and injuring many
more.103 However, Le Bien Public relayed the French government’s return to Paris from
Bordeaux with no trace of propaganda inserted into the stories. A story on President
Poincaré’s return to Paris was followed three issues later with a blurb stating the next
session would start sometime between December 15th and 20th, and that the Parliament
was going to limit voting to money bills and laws indispensable to the war and national
life.104 Coverage of parliamentary activity continued into the next year, when in February
readers were informed of the nine topics Parliament intended to focus upon in the new
session, including road construction in various areas of France, limits on the number of
treasury bonds issued, passing a law forbidding trade with Germans, and limiting the sale
of absinthe.105
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Most of the stories spotlighted France’s social and economic afflictions. A
lengthy article ran in the end of November, simply titled “In French Industry.” Citing the
Petit Parisien as its source, it stated that stagnation had gripped the country, as the army
had taken all able-bodied men, forcing businesses to close and placing both the young
and old on welfare. It was true that mobilization and the war brought industrial activity
effectively to a halt, as most firms retained on average only one-third of their pre-1914
workforce.106 However, as the military front stabilized, the French state authorized
industrialists to recall mobilized essential workers.107 Especially important to readers in
the occupied zone, Le Bien Public continued on to reveal concerns about the large
number of Belgian and French refugees flooding Paris and the surrounding areas,
accentuating economic problems. The French government was asking female refugees to
work a few hours a week making clothes for the wounded and children.108 Political angst
was also fair grist for Le Bien Public. Without providing much detail or context, it
reported that some members of parliament and journalists had joined forces under
Clemenceau to name a commission to present to the prime minister a protest against the
illegal manner in which he was censoring of the news.109 The newspaper covered social
issues, such as the falling French birthrate.110 The birthrate story warned it would take
generations to make up for war losses if families continued to limit the number of
children they had. If the French government did not make changes soon, the undesirable

106

Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, 61.
Ibid., 61-2. Later, in June 1915, the Dalbiez Law enabled the demobilization of half a million industrial
workers, and this social group suffered proportionally fewer casualties at the front than agricultural workers
or men from the middle class.
108
Le Bien Public, Nov. 30, 1914.
109
Ibid., Dec. 22, 1914.
110
Ibid., Feb. 19, 1915.
107

242
action of bringing foreigners in to help France recover its position would be necessary.111
The paper reported that the French government attempted to deal with the crisis by
enacting laws to punish single people and to favor large families. This statement
represented an interpretation of two laws passed in France. In January 1914, the new
family allowance act recognized large families as a special category of poor, which
deserved more money because of childcare costs. The law granted aid in the form of an
allowance to fathers or lone mothers who had three children or more between the ages of
three and thirteen.112 In July 1914, France graduated income tax contributions according
to family size.113 Related to this, another blurb noted that some in the French government
feared the French national esprit was waning, and the naturalization law of 1889 had to
be modified to ensure the country’s identity.114 In the last issue potentially received in
occupied France, it reported that Senator Bérenger wanted a law banning all foreigners
from French military service and wanted those already in the service recalled.115
Immigrant manual laborers were an important part of France’s population, even before
the war; in 1914, Paris ranked as the first European capital in its proportion of foreign
residents.116 Before the war, these immigrants mainly came from Germany, and to a
lesser extent, other central and Eastern European countries. As the war caused the
reconstitution of this labor force, Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, and colonial
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workers replaced these workers from now-enemy countries.117 These stories suggested
that the rest of France was changing for the worse during the Nord’s separation from it.
Occupied France felt isolated from the rest of the world, the rest of France, and
even internally as villages and towns felt detached from one another. These sentiments
were based in reality. Occupation authorities restricted or forbade travel between areas.
Such policies isolated citizens of occupied locales from all but their immediate areas,
while censorship deprived them of most news from the outside world, making
information scarce, and rumor indistinguishable from fact.118 In this atmosphere, Le Bien
Public might even have provided information about occupied France to people within its
boundaries. With the battlefield literally being entrenched within the Nord, daily reports
of skirmishes were local news. Furthermore, an article in Le Bien Public allowed
residents of occupied France a chance to gauge the problems their conquest posed for the
nation. An assessment of the occupied territories, taken from the Petit Parisien, let people
know that 3.25 million were in the occupied zone, and placed a monetary value on the
lost area at 9,500,000,000 francs.119 Indeed, the industrial production of the Département
du Nord was valued at four billion francs annually before the war.120 Two other articles
provided information perhaps not known outside the Lille area. A short article in the last
column of the front page of the November 19 issue, quoting the Nord Maritime, reported
the Germans had not allowed anybody to enter or leave Lille since October 13.121 A much
longer article in early December extolled the Bulletin de Lille as providing details of the
city’s occupation, with an accurate assessment of the use of hostages and the amount of
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food available.122 Such praise for that mainstay of German authority, Bulletin de Lille,
must have been a bitter pill to readers in occupied France.

Censorship in Le Bien Public
All of the German-authorized newspapers, whether originating in Belgium or
France, were supposed to provide a view of life as the Germans wished people under
their control to interpret it.123 Le Bien Public’s publishing staff did not always put
forward the world image the Germans wanted, and hence occupation authorities
frequently censored the paper. The censors went as far as suspending le Bien Public for
all of May 1915 (after it was no longer available in occupied France) over its practice of
publishing Allied communiqués relatively unaltered.124 At the outset of German control,
the censors allowed the newspaper to leave a blank space in the place of the deleted
portion.125 The result in Le Bien Public was a lot of blank space. The first incident of
blank space occurred on the second page of the fifth issue produced under German
supervision.126 Two issues later, censors deleted a paragraph from an article “On the
Eastern Front.”127 By the next issue a great deal of the first page was blank: the lead
article had been censored, as well as a British communiqué; missing too was a large
portion of a report on the Japanese attack of Tsingtau, and another section whose topic is
not identifiable.128 The attack on Tsingtau was most likely a difficult topic for German
censors. Japan, aligned with the British, demonstrated its expansionist plans in China, a
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tendency German propaganda writers could utilize to their advantage. However, with the
capture of the Port of Tsingtau the Japanese established themselves in the Shantung
Province, pushing out the Germans, who used to control the region.129 By early
December, these blank spots disappeared. Perhaps this change reflected the editors’
recognition of what the Germans would censor. The editors wrote in one article, “We
have no illusions – we know what subjects will not escape the censors’ pens.”130 More
likely, the Germans reversed their decision to allow evidence of their censorship,
demanding the paper’s staff rework page layouts to hide the deletion of items. Either
way, people in occupied France no longer were able to tell which stories the Germans
censored.
Despite the heavy hand of censorship, a few articles were included that seemed to
escape the censors’ attention. In the second issue, an article entitled “Prudence,” reported
that German soldiers in Belgium were frequently ending up drunk, because Belgian
alcohol was much stronger than the German variety, and they were not accustomed to
it.131 The article made the German soldiers sound clownish at the same time the French
were being told they had to salute the occupiers. Shocking was an article about the
wireless telegraph station at the Eiffel Tower. It explained in detail how during the night
its news broadcast could reach a distance of 5,000-6,000km and during the day 3,0004,000km.132 Considering the ban on outside news sources, and the fact that those very
broadcasts would be the central source of news for the main clandestine press, La
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Patience, not censoring this story was odd, even if few individuals had receivers. Other
reports, telling of economic hardships in Germany and reverses in German-held colonies
seem like the type of news a censor would consider deleting. One piece informed readers
that a British warship torpedoed a German submarine, and painted the picture of the
Germans waving a white flag as they sank.133 As Deborah Buffton noted about the
Gazette des Ardennes134, two voices coexisted in Le Bien Public despite German control.
That second, a Belgian voice, must have been welcomed in the Nord.

Conclusion
The ability of Le Bien Public editors to test, and occasionally exceed, the limits of
German news control must have been evident to readers in occupied France. Compared to
newspapers produced in German-controlled France, it provided extensive coverage of
both the battlefronts and the world at large. The Bulletin de Lille and Bulletin de Roubaix
provided almost no coverage outside local affairs. La Gazette des Ardennes did include
war coverage but more heavily censored it. The German voice was the dominant one in
these papers – in Le Bien Public it was often the quieter of the two voices. Of course, the
end-result was that the Germans stopped importing the paper into occupied France. It is
interesting that the Germans chose to briefly import these two newspapers to occupied
France, as within Belgium, the Germans did not allow either newspaper to be distributed
beyond its province.135
Readers of La Belgique and Le Bien Public in France were also certain to notice
the different tone the Germans took with the Belgians. The less-authoritarian tone in
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these French-language newspapers should not be associated with Governor Baron von
Bissing’s statement, “I am of the opinion that a squeezed lemon has no value and that a
dead cow will give no milk.”136 The German authorities saw some Belgians as potential
future members of the German empire in a way they rarely saw the French, but they were
not the French-speaking Belgians. The German policy of Flamenpolitik encouraged the
German occupiers to court Flemish leaders and exploit their pre-existing quarrels with the
French-speaking Walloons to split Belgian loyalties, with the ultimate aim eventually
being Belgium as a Flemish state under German rule.137 Le Bien Public did not begin
with German notices and threats. Rather, they were located in the middle of the first
page, or sometimes on the second, without a blaring headline, and sometimes even sound
like a request rather than a threat. This did not mean the Belgians suffered any less than
the French under German occupation, although readers of these newspapers may have
drawn that conclusion.
History did not record which issues of the paper made it in to occupied France
between October 14, 1914, and February 28, 1915, so one cannot say for certain what
exact information people received. What can be asserted is that during this time the
residents of occupied France did receive a greater amount of war and international news
than they would at any other time during occupation. They would also have insight into
Germany’s occupation of Belgium, revealing people suffering under requisitions, scarcity
of necessities, and living in general terror. However, this newspaper may have misled
readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to believe that perhaps the Belgians did not
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suffer all the indignities they knew in their daily lives. While this news was a brief portal
providing a connection with the rest of the world, it also may have painfully reminded the
people of occupied France of their isolation.
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Chapter Nine:
German Imported Belgian Papers 3:
Le Bruxellois

In the July 10, 1915, issue of Le Bruxellois, the editors extended a fraternal
welcome to readers in northern France, as the Germans began allowing its importation to
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.1 The German’s advertised Le Bruxellois alongside the
Gazette des Ardennes in locally-produced French newspapers, such as the Bulletin de
Roubaix. Before Le Bruxellois’s appearance, readers in the tri-city area of occupied
France had not received news from a Belgian source since February 1915, when the
German occupiers deemed two other newspapers under their control, Le Bien Public and
La Belgique as too uncontrollable to continue as a tool in the occupation of northern
France.
Le Bruxellois posed no similar problems to the Germans. Le Bruxellois was a
collaborationist newspaper. The editors made a great show of impartiality in their
presentation of war news and in claiming their independence in relation to the German
occupying government. Despite these claims, the editors of the paper propagated the
German position on almost every topic. An example can be seen in an early lead story,
signed simply TONY, on Italian neutrality. The writer states in the article that Italy
remained neutral on the pretext that Austria attacked Serbia and that the Triple Alliance
required Italian involvement only in a defensive war.2 The author, however, implied that
Austria was not an aggressor in the war. Such assertions reflected the views of the
German occupiers and were a central feature of this newspaper.
1
2
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Even though the newspaper’s staff distorted information with a German
viewpoint, they did provide important news to occupied France. Unlike several of the
other sources of information available, there were no glaring gaps in news in terms of
follow-up. In many newspapers, like the Gazette des Ardennes, an important story could
be mentioned one day, with no follow-up forthcoming. However, even deprived of news,
the people of occupied France remained aloof from this publication.3 Hence, it is difficult
to know how many people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing read Le Bruxellois. History
recorded that the paper did reach these cities. However, nobody in occupied France
believed it was an unbiased paper. One man who lived in Roubaix until January 1917
noted that the only war news available was from the “German” newspaper, Le
Bruxellois.4 People could pay to place information in the newspaper, in a manner similar
to modern classified advertisements, and people from occupied France placed such
advertisements, as did people from other areas to reach people in northern France. In one
issue, a man named Victor Rider wanted to tell his wife, living in the Lille area that he
was in good health in a prisoner of war camp in Staumohle, Germany.5 Starting in August
1915, advertisements from Lille-area stores also appeared in Le Bruxellois.
Advertisements from occupied France slowly stopped appearing in the pages of the
newspaper, however, perhaps an indicator of the unpopularity of the newspaper, the
difficulties in placing advertisements in a foreign newspaper, or the dwindling
availability of the newspaper.
For the most part, Le Bruxellois provided readers with information concerning the
same happenings that people in other parts of Europe learned about from their
3
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newspapers. The difference was in emphasis: this German-controlled newspaper
emphasized some news while devaluing (or at times even ignoring) other items. This
chapter analysis this German “emphasis” as it affected different categories of the news
available in Le Bruxellois.6 First, we examine the communiqués and battle news with
special attention placed on the newspaper editors’ coverage of Verdun, the Somme, and
Gallipoli. Next, we will provide an overview of news demonstrating German successes
and greatness, with two prominent subcategories being their submarine and aerial
exploits. The next category reviews the great volume of information categorized as
stories revealing domestic problems of the Entente powers, and the inherent evil of these
countries. A final category of information that we analyze looks at stories promoting
pacifism and demonstrating the evil nature of war. Before the news available to readers in
occupied France from this paper can be examined, however, it is worthwhile to discuss
the format of the newspaper and share what little is known about its publishing.7

Publishing the Newspaper
Le Bruxellois began publishing in September 1915 and continued until the
liberation of Brussels in November 1918. Despite the fact it was the Belgian newspaper
most under German control, in its initial issue, Le Bruxellois’ editors described the new
6

It is important to note that this examination reviews Le Bruxellois with an eye to what news it provided
the readers of occupied France, as opposed to those in Belgium. While the audience does not change the
content of the newspaper, it does alter what information I chose to focus upon. For example, this chapter
does not discuss the frequent criticism of the Belgian government or discussions of Belgium’s linguistic
tensions.
7
A brief note on which issues of the newspaper I examined for this chapter is in order. Until July 1918,
two issues of the newspaper appeared daily, after which only one issue appeared daily. During the time that
two issues appeared, I consulted the main, morning edition. From mid-June 1917 until the newspaper
editors moved to one issue, the archives I consulted contained mostly issues of the second, evening
newspaper. While there was a great deal of overlap between the two issues, I contained my remarks to the
section of the newspaper entitled “Latest New Releases: Reproduced from the Preceding Edition” to make
certain not to exaggerate the information reaching occupied France.

252
paper as edited and administered by Belgians for Belgians, and as an organ “worthy of its
name.”8 It claimed that German censors wanted to review issues before publication, but
that such demands by the Germans were logical in time of war.9 In the issue celebrating
the newspaper’s one-year anniversary, an article described how two Belgian journalists
founded the paper to restore to national life an open forum for the aspirations of the
public.10 This statement is very suspect. For this paper to achieve its mandate of
influencing the people it had to appear to be a Belgian paper, hence its German
ownership was a secret. At the time, people believed a Herr Rosenfeld of the German
civil administration most likely owned it.11 Very little information is available about
Rosenfeld. It is suggestive that his name is similar to that of Herman Hugo Rosenbaum, a
German expatriate, originally from Hamburg who lived in Brussels for many years before
the war.12 Andreas Laska described Rosenbaum as the editor of Le Bruxellois, but until
January 19, 1917, the front page proclaimed Marc de Salm as its editor. This was the
pseudonym of François Belvaux, a former journalist of the Patriote newspaper.13 The
Patriote was the most influential Catholic journal in Belgium before the war and it
stopped publication with the occupation. While de Salm (as he will be referred to in this
chapter) may have taken pains to hide his identity, he never tried to hide his
Germanophile sympathies.14 Unlike most of the newspaper editors still working under
German occupation, this editor was not doing his job against his better judgment. From
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January 1917 on, the newspaper stated that René Armand was its editor, however, Marc
de Salm frequently wrote the lead story in the paper, continuing up until its very last
issue. Even as Germany was evacuating Brussels, Marc de Salm defended the occupiers’
utilization of Belgian goods as legitimate during a time of war, and worried what would
happen when the Entente soldiers got their “claws” into Belgian territory.15 The editors
oversaw a staff of professional journalists, unlike many other newspapers in the occupied
zones whose staff included people whose key qualification was a willingness to work for
the Germans.
The newspaper began by printing 69,000 copies daily, quickly increasing to
75,000 copies daily, until late September 1916, when it increased production to 90,000
copies of the newspaper a day. In November 1917, the number of copies produced daily
increased again, this time to 125,000.16 For readers in Brussels, Le Bruxellois cost five
centimes until a price hike to ten centimes on October 24, 1917. The newspaper’s staff,
with a rather self-congratulatory note, stated they were keeping true to their principles,
with only a five centimes rise in price per issue.17 This sounded a lot better than stating
they were doubling the price of the newspaper. By July 1918, the price reached fifteen
centimes. For international readers (namely readers in occupied France) the price for a
three-month subscription was roughly double the domestic price, at 8.5 francs before the
1917 price hike. Interestingly, the subscription rate went down in 1917 because of an
increase in advertising rates.18 Advertisements in other newspapers available in occupied
France suggest that Le Bruxellois was available for sale at newsstands, but at what price
15
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is unclear. The newspaper informed readers at the beginning of March 1917 that to allow
for enough room for information, serials and small announcements (comparable to
modern classified advertisements) would not appear on Mondays in the first edition.19 By
the summer of 1918, readers could most likely tell that the newspaper was facing difficult
times. In July, the paper underwent a format change. Instead of publishing two issues
daily, the staff produced one paper a day. Four times a week, it was a four-page
newspaper; and three times a week was two pages in length.

Format of the Newspaper
Le Bruxellois looked somewhat different from the other newspaper available in
occupied France. The newspaper was sixteen by twenty-two inches, with news presented
in five columns. The paper usually began with a lead story, followed by communiqués
and then “latest news,” and “foreign news.” What made this newspaper look slightly
different was that from the fall of 1915 on, the newspaper frequently contained banner
headlines. The banner usually drew attention to the first story under “latest news,” such
as in the September 23-25, 1915, issue, which told of general mobilization in Bulgaria.20
These blazing headlines mostly told of news that was good for the German cause, such as
Bulgaria entering the war on their side. The presence of such headlines did not
necessarily mean then newspaper was about to provide a great deal of information on the
topic; often, only a paragraph of information followed a banner headline. This gave this
newspaper a different look and feel as compared to the other newspapers in the occupied
zone.
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This newspaper also felt quite different from German-controlled papers produced
in France because of the positioning of German ordinances and demands. Like the
Bulletin de Lille and Bulletin de Roubaix, this newspaper did carry notices from the
German occupiers, but the notices’ frequency and placement in the newspaper differed,
also contributing to the dissimilar look of the newspapers. Commands from the Germans
appeared in the Belgian paper on average once or twice a week and these directives were
not only worded less harshly than in the French German-controlled newspapers, but did
not carry the same blaring titles. For example, one German order in Le Bruxellois related
to registering horses and cattle provided polite reassurances that the census was not going
to lead to confiscation for military purposes, but was intended to make sure that the area
conserved its resources.21 Even when somebody stabbed a German soldier to death and
the Germans believed that they knew the hometown of the suspect, the German notice
offered a reward for information, rather than threatening the entire populace of the
suspects’ town.22 After Bulgaria entered the war against Germany, a notice in the
newspaper “invited” Bulgarian subjects in Brussels to please bring their papers to
German authorities, all in a very friendly tone.23 One interesting German notice did not
announce any rules or orders, but instead informed readers that the British enslaved
Belgian refugees, forcing them to work in factories making munitions or sending them to
plantations in India.24 Few studies mention the plight of Belgian refugees in Britain.
However, it appears that the refugees’ class and status determined the British treatment of
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Belgian refugees, with poorer Belgians facing the greatest animosity, which at times
degenerated into violence.25

Communiqués and Battle Coverage
From the first issue, the editors made a great show of their impartiality when
presenting war news. The newspaper published official communiqués of all the
belligerents in a relatively timely manner, with Entente communiqués almost as up to
date as the German ones, if a day or two later in some cases. For most of the first year of
the paper’s publication, the editors did not publish French communiqués with the same
regularity as German communiqués and when they were published, they were often only
a few lines long. The newspaper offered an explanation within its pages, claiming that
the French were putting out hardly any communiqués.26 This of course was a fabrication.
By the summer of 1915, the newspaper had begun to publish complete versions of the
French reports, often with little censorship. The editors most likely picked the
communiqués they shared with care, to only allow smaller Entente victories to reach their
readers. Hence, communiqués were similar to those in the Gazette des Ardennes. One
small difference is that in this newspaper German and Austro-Hungarian communiqués
identified each battle by providing a sub-title, stating the Entente general who led the
fight.
The German and Austro-Hungarian communiqués frequently told of British,
French, and Italian failures, often making their enemies look like failed aggressors. The
July 12, 1915, issue of the newspaper provided an example of this trend, with a
25
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communiqué detailing events of the fighting at Ypres. It stated that the British tried to
take the German position on a canal, but the attack failed with enormous losses for the
British.27 As with the other newspapers, Le Bruxellois included the Entente nations’
communiqués describing small victories. In one from August 1915, Field Marshal Sir
John French commander of the BEF stated that since August 1, there had been a great
deal of artillery activity from both the north and east of Ypres. Nine days into the
fighting, the French attacked trenches taken by the enemy west of Hooge on July 30,
taking back over a thousand meters of trenches, and capturing three officers and one
hundred twenty-four men.28 The newspaper made no mention that the Germans had
initially captured the area around Hooge utilizing six flamethrowers, which spewed liquid
fire over the British trenches.29 Another communiqué quoted Field Marshal French as
asserting that the British inflicted on the enemy serious losses east of Loos, taking 53
officers, 2,800 soldiers, 18 cannons, and 32 machine guns.30 In reality, this was the
continuation of the unsuccessful Allied offensive, which resulted in slight back-and-forth
gains and losses for both sides. On September 30,1915, Joffre halted the attacks.31 While
announcements of only minor victories for the Entente were the norm in the newspaper,
the editors did allow in examples of the British and French causing great destruction,
presumably to cast them in a bad light in the readers’ eyes. For example, a December 30,
1915, British communiqué made it into the newspaper, proclaiming that the British
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bombed areas behind enemy lines.32 In the same issue, a German communiqué
announced that the British caused considerable damage to the Belgian city of Oostende,
omitting the fact that the Germans utilized the port town as a base for submarine
attacks.33
Le Bruxellois covered the Battle of Verdun as one extended battle. This differed
from many other newspapers available in occupied France that discussed various
engagements without always making it obvious they were apart of the same offensive.
Coverage began in earnest in the February 29, 1916, issue of the paper, when a notice
described the success of the Brandenburg regiments.34 This issue did not carry a lead
story but began with the communiqués and two headlines, with the second drawing
readers to the notice, by announcing “The Situation at Verdun.” The newspaper reported
news from the Verdun front within a few days of it happening. The French attempted to
retake Douaumont and failed on March 2, 1916, and the newspaper reported this fact in
the March 5-6, 1916, edition.35 While coverage of Verdun focused upon larger German
victories and French failures, readers did gain the correct impression that Verdun quickly
became a battle of attrition. The newspaper never stated that Falkenhayn wanted to inflict
damage so great that the French army could not continue to fight, and it also did not
mention the use of poison gas or the German introduction of flamethrowers. The editors
did include communiqués that told of French soldiers utilizing grenades to take back a
few trenches around Champagne.36 The editors of the newspaper also did not shield
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readers from the damage to Verdun, informing readers that bombing completely
destroyed the city.37 At the beginning of April, 1916, a lead story, signed “H. Narcy,”
noted that French officials evacuated the entire civilian population (which had occurred
months earlier) and provided a brief history of the city of Verdun, including an overview
of statues and buildings that the writer assumed were most likely destroyed.38 The article
suggested two older works, Historie de Verdun by Clouet and Le Première Invasion
Pressienne by Chitquet for reference.39
William Martin notes in Verdun 1916: They Shall Not Pass, that on March 9,
1916, the Germans released a communiqué announcing the capture of Fort Vaux, but it
was still in French hands. Fighting continued around it until the Germans actually took
Fort Vaux on June 8, 1916.40 The official communiqués pertaining to Verdun in Le
Bruxellois copied the German error, either accidentally or intentionally, and announced
the fall of Fort Vaux in the March 10-11, 1916, issue.41 As the war of attrition continued,
the newspaper still provided communiqués from Verdun, but drew less attention to them.
One article, looking back upon Verdun, told of French blindness on the subject of
Verdun, but not that the Germans were also wasting soldiers on an endless battle that
nearly destroyed both sides, not just the French.42
The British and French took the offensive in July 1916 to relieve some of the
pressure on the French defending Verdun.43 The Somme was a disaster for the British, as
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they sustained 432,000 casualties before the fighting ended in November 1916.44 Western
Front coverage in Le Bruxellois switched over to include more Somme coverage than
Verdun information by the end of July 1916. After a month of battle, the newspaper
editors included an article, signed “George Gueri,” and uniquely placed on the second
page of newspaper rather than the first, stating the German defenses at the Somme gave
the Anglo-French forces no room to advance. He described their attack as simple blind
rage.45 The Somme lasted until mid-November 1916, and often included small
skirmishes. Interestingly, Le Bruxellois continued to allow some positive news from the
French side, such as accounts of their recapture of certain trenches or capture of small
numbers of prisoners.46 However, the emphasis placed upon French and British losses,
even after the battle was over, informed readers that the French and British were the true
losers at the Somme.47 The newspaper gave approximately accurate numbers of French
and British losses, but did not dwell upon the casualties inflicted upon the German army
during the four and a half month battle. As William Philpott notes, an accurate figure for
German casualties on the Somme will never be established, but from available evidence,
he has inferred they very heavy, at around approximately 500,000 irreplaceable losses.48
Battle coverage in Le Bruxellois was not limited to the Western Front and the
editors included coverage of fighting in Gallipoli. Surely, to British dismay, their failures
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in Gallipoli in the fall of 1915 were public knowledge throughout the world. Utilizing a
dispatch originating from Geneva, Le Bruxellois reported that Kitchener might order a
retreat from Gallipoli, and this was causing outrage among the British public.49 However,
the article also allowed in a little British propaganda, noting that Kitchener planned a trip
to the Orient, and that hopefully he could find bring victory for the British to the TurkishBalkan problem.50 For once, the newspaper perhaps underplayed this seriousness of the
situation. On October 11, 1915, Lord Kitchener stated that withdrawal from Gallipoli
“would be the most disastrous event in the history of the Empire.”51 Nevertheless, Lloyd
George and Bonar Law forced him to fire General Ian Hamilton in Gallipoli, replacing
him with General Charles Monro, who did not believe in the Gallipoli adventure.52
Kitchener’s visit on November 14, 1915, was to make a personal assessment before
beginning the evacuation. One of the last articles about Gallipoli cited a Swiss source
about the staggering losses the French and British had suffered.53 Indeed, the British and
French endured 252,000 causalities in Gallipoli.54 In another example of telling only half
the story – the half telling of the Entente’s problems – the Turkish side endured 251,000
casualties, albeit in a winning effort.55 The timing of this story also would have allowed
the editors to mention that the British managed a miraculous escape, evacuating 35,000
troops, 3,600 horses and mules, 127 guns, and 328 vehicles without a single casualty, but
they did not.56 Lord Kitchener died seven months later when a German mine sunk the
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armored cruiser Hampshire, which he was traveling upon to Russia not far from the
Orkney Islands. Le Bruxellois recognized Lord Kitchener as a worthy military man,
describing his career as brilliant.57

German Success and Greatness
René Deruyk, who wrote several books about the German occupation of Lille,
noted, “Buy le Bruxellois and you will read every day how the German army has never
lost a soldier.”58 The examples of German bias in the newspaper were too numerous to
record them all, but the praise – not just the reporting - of Hindenburg’s triumphs on
Germany’s Eastern Front in an article recapping the war in 1915 provides a good
example.59 While there is no doubt the Central Powers enjoyed success in 1915 on the
Eastern Front, the emphasis placed on Germany’s victories revealed the Germanophile
stance of the paper.
By the fall of 1917, the tides were turning against Germany on the Western Front.
Hence, Le Bruxellois again reported in detail about German successes on the Eastern
Front, notably Hindenburg’s taking of Riga.60 The German victory at Riga in September
1917 to all intents and purposes took Russia from the war. This allowed the Germans to
begin to transfer forces to the Western Front, giving them at eighteen-division superiority
over the Allies at the start of 1918.61 One report captured Russian shock at the event,
noting that the Russians expected the Germans to attempt to occupy Riga, but thought
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such an attack was not imminent because the rivers provided safety.62 As late as August
31, life was carrying on as normal in Riga, with even the theatres playing as usual.63 The
editors placed particular emphasis on German prowess by providing a great deal of
newspaper space to stories telling of German submarine and aerial feats.
German success at sea came from its submarine campaign. Germany showed
caution in utilizing its High Seas Fleet, due to weakness in numbers, geographical
disadvantages, and an inferiority complex, reinforced by the Heligoland Bight and
Dogger Bank battles.64 For most of the war, the main achievement of the German High
Seas Fleet was forcing the British to invest in an infrastructure for supporting their Grand
Fleet, whose ships could otherwise been useful in commerce protection and antisubmarine warfare.65 The only major fleet engagement of the First World War took place
in the North Sea, west of the Jutland peninsula of Denmark and ended with the British
losing 6,094 dead and Germany losing 2,551.66 However, Le Bruxellois covered this one
apparent German naval success, the Battle of Jutland, in detail over several days. While
some historians concluded that the battle ended in little worse than a tie, the Germans
gained a public relations victory because of the number of British ships sunk.67 Referring
to it, as is the German practice, as the Battle of Skaggerak, the headline was about the
naval battle for a full week, with the newspaper editors reprinting German statements that
it was a grand and brilliant success, as well as American newspaper coverage alleging
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that Germany had just won the largest naval battle in modern history, with the win being
meaningful to the outcome of the war.68
With this one exception, Le Bruxellois focused upon German submarine
successes. Dozens of blurbs appeared like the one that stated that between October 1 and
October 20, 1915, French steamships sunk in the Mediterranean included the Provencia,
the Sainte-Marie, the Antoine, and the Amoral Hamile.69 The German submarine sinking
the Lusitania went beyond the initial story to telling of the political fallout that ensued.
Indeed, the consequences of the German sinking of the Lusitania received extensive
coverage, including the back and forth diplomatic correspondence between the United
States and Germany. Coverage of this issue may be an example of people in the occupied
zone receiving a distorted report of events. Under the paper’s frequent section, “Press
Review,” an article appeared reporting that American opinion in regard to the latest
German note was generally favorable.70 Germany sent a second note, responding to the
American note, on July 8, 1915. According to Dinana Preston, who wrote Lusitania: An
Epic Tragedy, this note was as unsatisfactory to the American administration as the
previous German note, as it evaded the issue of sinking enemy ships without warning.71
President Wilson did not intend to accept the German offer to provide safe conduct to
American ships (painted in American colors through the submarine zone provided the
Germans received advanced notice). The American press backed the president, and made
quips about “barber ships” as the American ships painted with red, white, and blue stripes
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would look like barber poles.72 The timing of this article in Le Bruxellois was interesting,
as eight days earlier President Wilson had sent another note to Germany, which noted
that any future infringement of American rights would be deemed deliberately unfriendly.
Le Bruxellois shared news of both zeppelin attacks and the success of German
flying aces. The German pride in their zeppelin attacks carried over to the reporting of
those attacks in Le Bruxellois. The need to tie up numerous British and French squadrons
was the zeppelin’s greatest achievement. The cost of constructing the one hundred
fifteen zeppelins employed by the Germans was approximately five times the cost of the
damage they inflicted.73 However, the editors of Le Bruxellois focused upon the fear
zeppelin raids caused, including in the newspaper an article entitled, “A War Night in
Paris,” which stated that life had greatly changed in Paris as it could no longer be the
“city of lights.”74 The editors were correct in noting the atmosphere of fear the zeppelins
created. A bold, large, headline screamed “Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, and
Sheffield Bombed,” and the following blurb noted that the bombing by the zeppelin did
not kill anybody and the only damage done was to a communication establishment.75 The
editors chose this story wisely, as it showed both Germany’s might and sense of
chivalrous conduct of war.
The newspaper also reported upon the aerial aspect of the battles at Verdun and
the Somme. Verdun saw the largest use of aircraft in war as an adjunct to a battle waged
on land to that time, a fact that Le Bruxellois shared with readers.76 A communiqué stated
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German pilots came out the winners in air battles around Verdun, as German planes shot
down at least three Entente planes and several French pilots sustained injuries.77 As the
battle of the Somme concluded in November after the Germans sustained nearly a half
million casualties, the newspaper focused upon a description of aerial battle, noting that
the superiority of the German flyers displayed itself clearly.78 While most of the coverage
of the aerial war was to vaunt German successes, Le Bruxellois also carried a few
examples of Entente failures. Utilizing a Havas report, the paper reported that the
French dirigible Alsace that left on October 2, 1915, on a bombing mission, did not return
and that a German source said that it had been downed and its crew taken prisoner.79 Le
Bruxellois’s editors demonstrated compassion and civility at least once in covering the
aerial war. When French aviator Adolphe Pégoud died, the German press expressed its
sympathy and Le Bruxellois summarized these sentiments in its pages.80 Their remorse at
the death of the first flying ace appeared genuine.

Problems in the Entente Countries
This newspaper certainly kept readers abreast of the political and socials issues
plaguing France and England, if at times exaggerating those problems. Le Bruxellois
informed readers about problems in French politics, with pieces on the French economy,
the French public spirit, and alcoholism and population decline. France’s political
happenings were always good fodder for Le Bruxellois, as could be seen in the pages of
the newspaper toward the end of October 1915. At that time, the French cabinet
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reshuffled, mainly in response to the lack of French success in the Balkans. In this
reshuffle, René Viviani and Aristide Briand switched positions, with Briand becoming
prime minister and Viviani taking his spot as deputy prime minister. While this
restructuring left Millerand out and added the Catholic right leader Denys Cochin, there
was a great deal of continuity in the personnel of the French government.81 However, to
read about the cabinet change in Le Bruxellois was to believe the entire French
government was undergoing a crisis. While the newspaper editors admitted they shared
this news with reservation because their sources were not the best, they reported that even
President Poincaré’s position was in jeopardy.82 The editors’ reservations about their
sources did not stop them from running the banner headline “Presidential Crisis in
France?” at the top of that issue. Follow-up issues correctly named the new members of
the French cabinet, without making reference to previous statements that Poincaré’s
position was in jeopardy, and article authors focused upon the failure of the old cabinet
that led to its fall.83 A two-part story on Georges Clémenceau portrayed him as the only
respectable politician in France, as he was the only one not trying to fool the people of
France.84 Despite the editors holding Clémenceau up as the one just public figure left in
France, they did not praise him once he became the French prime minister in November
1917. In 1916 Clémenceau was “the tiger,” a man pointing out the flaws in the French
military system, and of course also providing fodder for German propaganda. When he
became prime minister, Le Bruxellois emphasized his repression of dissent, and arrest of
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a few senior politicians with pro-German views. He stopped being a Le Bruxellois
favorite.
The failing French economy received attention in the pages of Le Bruxellois
several times in the course of the newspaper’s life. An example that typifies the coverage
was a lead story that ran in the summer of 1916, stating that the economic situation in
France worsened with the war, and comparing the French poorly with that of Germany in
terms of sustaining its war effort.85 The timing of the article demonstrated the presence of
German propaganda, telling only the problems of one country and not the other. This was
the first summer that the pressure of the British blockade caused the critical failure of
German agriculture. The lack of fertilizer led to a poor potato crop in the summer and
shortages of fodder for livestock reduced meat production. Hardship was Germany’s in
the coming winter.86
Early in 1916, one article told of a deeply discouraged French public, waiting
impatiently for the end of the war, a sentiment Le Bruxellois portrayed as similar public
opinion in other Entente countries.87 At this time, civilian morale was beginning to crack
in most of the warring nations, including Germany. For example, 50,000 German workers
had a three-day work stoppage in Berlin to object to the arrest of radical socialist
leaders.88 Le Bruxellois did not cover this. Another article appeared in the newspaper that
summer, stating that nervousness permeated the French capital, as popular sentiment felt
Germany might still have war plans unknown to French leaders.89 A common thread
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(discussed later in this chapter) suggested that England was to blame for the war. The
editors of the newspaper at times suggested that not only was England to blame for
starting the war, but the French government was separate from the French people. The
editors hinted that the French people were tiring of their government. In a lead story,
entitled “The Essential Causes of the World War,” the newspaper reported that while
French newspapers might blame German militarism and economic organization for the
war, the French people did not agree. Rather, brave, isolated voices from within France
note that French political leaders did nothing to avoid war, making their nation as
responsible as any other.90 The article, taken from an unnamed Geneva newspaper, cited
Jean Grave as one of those voices blaming France for the war. Grave was an anarchist (a
word not utilized to describe him in the Le Bruxellois article) who edited two
newspapers, La Révolté and Les Temps Nouveaux. That Grave blamed France for the war
is a partial truth. He blamed the war upon commercial aims, such as finding new
markets, “which themselves were part of a larger mosaic that not only included the civil
and military bureaucracies in imperialism’s service but also a largely predatory bourgeois
Weltanschauung tied to nationalism that expropriated the lands of conquered peoples …
[done] by appealing to a jingoistic patriotism.”91 Such a viewpoint hardly exonerated
Germany from partial blame for the starting the war. An unsigned lead story blamed
Poincaré and Briand for leading France into war, declaring them jointly a third Napoleon.
This article writer claimed the real destiny of France was under socialist leadership, not
the militarism of the governing elite.92
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A common thread in the newspaper was evident in lead stories warning about the
scourge of alcohol throughout Europe. This was not a topic unique to Le Bruxellois, as
alcohol use became an area of concern in all the warring nations, as people saw it as both
an impediment to mobilization and a waste of resources.93 In an article published early in
the period of the paper’s distribution in France, Marc de Salm pointed to the issues facing
Russia and France due to drink.94 However, both countries had done exactly what de
Salm was asking; taken definite action to stem the tide of alcohol abuse. In Russia, the
tsar halted the operation of the state vodka monopoly in 1914, curtailed the sale of spirits,
wine, and beer, and voided all prewar licenses, despite this action causing a dramatic
drop in revenue for the government.95 France relied more upon propaganda linking
alcohol abuse to military impotence to quell over drinking, but did limit café hours and
banned absinthe in the year after de Salm’s article appeared.96 While Marc de Salm did
manage to insert a few jabs at Germany’s enemies into this article, it appears that his
concern over alcoholism was not a German imposed issue; in Germany, the government
placed limits on drinking, but concerns were based on the grain supply, rather than on
intemperance.97 De Salm also wrote an additional lead story, telling the shocking story of
alcohol and opium abuse in France98 A few days later another article stated that Parisians
amused themselves during the war by drinking a great deal at night.99
Interestingly, de Salm tied alcoholism to another topic he frequently returned to,
namely women’s suffrage. He noted that in places where women had the vote, such as
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Denmark and New Zealand, women worked to combat alcoholism and “cabaretisme.”100
De Salm returned to the evils of alcoholism many times in the newspaper, and not just to
cast aspersions on France and Russia; he also wrote on the effects on children of their
mothers’ drinking.101 Le Bruxellois quoted a French specialist on the subject of
alcoholism when it wrote an article on Dr. P. Garnier’s La Folie à Paris.102 Originally
published in 1890, Garnier’s work studied the medico-legal aspects of moral offenses,
frequently finding alcohol to be a contributing factor. Not surprisingly for a work done in
France, the information discusses alcoholism in Paris, which, within the pages of Le
Bruxellois, cast the city in a bad light.
Alcohol abuse and France’s population decline were two interconnected issues in
the pages of Le Bruxellois. Marc de Salm wrote another lead story, this time entitled
“Antialcoholism in France,” stating that alcohol was the prime cause of the degeneration
of the human race. He noted that France was facing becoming a second tier power, thanks
to its low birthrate, which he tied to alcoholism.103 Another lead story cautioned about the
abnormalities caused in children born to alcoholic parents, warning parents within the
occupied zone not to undermine their children with this behavior.104 Indeed, in most
countries, protecting children from alcohol abuse was a key issue, as people viewed
children as both an investment and a threat due to their value as future healthy,
economically productive citizens.105 Some articles gave the impression of being an
unbiased overview of depopulation and birth rate trends throughout Europe. Then at
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some point in the article, the writer pointed to France to prove his point about the dangers
of population decline. One article admitted that Germany was also starting down the road
of diminished birthrates in its large cities.106
The newspaper editors returned to the topic of the low French birth rate
frequently, and not all articles simply associated the with the alcohol abuse.107 One article
placed the blame for France’s future population woes on the women of the country,
stating that “chosen infertility” was the cause of France’s falling birthrate.108 Attacking
France for its low birthrate was commenting on a portion of the country’s long-term war
preparedness. France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war stunned the nation. Many
fixed upon the relative size of France’s population compared to Germany’s and France’s
low birthrate.109 Hence, pronatalism became a nationalist concern to many, with
maternity becoming a measure of national defense.110

Evil and Untrustworthy Nature of the Entente Countries
The international coverage of Le Bruxellois, while extensive, was suffused with
pro-German propaganda in which we can discern certain broad themes. Le Bruxellois’
editors seem to have enjoyed demonstrating that France, Germany, and Belgium shared a
common enemy even if they did not know it: England. Their paradigm was that England
caused the war but was not suffering alongside the others. The United States enjoyed
positive coverage at first, but as it grew closer to declaring war, America became corrupt
capitalists with an agenda. Coverage of the Russian revolution in this newspaper is
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intriguing, as the editors walked a fine line of declaring the Tsarist government
malevolent, but not wanting to endorse wholeheartedly the provisional government.
Finally under this heading is included the newspaper’s coverage of Greece during the
war, as the editors continuously highlighted events in Greece to demonstrate the
underhanded manner in which France and England conducted the war.
The mantra of the newspaper’s staff was that England was the true enemy of the
French and Belgians. One lead story provided an analysis of the causes of war,
concluding that British capitalism was the cause, as England feared the increased
industrial competition from Germany and the United States.111 This was a common
refrain of the editors, who frequently laid blame for starting the war on Britain’s
doorstep, as opposed to Germany. One lead story, entitled “The Punishment of
Germany,” stated that England saw Germany as a troublesome economic competitor, so it
began the war to make Germany docile and less of a commercial threat.112 The
newspaper enjoyed sharing the differences in the cost of living in England and France to
show France suffering much more from the war. It one issue, a blurb under the heading
“Foreign News” stated that it cost thirty percent more to live in France than England,
with a pound of meat costing 1.75 francs in England compared to 2.5 francs in France.113
This brief news item reflected reality, as Britain experienced the least disruption to
civilian society of any warring nation.114 In 1915, the British state introduced fixed prices
for essential food, and the centralized distribution of food supplies and rationing meant
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that nutrition, especially among the poor, actually improved during the war.115 At the
same time, France faced falling agricultural output due to the mobilization of farmers and
rising food prices. Interestingly, towards the end of 1917, when the rise in food prices in
France became dramatic, British assistance helped restore the French food supply.116
However, at least one story contradicted the notion that England was not suffering due to
the war. Rather, news reached readers that Britain had to introduce bread cards due to the
success of the German submarine campaign in reducing supplies of imported food
stuffs.117 Britain faced a food crisis by the end of 1917 (several months after this notice
appeared), manifested in long shopping lines for butter, tea, and meat. In January 1918,
the British Ministry of Food issued ration cards for scare food (the Ministry had begun a
registration program before this), which was a solid success.118 Consumption of bread
went up during the war, as it compensated for the decline in per capita consumption of
butter, fresh meat, sugar, and milk.119 Germany fared much more poorly on the home
front, as the government had to ration almost all foods and most were in very short
supply.
Not surprisingly, the British blockade of Germany received a great deal of
negative attention in newspaper. While the newspaper blamed the blockade for a lack of
food, the editors chose stories that focused more upon international abhorrence of the
blockade, and in particular, the reaction of America before its entry into the war. The
editors of the newspaper appeared to want to push an agenda of British-American
animosity. Towards the end of January 1916, a headline and attendant article highlighted
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the discord between the two countries by reliving their enmity during the American Civil
War.120 One article, entitled “England and the American Note” stated that England
believed Wilson’s note denouncing the British blockade did not change anything.121 The
article hinted at British callousness in the face of world judgment. The United States had,
months earlier, sent lengthy official notes protesting the infringements on the legal rights
of neutrals to trade in non-contraband goods. The notes warned of the bad effect on
American opinion of British practices, but Wilson stated it in friendly terms.122
Realistically, England had nothing to fear from these notes. By late 1915, not only had
American opinion swayed to the Entente side, but any American economic loss from the
British blockade was more than compensated for by increased Allied purchases of
American goods.123 The newspaper’s editors had no qualms stating their view of the
blockade; they entitled “A Tyrannical System” one lead story on the blockade signed
“PAX.”124
Another 1916 article, under “Press Review,” and taken from the Economiste
français, provided several statistics demonstrating that France was spending huge sums
upon the war, while England was enriching itself.125 The timing of the article was
fortuitous; the balance of trade between Britain and France was moving steadily against
France, forcing the latter to raise taxes and increase its borrowing.126 That did not
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translate into Britain shrinking from making its economic contribution to the war, as it
often financially carrying her allies.
A lead story, signed Zoltan de Szasz, expounded upon the idea that France was
the principal victim of the war.127 He stated that Poincaré’s “victory at any cost” was
hurting the nation, as the war was destroying France’s – not Germany or England’s –
cities and artwork. Another article, this one by Marc de Salm, told much the same story,
this time under the headline, “The French Nation Has Been Led to War in Spite of
Herself.”128 A further lead story argued that Britain – not Germany – was France’s
hereditary enemy. Signed A. Gel., the writer, admitted that since the war of 1870, the
French hated the Germans, but if people had longer memories, they would recall whom
they truly disliked, especially if one asked a Picard, Norman, or Breton.129 A lead article
signed “Sera,” asserted that the war revealed British character, with the good being three
million men signing up, and the negative being the lack of talent and courage in
leadership.130 If readers still had any doubt about England’s integrity, Le Bruxellois
provided coverage of the Irish troubles, casting the English as exploiting the Irish.131
While Britain consistently received poor treatment in the pages of Le Bruxellois,
the treatment of the United States varied over time. During the first months of
publication, the editors and journalists wrote courteously about the United States. Before
the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, Le Bruxellois devoted several articles
explaining why the United States would never enter the war on the side of the British and

127

Le Bruxellois, November 20-21, 1915. Little is known about the author, except that he wrote other
pieces, including M. Paul Adam et la morale de Paris (1909).
128
Ibid., November 25-26, 1915. “La nation Française a été entraînee à la guerre malgre elle.”
129
Ibid., December 21-22, 1915.
130
Ibid., March 27-28, 1916.
131
Ibid., May 3-4, 1916.

277
French. For example, in May 1916, a lead story signed “Jonathan,” asserted that the
United States would not enter the war because it would be bad for its economy.132 The
same edition carried a quotation from the American ambassador to Germany, James
Watson Gerald, that he wished peace to continue between the two countries. The article
suggested that Gerald had warm feelings for Germany, when in fact he was so unabashed
in his anti-Germanism that President Wilson grew to believe it compromised his
effectiveness.133
Slowly the editors began commenting more about America as a country driven by
economic ambition. The editors of the newspaper mentioned numerous times how
wealthy the United States was becoming thanks to the war. One lead story, simply
entitled “The Unites States becomes Rich from the War,” reiterated the wealth that was
streaming across the ocean.134 This was indeed true. The war quickly reversed the credit
standing of the United States. The Entente powers began importing massive quantities of
American goods, unmatched by the same quantities of exports. At first, the European
countries paid these debts in gold, almost doubling the American gold supply by 1917.135
As the gold supply of European countries rapidly diminished, the United States extended
loans and accepted securities in payment. By the time American neutrality ended in
April 1917, it held over a billion dollars in foreign securities and several billion dollars in
newly acquired European debt obligations.136 Readers of Le Bruxellois knew that the
financial capital of the world was shifting from London to New York.
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As German submarine policies soured German-American relations, references to
the United States became more insulting and dismissive as the editors described the
country as immoral and money-obsessed. In a lead story appearing in the late summer of
1916, the editors of the newspaper referred to “dollaricans” and described America’s
military as small and dated.137 In the pages of Le Bruxellois, the editors began treating the
United States as an enemy while President Wilson was still engaged in a re-election
campaign, running on a peace platform. The newspaper’s editors’ opinion of the
American military was “on the mark”; even though the United States National Defense
Act of 1916 authorized a wartime regular army strength of 300,000 men and a National
Guard of 400,000, it in no way provided for an army comparable to those of the European
combatants.138 Indeed, in 1916, Portugal, with a smaller population than Ohio,
maintained a great-sized army than America.139 By 1918, the newspaper carried a lead
story entitled “Wilson and Yankee Hypocrisy,” stating that while the American president
might claim to be an academic and an idealist he acted like another Entente minister.140
The article concluded almost threateningly towards the United States, stating the country
was about to pay a heavy price.141
Le Bruxellois covered the Russian revolution daily and in detail, ensuring readers
in the occupied zone knew as much as readers anywhere else. Starting in March 1917, the
newspaper informed readers that twenty thousand men joined the revolutionaries and all
the tsarist ministers were in prison.142 The reference to twenty thousand men having
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joined the revolutionaries most likely referred to the Bolshevik Party membership, which
numbered around 20,000 men in February, 1917.143 At this point, the Bolsheviks were a
rather insignificant political force, but in the spring and summer of 1917, it grew quickly,
as tens of thousands of new members joined, drawn by the Bolshevik Party’s promise of
a better future. The Bolshevik Party became a national force as soldiers, tired of the war,
became increasingly radicalized and joined the party.144
Frequently news from Russia garnered the newspaper’s headline, such as when
the Tsar abdicated.145 But early coverage of events in Russia presented Le Bruxellois’
editors with difficulties; they had been very critical of Russian government under the
monarchy but did not want to praise the revolution. Hence, most of the information
focused upon the wrongs of the tsarist government that had provoked this uprising and
the ensuing chaos. For example, the newspaper reported that train travel to Petrograd
stopped and the rioting continued in the suburbs on March 16-17, 1917.146 The lead story
on that day told readers not to have any illusions about any change because, the ignorance
of the Russian people ensured that the country would not make any great strides.147 The
newspaper summarized the free French press’ coverage of Russian affairs, noting that the
general sentiment in France was one of pessimism, as the country feared that Russia
might not observe the promises it had made to the Allies.148 Le Bruxellois covered the
bevy of problems facing Russia, from naval officers protesting brutal reprimands to the
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disheartened spirits of the people of St. Petersburg.149 Readers learned in a timely manner
about the German peace offer to Russia and the different workers and soldiers’ councils
about to vote upon it.150 Of course it was with the Bolshevik Revolution in November
that Russia left the war, freeing up German troops for Germany’s last great offensive in
1918.
Le Bruxellois kept readers informed of developments in detail in the countries late
to declare war, including Romania and Bulgaria. However, events in Greece received a
greater amount of attention, as the editors utilized this coverage to vilify the French and
British. Readers of Le Bruxellois were well informed on happenings in Greece, beginning
in mid-August 1915, and continuing for over a year. The war tore Greece apart, as King
Constantine, brother-in-law of the Kaiser, believed the Germans would win the war and
wanted to remain neutral while Prime Minister Venizelos judged that the Entente would
be victorious and wanted to intervene on the side of the French and British.151 The British
and French admittedly took advantage of a divided Greece. The Entente nations, having
no success in the eastern Mediterranean, debated the strategic merits of Salonika. Once
Bulgaria mobilized in September 1915, Britain and France decided to land troops at
Salonika to march north in aid of the Serbs. Prime Minister Venizelos approved the plan,
even though Greece was still neutral, leading the king to demand his resignation.152 On
October 5, 1915, Entente troops arrived in Salonika, leading Constantine to threaten that
if British and French troops did not leave, he would order the Greek army to allow
Bulgarian forces into Greece. He delivered on this threat in the spring of 1916, as the
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Bulgarian army took over Greek border fortifications and took most of the Greek Fourth
Army prisoner.153 This act clearly threatened Greece’s territorial integrity and national
honor, turning popular opinion against the king. It also outraged the Entente powers, and
they declared martial law in Salonika on June 3, 1916, as French troops took over the
main government buildings. On August 30, 1916, a pro-Entente revolution declared
Macedonia independent of Athens, and Venizelos established a provisional government
sympathetic to the Entente, creating two Greek governments. This drama unfolded in the
pages of Le Bruxellois, as Greece frequently made the headlines of the newspaper.154
Coverage of this topic portrayed the British as bullies, confronting Greece with unfair
ultimatums.155 In many articles, it appeared that France was practically invading Greece,
although at least one article asserted that Greece accorded the Entente powers right of
passage.156 One headline read, “Occupation of Salonika by the Entente,” making the
situation sound similar to that of the Germans in Belgium and northern France. Another
read “Salonika Evacuated by Greek Troops.”157 Another notice appeared under the title
“Reign of Terror in Greece,” in which the Allied high commissioner Célestin Jonnart is
only referred to as a dictator.158
The newspaper reveled in Delcassé’s resignation as French foreign minister,
announcing it in a headline in the October 13-14, 1915, issue. Suddenly, Delcassé
became a respectable politician in the Le Bruxellois, choosing to resign rather than stand
by the violation of Greek neutrality.159 In one lead story, Pierre Hantcheff described
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Delcassé as a victim of France’s deceitful Balkan political dealings.160 Indeed, Delcassé
resigned because he did not believe in the creation of a Balkan front; however the
newspaper made no mention of any Greek compliance with the Entente powers landing
troops in Salonika, providing the appearance that Delcassé was resigning due to French
violation of international law, eliminating all shades of gray from the complex issue.
People in occupied France may not have appreciated the slant added to coverage
of the Entente powers in Salonika, but at least Le Bruxellois kept them abreast of events
almost daily. The lack of follow-up available in other newspapers in occupied France
helped give the impression that people in occupied France knew little of what was going
on in the news. This newspaper provided consistent news on events in Greece.
However, the coverage did contain factual errors. The newspaper editors may have gotten
ahead of themselves when the newspaper announced the French government had recalled
General Sarrail from Salonika in April 1915.161 Sarrail was experiencing failures at the
time, as two British divisions failed to break into the German-Bulgarian positions.
However, it took several months of complaints until the French government replaced him
in December 1917 with General Marie-Louis Guillaumat.162 The newspaper’s editors
made another slight error, when the newspaper informed readers the Greek King
Constantine had abdicated in June 1917.163 In reality, conflict with General Sarrail and
the Allied forces had forced the king into exile but without formal abdication.
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Push for Pacifism
Items chosen from international news and lead stories written by the newspaper’s
editors frequently advocated pacifism. The aim of this pacifism, according to Oscar
Millard, was to undermine the morale of the civilian population and quash their patriotic
sentiments.164 The newspaper’s editors gave the impression that the people of Belgium
wanted peace. Occasionally the newspaper included a “Free Forum,” article, similar to a
letter to the editor.165 These articles frequently supported the concept that people wanted
peace. One such article, published in the lead story position, stated that the working class
had had enough of war, and that the socialist movement wanted peace.166 The editors
added to this, with one article pointing out the economic costs of the war to individuals,
noting that military service delayed the age at which a young man could begin his
working career.167
The editors of the newspaper reported on “Lloyd George and the Neutral Press,”
noting that the Swedish press denounced the prime minister’s ignoring the last peace
proposal by Lord Lansdowne as another example of British imperialism.168 Lord
Lansdowne led the Conservative opposition in the House of Lords from 1905-1915,
continuously defeating measures passed by the Liberal majority in the House of
Commons.169 In May 1915, he entered the coalition cabinet as a minister (without a
portfolio). By 1916, he believed that a negotiated with Germany was the only solution.
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Without consulting the rest of the Cabinet, he shared his views by addressing himself to
the press. His “peace letter” appeared in the Daily Telegraph on November 29, 1917. He
stated he did not want to annihilate Germany as a great power or deny her place among
great commercial communities of the world.170 It is not surprising Lloyd George did not
embrace Lord Landsdowne’s suggestions.
In December 1916, Germany suggested peace negotiations. However, the
chancellor’s offer, published on December 12, was meaningless, as it failed to specify
terms with the exception that the peace offered rested on a German victory.171 From this
moment on, the editors of Le Bruxellois placed the blame for the continuation of the war
upon France and England. A lead story, signed simply “R.A.” stated that by refusing to
enter into negotiations with the Central Powers, the Entente Powers were completely
responsible for the continuation of the war.172 Another article recounted Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg’s speech to the Reichstag to the effect that the British and French had
spurned Germany’s proposed peace talks it was they who forced the war’s continuation.
Germany therefore had the right to utilize submarines to win the war.173

Conclusion
The German occupiers gave the newspaper a title meant to invoke friendly
sentiments and its by-lines always carried Belgian-named contributors. This did not
change the German control over the newspaper, implemented not only through stringent
censorship but also by staffing it with Germanophiles. Sophie de Schaepdrijver describes
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both La Belgique and Le Bruxellois as propagating the German cause with some
subtleness. This was much less true for Le Bruxellois than La Belgique. The pro-German
stance of the newspaper editors permeated every issue. When Romania attacked AustriaHungary and declared war on the Central Powers, Marc de Salm wrote in a lead story that
it was a historic date that might prove fatal for Romania.174 As this chapter attempted to
demonstrate, the editors and staff arranged news in a manner meant to dishearten the
Belgian and French readers, but news was present in abundance. The result was that
readers of Le Bruxellois knew a great deal about the happenings of the war, except
perhaps the news they most wanted. As the war began going badly for Germany during
1917, the newspaper reported mostly upon the rarer and rarer bright spots for the
Germans, such as the taking of Ösel island in the Gulf of Finland in October 1917.175 By
the time the newspaper carried news suggestive of Germany and Austria-Hungary’s fate
in September of 1918 it is uncertain whether the newspaper was still available in
occupied France. The newspaper still carried an announcement at the time of each issue
explaining its “international” availability, but with the problems facing the Germans, it
would be surprising if the newspaper still reached Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.
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Chapter Ten:
The Clandestine Press
Maxence van der Meersch’s fictionalized account of life in occupied Roubaix
accurately captures how people reacted to life under occupation. His portrayal of
people’s need for information and reactions to the clandestine press are particularly
poignant. He writes, “But in this state of universal uncertainty, imaginations grew heated.
Elaborate stories gained currency; tales of sensational defeats and victories were passed
from mouth to mouth… It was quite obvious that the continued ignorance was sapping
the morale and generally unsettling the civilian population; and it was undoubtedly the
intention of the enemy to do so.”1 He claims people welcomed news through the
clandestine press, whether it was good or bad, noting the creators of the underground
newspapers (based on the real men) “saw how relieved people were to know, to get
genuine information, whether it was good or bad.”2 A letter written by someone in Lille
and smuggled into Britain tells of the many hardships people in the occupied zone faced
but noted, “the greatest depravation is to not receive news.”3 Perhaps more than other
hardships, German control of news dissemination caused resentment among the people of
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Sporadic mail service and German media control meant
that the French people of the occupied zone suffered from a double lack of news: lack of
news about loved ones fighting on the front or living in other parts of the country and
information from a trustworthy medium. While it was extremely difficult for residents of
the occupied Nord to gain information about individual loved ones, the clandestine press
was able to bring news that was more general to the people, a task not without dangers.
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The German occupiers placed the utmost importance on controlling information. Hence,
they considered the production and distribution of clandestine newspapers as one of the
most serious infractions a French civilian could commit, in gravity ranking perhaps just
under hiding enemy soldiers. Conversely, the people of the occupied zone considered the
men and women who produced the underground newspapers as some the greatest heroes
of the time. Indeed, their story is one of bravery in the service of others.
Firmin Dubar, Abbé Pinte, and Joseph Willot aimed to break the German
stranglehold on news distribution by providing the people of Roubaix and Tourcoing, and
then Lille, an underground newspaper that could be trusted. Firmin Dubar was a wellknown textile manufacturer and Abbé Pinte was a young priest. Joseph Willot was a
chemistry teacher at the Roubaix technical institute and doctor of pharmacology at Lille
University with his own laboratory in Roubaix. How these three men, with the help of
many others, for a short time produced and distributed a clandestine newspaper in the
occupied cities is a fantastic part of the story of news availability in the occupied zone.
Not surprisingly, considering that each issue of the newspaper carried the request that
readers incinerate it after reading, copies of every issue no longer exist. What is perhaps
more surprising is how many copies survive. For the purpose of this study, I was able to
locate and consult twenty-eight issues of the clandestine press. The clandestine press in
the occupied zone produced numerous papers under different names with their editors
and writers never identified on the papers. However, the Dubar-Pinte-Willot groups,
aided by a consistent staff, produced all these papers and while the newspaper name
changed frequently for security reasons, in reality all were the same newspaper. The
newspaper appeared under the following names: Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés,
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Patience, Nouvelles françaises, Echo de France, Voix de la Patrie, L’Hirondelle de
France, Courrier de France, L’Oiseau de France, L’Oiseau, and La Prudence. Some
issues carried no name, but were similar enough in format and style to identify their
origin with the Dubar-Pinte-Willot group. For this dissertation, I consulted the only major
collection still in existence of the clandestine press, saved at the Archives
Départementales du Nord. This collection includes nine issues of L’Oiseau de France,
seven issues of La Patience, four issues of La Voix de la Patrie, four untitled issues, one
issue of L’Echo de France, one issue of Nouvelle française, and one issue of L’Oiseau.
There also exist printed reproductions of newspaper articles from banned newspapers that
appear to have been printed utilizing a machine sometimes used for the abovementioned
newspapers. As shall be discussed later in the chapter, there were other, minor, examples
of clandestine printed media produced in the occupied zone during the war, but there is
no concrete evidence suggesting who created these items and so they must be dealt with
separately.

Producing the Newspapers
The story of the clandestine press began when Abbé Pinte assembled a makeshift
radio receiver in his living quarters, utilizing a telephone wire on the roof as the aerial.
He hid the radio when not in use behind the paneling around his bed.4 Firmin Dubar
encouraged the priest to attempt building the device, knowing that before the war Pinte
had gained experience with the wireless transmitter owned by the Roubaix technical
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institute seized by the Germans at the time of occupation.5 On October 24,1914, Pinte
received the first news reports on his radio from unoccupied France, transmissions from
the Eiffel Tower and the English station at Poldhu. The War Ministry had established a
military station at the Eiffel Tower, utilizing it to send out both military communications
and news reports imbued with the same style of propaganda that their written
communiqués contained. Likewise, the British government took control of the station in
Poldhu, Cornwall, utilizing it both for naval communications and to issue daily war
bulletins. Pinte dutifully listened to the 3pm and 11pm war bulletins. He quickly shared
the news he received with a chosen few, including the departmental prefect, Félix
Trépont, the bishop, Mgr. Charost, Senator Dron, Professor Clamette, and of course
Firmin Dubar and Joseph Willot.6 Just listening to the radio was dangerous, and from the
start, Pinte risked discovery by the Germans. As a chemistry professor at the Institute,
Pinte chose to live at the school, his apartment in the technical institute linked to the
military prisoners’ room, and German sentries almost continuously patrolled outside his
door.7 As Pinte felt the pressure mounting and believed continuing from his room would
lead to capture, he decided to move his radio equipment to a space behind the altar in a
chapel, located along the same corridor. He made the transfer, carrying the radio in a
suitcase past several sentries. He continued receiving transmissions for two more years,
despite the fact that the Germans suspected the Institute and searched it eleven times.8
At first, the men disseminated news via word of mouth to important, trustworthy
people. However, word of mouth news dissemination could only reach a limited number
5
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of people, and as information circulated orally to larger groups, it could become
inaccurate.9 It was Firmin Dubar who began planning a newspaper, eventually
commencing production on the mimeograph machine of his friend Joseph Delespant. On
January 1, 1915, eighty copies of Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés appeared under the
doors or were discreetly handed to the most important citizens of Roubaix.10 The second
issue of the paper appeared January 13, with the third issue on January 24, and the fourth
and fifth issues appearing on February 6 and February 23 respectively.11 Joseph Willot
played a key role. As a university professor and the senior pharmacist for the health
service, the German authorities expected him to travel daily between Lille and Roubaix,
which allowed him to pass information between the cities. Both Pinte and Willot worked
for the health service in Roubaix, allowing them daily contact. Hence, Willot took on the
role of distributing and gathering news in Lille while Pinte did the same in Roubaix. The
group did not forget Tourcoing. No less a person than the chief of police and head of the
French information services, M. Lenfant, collected and distributed news in the third city
of the conurbation.12
Quickly the newspaper became an indispensable counterweight to the German
produced news, however, with only fifty to eighty copies of each issue appearing, the
number of copies were painfully insufficient. Furthermore, very few of those copies
circulated beyond Roubaix. Willot believed it to be imperative to start a newspaper in
Lille. Working with Pinte and Dubar, Willot published La Patience in Lille on February
9
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23, 1915. This first issue was nineteen pages long and carried the same news as the
Roubaix version of the paper.13 Willot chose to name the Lille newspaper La Patience to
encourage the population to have continued patience and confidence that France and
Britain would win the war. They continued to produce two newspapers until March 1915,
when the three men decided to combine the Lille and Roubaix newspapers to limit the
risks of detection, which doubled by producing separate newspapers. They met daily to
prepare the issues, which at this point ran about twenty pages each. At this stage in the
venture, they produced two-hundred and fifty copies per an issue, which meant an outlay
of five to seven thousand sheets of paper per run.14
The newspaper team was not satisfied with only including news Pinte received via
his radio. Along with a wide net of co-conspirators, (many of whose names are lost to
history and others who are both remembered and were later incarcerated for their efforts),
they actively collected news, both local and international. In an environment where
newspapers from unoccupied France were very hard to come by, they managed regularly
to include articles from Le Figaro, Le Temps, and Le Petit Journal. They secured French
newspapers by stealing them from German officers, obtaining smuggled-in copies, or
retrieving them from airplane drops. The clandestine newspapers also included local
news, which, thanks to the strict German controls on travel and communicating with
others, was also hard to gather. By April 1, 1915, over a dozen people worked to prepare
each issue. Two priests from the Catholic University of Lille, Auguste Leman, and
Délépine provided religious and economic coverage for the newspaper (Délépine also
provided the artwork), while Dr. Calmette, director of the Pasteur Institute, provided
13
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scientific coverage and acted as a sounding board for Willot. Joseph Willot’s wife often
contributed a women’s page that aimed to provide morale support to mothers and wives
with loved ones at the front.15
Printing these newspapers in secret posed considerable difficulties. One serious
difficulty was attaining enough paper. The German authorities requisitioned paper on a
regular basis.16 Fortunately, another industrialist (whose name is unknown today) had a
large quantity of paper that he donated to the cause. Of the samples that still exist, the
newspapers were usually printed on standard eight inch by eleven-inch paper of rather
poor quality. Another problem for editors of the secret press was the actual printing press.
Their original mimeograph machine proved inadequate for producing the larger number
of copies they now wanted to produce. In February 1915, Paul Delmasure, a Roubaix
industrialist who frequently helped distribute newspapers, provided a new mimeograph
machine. That machine quickly proved inadequate to the task as well. By the spring of
1915, the group was facing new problems. The mimeograph machine created poor
quality newspapers, with the master copy falling apart after eighty copies. The clarity of
the print varied greatly, both from issue to issue and even within the same issue. A few
issues were difficult to read because the print was faint, suggesting the mimeograph
machine was running low on ink. The team printed one issue with type that was in poor
condition, as “e”s looked like “o”s.
The quality of newspaper improved, however, when Madame Reboux, manager
of the Journal de Roubaix offered a proper, pedal driven printing press, which Willot
kept in a small room behind his laboratory on rue du Vieil Abreuvoir. With Edouard
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Dutriux, a competent typesetter, on the team, production increased, and the newspaper
expanded.17 This solution, however, was short-lived. German demands forced Reboux to
take her printing press back in a vain attempt to escape detection. The Germans
demanded a list of all workers in the printing business and took samples of the typeface
of each press in an attempt to figure out who was publishing the underground newspapers
that they managed to obtain. The Germans thus recognized the typeface of the clandestine
newspaper as the same as that of Reboux’s newspaper. Fortunately, within three days
Willot found in Tourcoing a new printing press that the Germans did not know existed,
and its owner, Georges Rohart de Valkenaere, allowed Willot to install it in his
laboratory.18 This change in press meant the team could produce a newspaper in the same
format and similar quality, but with a different typeface, one that the Germans could not
trace. Indeed, the look of the publication even improved at this point. In the spring of
1915 the papers averaged twenty-pages, on 22 x 27cm paper, with two columns per page.
Articles came one after another, separated by large titles. When space was available, the
newspaper carried a table of contents, which the editors included in four of the issues
consulted. A few issues even had supplements, suggesting that when the editorial team
had the time and supplies to offer even more information, they did. When space was at a
premium the editors utilized tricks to fit in as much news as possible, including
abbreviating many common words to offer a lot of information in shortened newspapers.
A women’s page often appeared, and Henri Soubricas provided humorous illustrations
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and caricatures of German soldiers. Father Delépine, professor of geography at the
Catholic University of Lille frequently drew maps of the front for the newspaper.19
Cost of production was also an issue: the newspaper producers chose not to
collect money from the readership, as this would have been difficult while maintaining
their anonymity. The newspaper’s front page frequently reminded readers that the
newspaper was to be a free publication, hoping to avoid dishonest people from trying to
make a profit by selling copies. One estimate suggests that producing the newspapers
cost approximately 32,000 francs (in 1915 currency), paid by Willot and Dubar.20 This
amount refers only to materials and products they donated or bought; it does not include
the people working on the paper who volunteered their time, or donated items. Perhaps
the true largest cost of producing the clandestine press was the toll the constant stress
took upon the people involved. Joseph Willot experienced extreme mental and physical
stress, attempting to produce the underground newspaper while maintaining his façade as
university professor co-operating with the German occupation authorities. He pursued
academic contacts with German professors to sustain his alibi. To keep the Germans
from requisitioning all of his paper he had to have an ongoing project to justify his
supplies and his time. Indeed, in February 1916, he published Le Guide médical des
laboratories.21 Employment in production of this book also provided alibis for René Coq
and Margueire Nollet, both of whom worked for Willot at the Instiute and helped publish
the underground newspapers.
The problem of disseminating news while not getting caught was evident in each
newspaper issue, which advised readers to share the information in its pages with
19
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discretion and to burn all issues once they had been read. A note in one of the Journal
des occupés best summed up news dissemination in the occupied zone, noting that,
“under the régime of terror which we are undergoing, we must understand how to dare,
but we must dare with caution, with moderation, and without rashness.”22 The German
occupiers made it a top priority to discover the source of these newspapers. In March
1915, an official proclamation forbade the reading of any newspaper in Lille except for
the Gazette des Ardennes and the Bulletin de Lille. Specialized German investigators with
trained dogs ripped apart houses and businesses, looking for evidence of the underground
newspapers.23 During one of the earlier raids Dubar managed to hide the printing
equipment at the Institute in a chimney flue of an old steam-driven machine, which,
located behind the large flush water closet, appeared to be a drain. Another raid occurred
on April 1, 1915. Four German officers arrived, interrupting the team in the midst of
completing an issue meant for distribution later that day. Dubar sounded the special alarm
bell to warn printers and folders to hide everything, while he took his time answering the
door.24 Amazingly, the Germans discovered no incriminating evidence, but clearly they
suspected Dubar, for the next day, they requisitioned more than a thousand lengths of
fabric from his stores.25 The distributors of the clandestine press were also at risk of
exposure. One distributor, Henri Soubricas, outsmarted the Germans, and avoided tram
searches and the need for German-authorized passes by regularly walking from Roubaix
to Lille with newspapers.
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German pressure affected the newspaper. April 1915 saw the last twenty-page
edition; the paper from that point on usually contained only one or two pages (up until
August some issues still contained ten to twelve pages) but with more frequent issues.
The name of the newspaper changed frequently and at times the paper appeared without a
name. In May 1915, the team changed the newspaper’s name to Les Nouvelles françaises.
In June, it became L’Echo de France and in July 1915, it changed again to La Voix de la
Patrie. In August and September 1915, the newspaper carried the names Le Courrier de
France, La Voix de Patrie (again), La Confiance, and L’Hirondelle. In October, it
became La Prudence.
During the early fall of 1915 a few issues of the newspaper fell into German
hands. To counter the danger of detection, the next issue proclaimed that French refugees
in a neutral country produced the paper and sent it into the occupied zone. The team then
made sure a copy of the issue with that statement reached German hands. In October, a
French woman brought the German Kommandantur a copy of La Prudence. The
Germans carefully searched Lille, but not Roubaix, the location of the printing press.
This led Willot in October 1915 to suspend the newspaper. From this point forward, only
a few bulletins, shared with a small circle of trusted people came out. Each copy carried a
stamp declaring “French airmail” to protect readers who could claim to have just picked
it up.26 The newspaper shrank to one page with three columns, and it continued in this
form until its end in 1916. Almost every issue carried a warning not to share the
newspaper with others and to burn it once read. Most issues began by stating the paper’s
headquarters was “X,” a locale outside the occupied zone. The newspaper asked that
people not research the location, but simply know that it was outside the occupied zone
26
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and the newspaper producers were French refugees originally from the occupied zone
who bravely worked to bring the truth to people in the occupied zone.27 The team
attempted to make it truly appear that the newspaper came from outside the occupied
zone.
The dating of newspapers also presented security risks to their editors. Only one
of the newspapers consulted in the present research – the first issue published in Lille carried an exact date of publication. One can assume the editors stopped using exact
dates, instead leaving an underlined blank space where the day should have been, to
cloud the issue of transportation time and the paper’s publishing locale. Hence, several
issues could carry the same date, it simply being a month and year. The dates on the
official communiqués reproduced by the newspapers allow historians to place the
newspapers in order, but not to determine an exact publication date for each issue.28
Later, the editors identified the date by referring to how long it had been since the war
began, providing dates such as Day 752.
Security concerns also underlay the editors’ complaints in the newspaper of
transportation problems. In a November 1915, issue, the editors blamed transportation
difficulties in getting the papers past the German authorities and into the occupied zone
for the reduced format and irregularity of the paper’s appearance.29 In a later issue, the
editors promised that anytime something happened to change the military situation, they
would drop this paper into the invaded area via airplane.30 Moreover, throughout the
existence of this clandestine newspaper, the editors included articles on the importance of
27
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treating the paper like secret documents. In May 1915, the newspaper writers noted that
rumors circulating that the Germans arrested the newspaper’s editor were ridiculous,
stating it would be just as easy for the Germans to stop the editors of the Le Temps, Le
Figaro, or Le Matin.31 Still, the editors warned people to be careful. In a September
issue, they lamented the carelessness of readers in a large city in the occupied zone that
forced the newspaper producers to modify how they transported the paper. Trust nobody
was the message. Apparently the editorial staff’s requests were not completely heeded,
for a later article in the newspaper noted that people committed serious transgressions,
including reading the paper in public places, and talking about it in the streets and
tramways, creating a dangerous atmosphere.32
In October 1916, the Germans detained Dubar, suspecting his connection to the
clandestine press. On October 21, 1916, a double agent named Lefebvre provided
Germans with evidence that led to Pinte’s arrest.33 Unlike Pinte, the Germans released
Dubar, who warned Willot, who then destroyed compromising papers. People
encouraged Willot to leave occupied France. Willot had the means to repatriate to
unoccupied France, but his wife was too ill to travel and he refused to leave without her.
Immediately after Pinte’s arrest, the Germans searched the Institute again, although
workers, particularly Marguerite Nollet and her friend Antoinette Valentin, again
successfully hid material. However, this time the Germans found incriminating evidence
kept by the Institute’s janitor, including a complete run of L’Oiseau, notes about the
newspaper’s publication in various people’s handwriting, and a photograph of the entire

31

La Patience, May 1915 c.
L’Oiseau de France, Day 817.
33
Grelle and Visse, 4.
32

299
newspaper team taken on Bastille Day 1916.34 The Germans found the actual printing
press and related material later that month. The Germans again detained Dubar. This time
they interrogated him and placed him in solitary confinement. Although he did not reveal
information about the newspaper staff, the Germans also arrested Willot’s assistant,
Marquerite Nollet. Surprisingly, Willot was still not a suspect and decided to print
another issue using simple equipment. The Germans discovered a copy of a newspaper at
the university, and descended on the campus but Willot was not there, although he was
now a suspect. The police arrived at Willot’s house while he again attempted another
issue. Again, one of the press team hid the incriminating evidence from German eyes.
Willot did the only thing he could think of to clear his friends of suspicion: he
printed one final issue. Five hundred copies, printed by Valkenaere in Tourcoing and
distributed by Soubricas, proclaimed that the wrong people were under arrest.35 The plan
enjoyed some success; the Germans temporarily released Dubar and Nollet, but Pinte
remained in prison. Returning to the newspaper name, La Voix de la Patrie, Willot
attempted to print another issue, with the help of a Roubaix student, Jean-Baptiste Pennel,
listening to Pinte’s radio. However, on December 19, 1915 a surprise German raid on his
laboratory caught Willot in the act of preparing the newspaper. The German authorities
arrested Willot along with thirteen others.36 The publishing team faced trial in April
1917. A few received acquittals, while the Germans sentenced the rest to prison terms
either in German prisons, or in the case of Pinte, a Brussels prison. The main forces
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behind the newspaper received the harshest sentences; Firmin Dubar received a sentence
of ten years and one month in isolation; Joseph Willot a sentence of ten years; Jules Pinte
a sentence of ten years and six months; and Marquerite Nollet a sentence of two years
and six months. While all endured and survived their prison terms until the Armistice,
Willot died shortly after due to the hardship and strain of prison life.
Even with the main contributors to the underground newspaper in prison, Willot’s
wife continued their work. An electrician, Vandendriesche, installed a radio inside her
home. The Germans always suspected her, and not only searched her house frequently
but also forbade her to receive visitors. This did not stop her. When publishing news
became too difficult, she relayed news via word of mouth until the end of the war. Upon
their release from prison, Coq and Soubricas (who both received a few months’ sentence)
as well as Pennel and Valentin helped her. A series of articles published in Le Progrès du
Nord after the war revealed that Madame Willot published about twenty-five issues of the
paper after the Germans imprisoned her husband.37

News in the Papers
The first issue of Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés stated the newspaper’s
producers were “As resolutely hostile to the foolish optimism which is blinded to truth
and transforms the most obvious failures into victories, as to the destructive pessimism
which, for fear of being surprised, can only believe in depressing news.”38 To this end,
the team worked to produce as professional a newspaper as possible. However, with their
main sources being French and British, often they were simply offering propaganda from
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a different point of view, albeit a more palatable one from the point of view of the
occupied. The editorial team frequently identified the sources of articles, noting the
newspaper in which the articles originally appeared and sometimes their authors. Articles
from important journalists in unoccupied France, such as Alfred Capus and Maurice
Barrès appeared relatively frequently. Willot and the editing team always signed articles
they wrote with an “X.” Willot and his team also provided balanced coverage of the war
by providing excerpts from different newspapers on the same topic. For example, in April
1915, the editors put together a piece on British and American coverage of the Germans
sinking steamboats. The piece included brief excerpts from the Westminster Gazette, The
Times, The Pall Mall Gazette, The Globe, New York Herald, and New York World.39
While none of the articles represented the German point of view and hence was not an
unbiased account, the sampling counter-balanced the voluminous submarine coverage in
La Gazette des Ardennes and Le Bruxellois. Most news provided by the clandestine press
can be divided into five categories: battle news and information about the war, in
particular good news for the French; news that was negative for the Germans; articles that
demonstrated world opinion was against Germany; news from unoccupied France; and
news from the occupied zone.

Battle News
People in the occupied zone longed for battle news from a French point of view,
and the clandestine press provided it. This came in the form of official French
communiqués taken from newspapers in unoccupied France, and in sections entitled
“Review of the Main War Events of the Week” which were taken from French and
39

La Patience, n. 8, April 1915.

302
foreign newspapers, and in “The Situation in the Last Hour.”40 The editors tried to cram
as much news into these sections as possible. The newspaper always began with battle
coverage and news from the fronts of northern France. The first issues began updating
people on battles immediately. For example, in January 1915, the newspaper provided
details of fighting around the River Yser and gave detailed, relatively accurate, accounts
of fighting around the Soissons.41 Reports such as these continued and included detailed
information about trenches taken, areas bombed, and German soldiers taken prisoner.
One article, entitled “Conquering the Labyrinth,” depicted the danger and hardship
attached to taking enemy trenches, as it told of the May 30th through June 19th battle to
take German trenches between Neuville-Saint-Vaast and Ecurie.42 The article concluded
on a positive but relatively unbiased note, stating that the Germans not only lost their
trenches, but the entire 161st regiment, with the French taking approximately a thousand
prisoners and killing the rest. However, it also reports that the French army sustained two
thousand casualties in the fight.43
Each issue contained three to five days’ worth of communiqués. If readers
compared these newspapers’ communiqués from the front with those the Germancontrolled press provided in its newspapers, they found not only contradictions of detail,
but even more frequently that the editors of the French and German organs simply
concentrated on different parts of the extensive front where the war was going well for
their side. The newspaper’s editors tried to reassure a readership sensitive to the insertion
of propaganda into reports, providing an article from the Dutch newspaper the Telegraaf,
40
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stating that communiqués reporting the success of French armies north and south of Arras
as well as between Oise and Aisne were accurate and honest.44 Coverage extended to
every front, including the aerial and naval wars. The newspaper also extensively covered
the Eastern Front, which experienced more movement during this time.
Not only did the newspaper carry news from the Russian front, but also insight
into Russian strategies. For example, in a reprint of a New York World article, Russian
War Minister Poliwanow explained that the Russian army chose to retreat to Warsaw to
deny the Germans the quick battle they wanted, and instead tire the German soldiers by
forcing them to march prior to the fight.45 By the fall of 1915, the Russians retreated
beyond Warsaw, establishing a stabilized frontline running from Riga to the Romanian
border. The shortening of the front meant that Russian manpower was sufficient to hold
the line, and the chase across Eastern Europe and the stretching of their supply lines to
their limits did exhaust the Germans.46 What the article featured in the clandestine press
did not mention was the artillery and ammunition left behind during the Russian retreat,
as well as the huge territory and hundreds of thousands of prisoners lost to the Germans.47
The newspaper acknowledged that the Balkan situation was complex, and provided
readers with a detailed article analyzing the Balkan state of affairs.48 Taken from Le
Temps, the article portrayed the Balkans, already plagued with multiple groups with
conflicting national aspirations, as falling victim to Austrian-German ambition.49 The
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article, talking about the aims of different countries for the Balkan area, juxtaposes
Austria and Germany’s treatment against the French desire for independence for the area.
News about the South African and Canadian volunteers entering the war and
British munitions production provided small but important details proving the strength of
the French and British endeavor.50 Italian war efforts also received substantial notice.
Almost every story offered hope of the British and French side winning the war in an
attempt to counteract German propaganda in the form of false or exaggerated battle
reports. For example, in late February 1915 the Germans announced their remarkable
victory over the Russians in the winter battle of Masuria. Pinte, relying on news received
from the Eiffel Tower, was unable to find confirmation of this victory, and passed along
news denying the great German victory, heartening the French population.51 Neither
version received in the occupied cities was entirely accurate. The German commanders
on the Eastern Front, Paul von Hindenburg and his chief of staff Erich Ludendorff,
planned a “knockout blow” against Russia. On February 7, 1915, the German Eighth
Army struck east against the Russian Tenth Army standing north of the Masurian
Lakes.52 During a heavy snowstorm, the Germans took the Russians by surprise; as the
Russians began falling back, the German Tenth Army assaulted them from the north. All
four Russian corps seemed on the brink of annihilation. The brave resistance of the
Russian XX corps in the Forest of Augustrow enabled the other three corps to escape.
The XX corps did eventually surrender to the Germans on February 21, 1915. German
combat losses were light, but numerous German soldiers suffered harshly from
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exposure.53 While the winter battle of Masuria was not the great victory the Germans
claimed it to be with the occupied population, it was still a minor German victory.
During the summer of 1916, the newspaper provided detailed coverage of
Verdun, noting the French recapture of le Morte-Homme and the Fort de Vaux, events
the German-controlled newspapers did not report.54 The Germans captured le MorteHomme earlier in 1916, rendering the French vulnerable at the salient around Fort
Moulainville.55 The Germans fought for months to gain this high ground, with “…the
grim weeks of seesaw battle over control of le Morte Homme have exact[ing] a dreadful
toll [in terms of casualties].”56 The editors of the clandestine press shared relevant battle
news the Germans were withholding when they reported that General Philippe Pétain
launched a successful offensive, recapturing le Morte Homme.57 The fighting for Fort
Vaux, the smallest fortress of the Verdun fortifications was equally brutal, with French
soldiers enduring siege conditions prior to the Germans taking the fort. The clandestine
press may have been premature in reporting the French retaking the fort however, as it
was only on November 2, 1916, after five days of bombardment by French artillery, that
the German garrison finally abandoned the fort during the night.58 Thanks to the
clandestine press, many in the occupied zone knew that the Germans never completely
captured the city of Verdun, despite German-controlled newspapers proclaiming it.59
Through the Eiffel Tower transmissions, Abbé Pinte was also able to confirm the
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stalemate along the Allied front line.60 Readers were able to catch up on any war
information they missed before the inception of the clandestine press, as the newspaper
included the “Official History of the War,” series originally published in The Times in
July 1915.61 Of course, since a large portion of its news came from French newspapers,
the clandestine press administered to its readers its own dose of propaganda, this time
from the French point of view.

Negative Information About the German War Cause
Not surprisingly, the German-controlled press in the occupied zone provided very
little information that presented their war effort in a negative light. The clandestine press
offered a great deal of news to counteract German propaganda that the war was going the
German way and that people in Germany were resilient. Many articles told of heavy
German and Austrian losses on the battlefield, while others explained why victory was
impossible for the two countries.”62 The newspaper staff reported the naval battle of
Dogger Bank and the sinking of the German warship Blücher, deeming this a major
setback for the German navy.63 It was not the complete British victory the British and
French media proclaimed, as three of the four Germans ships escaped, however it did
have serious repercussions for the Germans. Wilhelm II and the Naval general staff
made major personnel changes in the leadership of the High Sea Fleet and became more
cautious in deploying Fleet as a result.64 The newspaper’s editors reported problems on
the enemies’ home fronts as well. One quick blurb informed readers that numerous
60
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people in Austria-Hungary were dying from cholera.65 This statement appears to be true,
if exaggerated. A cholera epidemic occurred in Hungary in 1913 and outbreaks again
occurred during the war in both Hungary and Austria in areas around prisoner of war
camps housing Russian prisoners.66 However, these outbreaks do not compare to the
cholera epidemic Austria-Hungary endured during the Austro-Prussian War. In 1866
approximately 165,000 deaths due to cholera occurred in the two countries.67
A longer article, taken from the Daily Telegraph, examined German morale at
home. Reporting from Rotterdam, the journalist remarked that everyone in Germany,
from the public to government officials were worried and demonstrated great anxiety.68
Francis March, in his work, World War One: History of the World War, includes a line
graph depicting the state of German civilian morale. He arbitrarily regards morale as
standing at one hundred percent in August 1914, and at zero at the end of the war, a point
at which an effective majority of the German people refused to support the war. In the
fall of 1916, when this article appeared in the clandestine press, German civilian morale
hovered at approximately sixty percent on the line graph, having been in decline since
October of the previous year.69
Another article the editors published reported that German threats of regular
zeppelin attacks on England were German distress cries in a war they were losing.70 That
the clandestine press associated a potential increase in German zeppelin attacks on
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England with Germany losing the war, demonstrates that some of its news contained
blatant Allied propaganda, in the this case British. This article appeared before Britain
developed defenses, such as incendiary bullets that later in the war would render zeppelin
raids ineffective. In the fall of 1915, “the specter of these great leviathans of the air
sowing the seeds of death and destruction in the streets of London…” was still a real fear,
with bad weather being Britain’s greatest weapon in stopping the zeppelins from
bombing its cities.71 While zeppelin attacks resulted in only moderate damage in
England, their psychological effect on the British home front in 1915 was profound. This
article represented brave talk in the face of fear, something readers most likely would
have recognized. Borrowing a tactic from the German-controlled press in the occupied
zone, the clandestine press included articles about sections of the German government
wanting peace, including one that claimed the Chancellor had sanctioned a socialist
public appeal to end the war.72 Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg would publicly indicate
his support for a negotiated peace a year later, but the Allies rejected his request,
potentially because they realized German military leadership did not support Hollweg’s
stance.73
The clandestine press also covered the desperation of the German military to
garner supplies, running an article stating that the Germans mobilized their churches to
requisition metals. Clergy were supposed to both encourage their congregations to hand
in metal, as well as to hand over all metal items that belonged to the churches.74 While
not explicitly stated in the article, this news surely supported the French belief that the
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Germans were sacrilegious barbarians, for who else would ransack their own churches
for the war effort? Biased editorializing, perhaps, but the basis of the news article was
accurate. Germany needed metal reserves. Calling for self-sacrifice to overcome metal
shortages, particularly copper, Wilhelm II promised to melt down some of his own
monuments. In May 1915, the Prussian Ministry of War began to deal systematically
with metal shortages. It requisitioned metal objects such as kitchen utensils and church
bells. More than 40,000 churches and religious institutions relinquished items, and by
January 1918, German authorities took half of all church bells in Germany.75 Another
article focused upon the cost of living in Germany, and in particular in Silesia, where
potatoes had skyrocketed to the equivalent of thirty-seven francs a pound and ham to 15
francs a pound (in 1915 currency).76 The cost of living rose to twelve times pre-war
levels in Germany during the war, as compared to it rising by a factor of three in the
United States, four in Britain, and seven in France.77 Silesia, as one of Germany’s main
industrial centers, felt the rise in the cost of living, as wage increases did not match the
increase in the cost of living.
No piece of bad news for the Germans was too small too report. For example, a
brief article ran in the paper telling of the Spanish government interring Moulai Hafid,
the former sultan of Morocco, who expressed pro-German sympathies.78 The article did
not mention the fact that Moulai Hafid was most likely still receiving a French pension
paid since he abdicated as sultan of the French protectorate of Morocco. Like other
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French media, the tone of the clandestine press did approach gloating when reporting
Germany’s woes. This is not surprising, considering how the French viewed the
Germans during the war. These clandestine newspapers frequently referred to France’s
“hereditary enemy,” stating that Germany was looking to complete a conquest that began
in 1870.79 Deborah Buffton notes that the memory of 1870 was particularly strong among
the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, as they believed that if Germany won the
war, the Germans would annex their towns, just as they had Alsace and Lorraine.80

World Opinion against the Germans.
The clandestine press provided moral support to its readers, letting them know
that much of the world was on France’s side. Several articles in the underground
newspaper detailed the world’s disgust with Germany’s behavior, including certain
groups in neutral countries, such as professors, judges, lawyers, and the public in
Holland.81 Rising tensions between the Germans and Americans also received ample
attention. One article outlined a back and forth between the Kaiser and President Wilson
over the German use of submarines, providing analysis noting that the German leader
demonstrated a lack of judgment by utilizing aggressive language with the Americans.82
Another issue of the paper included two reports, one noting that President Wilson asked
the Austrian government to recall its ambassador to the United States because he was
attempting to ferment strikes in American munitions factories, and another taken from the
Dutch newspaper the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant claiming that German-American
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relations were more tenuous than ever before.83 By the fall of 1915, events strained
German-American relations. The German sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania on
May 7, 1915, while it was carrying American passengers and the German reaction to the
incident soured relations. On June 8, 1915, American Secretary of State William Jennings
Bryan resigned because he believed President Woodrow Wilson’s strong protests against
the German response to the incident and their general war policy could lead to the United
States entering the war.84 By the beginning of 1916, the War Press Office in Germany
had to clear any mention of German-American relations.85 Of course, German-American
relations were to deteriorate even further; the March 1917 Zimmerman Telegram incident
led directly to war.
Other articles told of Americans’ sympathy for the French cause and their
abhorrence of the first of two German campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare.86
The clandestine press made its readers aware of the submarine attacks by the Germans,
including coverage of the sinking of the Falaba, although in the issues consulted no
connection was made between the sinking of this British ship headed to West Africa and
American anger over one of its citizens being killed.87
The clandestine press also reported that the German secretly admired the French
military. A reprinted article from the Daily Telegraph reported that a German army major
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taken prisoner stated that the French military never ceased to show great determination
and courage.88 Another article, taken from the Frankfurter Zeitung, stated that the
German press was impressed with how the French in the occupied zone kept their morale
up, and compared it to the deplorable spirit of the Germans on the home front.89 This
statement bore out the truth, as the German home front moved towards collapse and all
the French in the occupied zone could control was their morale and dignity.90 However,
unlike the journalists, the occupied French people’s aloofness and pride angered rather
than impressed some of the more perceptive German soldiers.

News from Unoccupied France
The clandestine press attempted to provide readers with information from
unoccupied France. A lot of this information concerned the French government,
financing the war, and French industry. The newspaper included coverage of political
speeches, such as that by Prime Minister Briand declaring politics in France had only one
aim – victory.91 The newspaper staff included political news from France whenever
possible, such as when Minister of War Millerand received a check for four million
francs to buy war supplies.92 The newspaper informed readers of the Bank of France’s
gold reserve status in one article and attempts to minimize the imports of raw materials in
another.93 The newspaper covered politicians’ public events, including Poincaré’s trip to
the front and various politicians’ trips to munitions factories. The clandestine press also
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included political and domestic news from France’s allies. A report on British Minister of
Munitios Lloyd George’s speech to Welsh miners fighting on the Italian front was even
accompanied by an illustration of the prime minister in a special supplement.94 The state
of Russia and England’s economy and war effort also received coverage in the
newspaper, with Russian munitions production receiving particular attention.95
Some of the news provided by the underground press from unoccupied France
dealt with life in the occupied zone. One such article was “To Women of the Nord.”96
Composed as a letter, signed from “a French woman,” it tells the women of the occupied
zone that women in unoccupied France write to their husbands and fathers fighting on the
front, and they do so like mothers writing to their sons. This knowledge, that the men
from the occupied zone fighting at the front receive caring letters despite their families’
inability to send them from German occupied France, was supposed to comfort the
women of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. The same letter reported that recent evacuees
had a good trip and were now on French land, as their compatriots received them with
tenderness.97 Another article provided even greater detail about people evacuated from
the occupied zone to Paris. The article provided insight into the life of refugees after they
left the land of barbarians, including information about the Parisian neighborhoods in
which they congregated.98 Evacuees from the tri-city area arrived in France via
Switzerland, enduring what was often an exhausting journey, taking several days with
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people crammed into trains. News in this article that people arrived safely and in good
health would have been very welcome to the readers of the clandestine press.

News From Within Occupied Zones.
While the Bulletin de Lille and the Journal de Roubaix provided some coverage
of news occurring in occupied zone, the clandestine press supplemented that coverage.
The German occupiers attempted to isolate towns from each other, letting little news
from Lille reach Roubaix and Tourcoing, and vice versa.99 The underground press
covered other areas of the occupied zone. At least one story expressed anger towards
another occupied area, namely Brussels. An article written by a member of the
clandestine press team (as opposed to one taken from another newspaper) stated that life
in Brussels was close to normal; tramways ran late into the night, the cost of living
remained average, and cafés, movie theaters, and music halls were full of Belgians and
Germans alike. Indeed, the article noted that in Brussels it was not strange for German
officers and Belgians to socialize in cafés, a concept that would be scandalous in Lille or
Roubaix.100 These statements were far from accurate; yet they appeared to be a rumor
that had wide circulation in occupied France during the war. The reality was that the
Germans plundered Belgium with great thoroughness, and the more authoritarian the
Germans acted, the more stubbornly the Belgians resisted.101 The occupation of Belgium
was so brutal that Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador to Belgium during the war,
99
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described it as a “slow poisoning for the purpose of enslavement.”102 It is interesting to
speculate how the editors – educated, intelligent men – could believe that life in Brussels
could be so much better. Perhaps the glimpse they received into Belgian life via the
German-controlled imported newspapers from Brussels convinced them life there was
less harsh.
Articles about the occupied zone sometimes provided support, and sometimes
reminded people of their difficult patriotic duty. Support came in the form of an article
noting that Carnival in 1915 would not be a party, without even the flour necessary to
make the traditional crêpes, but that the people of the Nord were strong and would get
through the occupation if they had patience.103 Many people in Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing kept pigeons before the war as pets, something the German occupiers quickly
forbade for fear the French would use the birds to communicate with the outside world.
Hence an article in the first issue of the Lille version of the paper, telling of pigeons
living happily in the trees of Lille, must have brought comfort to many.104 The editors of
the clandestine press were also quick to remind people of their patriotic duty. A long
article urged people not to exchange their gold for city vouchers, noting that this was
simply giving resources to the Germans that could be transformed into enemy cannons
and munitions that would kill fathers and brothers in the French trenches.105 The tone of
the message was harsh and uncompromising, especially considering the hardship people
in the cities endured if they did not have money to buy items at their newly elevated,
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wartime prices. The newspaper frequently encouraged readers not to work for the
Germans, despite the suffering such resistance brought to people who followed this
advice.
The editors of the clandestine press frequently wrote articles about the occupied
zone that revealed aspects of life that the Germans would not allow discussed publicly.
For example, one article explained how German requisition demands were illegal
according not only to international law but also to also German law.106 Another article let
readers know that government officials in unoccupied France were aware that the
German military systematically took machinery and raw materials from the occupied
zone and transported it to Germany.107 The newspaper producers were not afraid to mock
the German occupiers. A March 1915 issue La Patience included a poem entitled “The
Ten Commandments of Von Heinrich.”108 The poem humorously pointed out the German
Governor of Lille’s attempts to control even the most mundane aspects of life, including
the lines, “The worst of falsehoods shalt thou swallow / Without the least reproach/ Thou
shalt accept the situation / or else look out for retribution!”109

Other Underground Newspapers?
Not included in the above discussion of the clandestine press are several copies of
newssheets, newspaper articles, and reproductions of speeches. For example, French
archives preserved a half dozen hand-written and typed copies of the Gazette de Cologne,
found in what was the occupied zone after the war. Did the same people or others
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attempting to disseminate news produce these sheets? Were they intended for private
consumption or passed around? Were the undated ones the work of Madame Willot? One
news bulletin was thirty-six pages long and appeared somewhat similar to Willot’s
clandestine publications, but not similar enough to say with certainty that she produced it.
Other people claimed to have produced underground newspapers in the tri-city
area during the war. Jules Eucher, a Roubaisien professor of stenography claimed that
during October 1917 he produced and distributed a clandestine newspaper entitled Les
Feuilles jaunes.110 While no copies exist to prove his story, he claimed that he provided
extracts from French and British newspapers as well as information from radio reports.
He did spend one month in prison under the Germans. Others have made similar claims
that cannot be proved or disproved. What is known is that the clandestine press provided
the inspiration for like-minded people to start another underground newspaper during the
German occupation of the Second World War, Les Petites Ailes de France.

Conclusion
As the risks mounted for Willot, Rector Margerin of the Catholic University of
Lille told Willot that God did not require him to take these risks, and asked Willot if he
had the right to chance making his wife a widow and his children orphans. Willot
responded a few days later, saying he had talked to his wife, and she urged him to
continue.111 And continue he did for as long as possible. The timing of the fall of the
clandestine press was unfortunate; Annette Becker cites a weakening of morale at the end
of 1916 that grew worse until the summer of 1917, which brought a return of hope and a
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spirit of resolution.112 The timing of the highs and lows of morale were quite divorced
from war events. This could suggest that while the people in the occupied cities were
receiving news, that information did not relay to them the large significance of certain
events, leading to a misunderstanding of how the war was going for the Allied side.
Perhaps more likely, internal events caused the ebbs and flows of morale. At the end of
1916, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing had experience over two years of
horrible occupation. By the summer of 1917, the occupiers were beginning to feel and
show the strain, a factor that may have bolstered the occupied.
While many historians lament that the ordeals of occupation suffered by northern
France are often left out of the narrative of France’s experience during the war, their
nation did recognize the work of the resisters. After the war, France bestowed the Ordre
de la Nation upon Marquerite Nollet and Madame Willot. Willot (posthumously), Pinte,
and Dubar received the Croix de la Légion d’Honneur. In 1920, the Académie Française
honored all involved by awarding the Prix Buisson, founded in 1889 to recognize works
resulting from righteousness and virtue, to L’Oisseau de France.113
While historians extol the bravery of the men and women who worked to provide
the citizens of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing with news they could trust, one does have to
admit that the audience was a privileged group of readers. Owing to the difficulty of
keeping the press a secret from the Germans, people were not encouraged to share the
news they received. The clandestine papers had a wide but favored circle of readers
consisting largely of persons known to the middle and upper class professionals who
produced the newssheets. It is difficult to say how much news trickled down to poorer
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residents and those without connections to the cities’ leaders. However, there are
indications that news from the underground press did reach a wider audience at times. On
at least one occasion, the newspaper was read from a church pulpit.114 Auguste Leman
also cited people’s indiscriminate reading of the newspaper in cafés, tramways, and even
in the streets as one of the reasons why publication was temporarily suspended in
November 1915.115 Copies were even found as far away as Douai, Tournai, and Brussels.
Every editor makes decisions about what information to include. The clandestine
press demonstrated a definite bias towards news that was would uplift morale. These
articles focused upon the successes of France and its allies, growing global distrust of the
Germans, and unrest within Germany. It is a matter of historical debate whether this was
propaganda as well, or if it simply made sense to publish the news that the Germancontrolled papers would not, to provide balance. When the clandestine press was
available, people did not have to read the German-controlled newspapers for war news.
However, the secret press did not stop people from reading the other papers, as they were
still a source of information on prisoners, the latest German regulations, and local news.
Like the German-controlled press, the underground newspapers frequently included brief
pieces of news from various places. However, the producers would have balked at any
comparison, having declared the German-controlled press part of the German industry of
lies.116

114

Ibid.,133.
Leman, “A la mémoire de M. Joseph Willot,” 614.
116
Le Courier de France, August 1915.
115

320

Chapter Eleven:
Other Sources:
Less Influential Publications Available in the Occupied Cities

The aim of this dissertation is to discover what news was available in occupied
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing during the First World War by examining all the news
sources available. To be a truly thorough examination, this must include sources that the
French people of those cities did not regularly read, but that were at times available.
Some sources were available only sporadically, such as smuggled newspapers from
unoccupied France. The difficulty and danger involved with attaining these newspapers
made them a relative rarity. Later in the war, airplanes and then air balloons dropped
newspapers produced in France and England for the occupied territory. The Germans
within the occupied territory made it a priority to intercept these newspapers and severely
punish anyone caught with one. Combined with the need for good weather and favorable
wind to drop the newspapers, these too were a rare treat for the occupied French.
German language newspapers were relatively easy to obtain, but were not widely read.
Few Frenchmen at this time in these industrial cities could read German and these
newspapers just provided more news from a German perspective, hence they did not
become a regular source of news for the French.
Even though the focus of this work is news available through newspapers, it is
worthwhile to briefly consider the books and pamphlets the Germans tried to sell to the
occupied French. It is safe to assume that these books did not sell for two reasons.
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Firstly, all the books had as their basic premise the strength and righteousness of
Germany and its war effort. Secondly, the occupied people had little disposable income
with which to purchase items. However, if we are to attempt to understand what
information was available in the occupied cities, all sources of news much be considered.

Little Treasures: Newspapers from Unoccupied France
Despite the German authorities’ best efforts, some newspapers from outside the
occupied territory did make their way into Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Auguste
Leman described receiving newspapers from the motherland as comforting but irregular,
and the newspapers were always several days old.1 He stresses the irregularity of the
newspapers noting, they were “too infrequent to help the suffering of the heartbroken
population of the occupied zone.”2 Newspapers from unoccupied France that did reach
the tri-city region were extremely expensive and the people passed them from hand to
hand until the newspapers fell apart. The newspapers most frequently cited as being
smuggled into the occupied cities were Le Matin, L’Echo de Paris, and Petit Journal.
Contraband newspapers reached the tri-city via a few different routes. Some
people succeeded in smuggling in newspapers from Holland, often as wrapping for other
items. There existed professional smugglers, before the war, who took advantage in the
lower prices of alcohol and gasoline in Belgium, selling it as contraband in northern
France for a profit. Once the war started, old and new smugglers undertook smuggling
under the Germans, and information passed secretly between France and Belgium despite
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the presence of sentries, and electrified and barbed wire barriers.3 The New York Times
reported in 1917 that if people in Roubaix or Tourcoing wished to read a French
newspaper they could sometimes buy one from German officers, who would sell the
newspaper for the outrageous price of the equivalent of ten American dollars (in 1917
currency).4 In occupied Brussels, the trade in prohibited newspapers provided many
people with a black market livelihood.5 It would not be surprising if German troops
partook in similar transactions. In “Invasion,” Maxence van der Meersch wrote, “there
were also occasions when an aeroplane would drop a bundle of French papers. A single
copy would be picked up, at the danger of the finder’s life, sometimes on a rooftop, and
for a fortnight there was sunshine in their hearts.”6 This precursor to concerted efforts of
dropping newspapers specifically written for the occupied zone occurred very
haphazardly, usually done as part of a larger aerial mission.
There are conflicting reports on how many issues of newspapers the people of
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received from unoccupied France. The Journal des
réfugiés du Nord is one of the best sources for such information. In the July 22, 1916,
issue, a person repatriated from the occupied zone noted that since the bombing, the
Lillois have had no news from France. The rare newspapers from Paris that British
planes dropped (namely Le Matin and L’Echo de Paris) remained in the hands of a small
number of people, as it was extremely difficult and dangerous to pass them along to
others.7 However, just five months later and seventeen miles outside of Lille, in Douai, it

3

McPhail, 116, 118.
The New York Times Current History: The European War, vol. 10, January-March 1917 (NY: The New
York Times Company, 1917), 112.
5
Massart, “The Secret Press in Belgium,” 6.
6
van der Meersch, 286.
7
Journal des réfugiés de Nord, July 22, 1916.

4

323
was reported that people get to read French newspapers often enough to generate
confidence in the final victory of the Allies.8 Another article suggested that it was not
only newspapers from unoccupied France being read on the sly in occupied France; a
person in the occupied zone stated that he read in La Suisse of American aid to Belgium.9
By April of the following year, the Journal des réfugiés du Nord reported that news from
unoccupied France is rare in the occupied zone.10 Overall, the evidence suggests that very
little information trickled across the barrier separating occupied France from the rest of
the world. Eugène Martin-Mamy wrote that he felt he had a responsibility to begin
publishing a newspaper in Lille immediately after the war ended despite all the obstacles
he faced, because he knew the misery of the people who went four years without a
French newspaper.11
Sources from the time (such as the Journal des réfugiés du Nord and Auguste
Leman’s writing) suggest that the three newspapers from unoccupied France most
frequently smuggled in were the dailies Le Matin, Petit Journal, and L’Echo de Paris.
Providing an analysis of the news contained in these newspapers would afford light
insight into the news available in the tri-city area, for we do not know which issues
reached the people of occupied France. However, it is worthwhile to include a brief
overview of each paper, to understand the slant and style of these newspapers that
occasionally reached some people in the occupied cities.
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Two Englishmen and an American started Le Matin in 1884, as an Americanstyled tabloid, including short, action-orientated news stories under large headlines.12 The
newspaper struggled until 1898, when Maurice Bunau-Varilla took over and reorganized
it.13 The newspaper’s circulation reached 600,000 by 1909. Bunau-Varilla oversaw Le
Matin until 1944, when French authorities closed it down for collaboration with the
Nazis.14 During the First World War, Le Matin, a right-of-center newspaper, tended to
adhere to the official line received from the French military, but its journalists also had a
propensity for hyperbole. For example, on September 20, 1914, the newspaper included
an article on two captured German soldiers found to have the severed hands of a woman
and a child in their pockets.15 The newspaper famously proclaimed that the Russians were
five days away from Berlin early in the war when it was going poorly for the Allies.16
With few exceptions, history has not recorded which issues of Le Matin reached Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Did the November 1, 1914, issue, which reassured readers that
the Allies pushed back violent German attacks (a fairly accurate description although the
statements that the Germans suffered great losses hinted of exaggeration), reach anybody
in the occupied zone?17 The most we can say with certainty is that infrequently a few
issues reached the people of the occupied zone, and when they did, those fortunate
enough to lay their eyes on the issue would have most likely read the official French
military line, with perhaps a dose of exaggeration in favor of the French cause.
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Moise Millaud launched the smaller format Le Petit Journal.18 The content of the
newspaper was mainly coverage of crime and violent events, but also included theater
schedules, stock quotations, and serialized novels. By the 1880s, illustrations and huge
headlines announced the sensational articles.19 Perhaps most unique for the time, Le Petit
Journal was nonpolitical, which exempted it from the government stamp tax on political
newspapers. Thus, this newspaper sold for approximately half the price of other low-price
dailies.20 When Millaud died in 1871, a syndicate including Hippolyte Marinonl and
Emile de Girordina, took over the newspaper.21 By 1882, it boasted the largest circulation
in Paris. Under the Third Republic the distinction between political and nonpolitical
newspapers disappeared for taxing purposes, allowing the editor-in-chief, Ernest Prevet,
to utilize the newspaper to espouse his aggressively nationalist views, that included being
anti-Dreyfusard in the 1890s.22 This viewpoint lost the paper a portion of its readership in
Paris, as its circulation dropped behind that of Le Petit Parisien and Le Matin. However,
it remained the most popular Parisian daily outside of Paris on the eve of the First World
War. Much like Le Matin, Le Petit Journal championed the official French military line,
which coincided with its political right-wing leaning and reflexive nationalism.23 Did the
August 1, 1916, issue that relied upon military terms to describe the economic strength of
France, stating that the country has utilized its economic arsenal prudently and had strong
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reserves, reach the occupied zone? 24 Again, we are unsure, but it can be stated that the
few issues of this newspaper that reached the occupied zone would have provided readers
with very encouraging news from the French perspective.
Le Matin and the Le Petit Journal were right of center in the views that their
editors and journalists espoused, but L’Echo de Paris’ staff published opinions that were
to the extreme right, leading Jean-Jacques Becker to deem it an organ of the militarist and
Catholic right.25 The newspaper contained an “inexhaustible flow” of articles on every
imaginable topic related to the war, written by nationalist writers such as Albert de Mun
and Maurice Barrès.26 The French novelist Paul Bourget described de Mun during the
early days of the war as the “pulse of the nation’s heart,” as de Mun preached daily to the
people, through L’Echo de Paris, a profoundly Christian message, reviving the message
of Joan of Arc, of courage and hope.27 As the war started, Maurice Barrès was one of
France’s most well-known and conservative novelists. Utilizing L’Echo de Paris as his
medium, he glorified the purity of war and the spirit of patriotism.28 Did the November
19, 1914 issue of L’Echo de Paris reach the occupied zone, with an article by Barrès,
extolling the unique contribution French women were making to the war, as mothers and
wives?29 With so many ardently patriotic, and even nationalistic and jingoistic articles,
many of which condemned the Germans as vile and corrupt, the laws of probability
suggest that whatever issues of the newspaper reached the readers of Lille, Roubaix, and
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Tourcoing, they surely raised the patriotic ire of the readers, and fuelled their intense
dislike for the German authorities.

Dropped Newspapers
As mentioned before, sometimes newspapers from unoccupied France reached the
occupied zone because a plane succeeded in dropping them.30 It is impossible to gauge
what literature reached people. Beyond the possibility of people not finding the
literature, British airmen did not like dropping material and “were reportedly prone to
burn[ing] leaflets in the hangars.”31 It is unclear whether the airmen distained the job
because it was not deemed “fighting,” or if they were concerned because Germany
threatened to hang any aviators captured with propaganda literature. After dropping
newspapers and pamphlets into unoccupied France for the first year of the war, France
and England decided to develop newspapers especially for those behind enemy lines.
The French government made some rather anemic attempts at influencing people
through newspapers in the occupied zone. The French army was in charge of propaganda
directed at French territories occupied by the Germans. The Section de la propagande
aérienne dropped imitation German-language newspapers, meant to trick German soldiers
into believing their own government was taking a defeatist attitude, to demoralize the
occupiers, and a French newspaper meant to raise the morale of the French population.32
They titled the newspaper meant for the occupied zone La Voix du Pays. Between
September 28, 1915, and October 29, 1918, Allied airplanes and balloons dropped
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approximately eighty issues of la Voix du Pays on occupied France. The French also
dropped this newspaper on Alsace and Lorraine.33 The information bulletin usually
contained four pages filled with war information and news from refugees originally from
the occupied territories, now living in unoccupied France.34 The March 29, 1916, issue of
Le Journal des refugiés du Nord described La Voix du Pays, noting it was a small
newspaper of four pages that brought news of France, which was printed on light paper.
The news in it was brief but true, and for that reason comforting. It offered news about
the lives of refugees in Paris and elsewhere, as well as topics such as le Comité des
réfugies du Nord and the great sorrow felt at the loss of Eugène Jacquet.35 The newspaper
attempted to provide the people of occupied France not only news of the war in general,
but news that would be of specific interest to them, that would not receive detailed
coverage in Le Matin or L’Echo de Paris.
Starting in April 1917, the British Ministry of War created a newspaper, Courrier
de l’Air, for distribution in occupied Belgium and France, and intermittently in Germany.
Published until January 25, 1918, it was an eleven-inch by nine-inch single-sheet with
print on both sides produced weekly. The average number of copies distributed was five
thousand.36 The newspaper’s stated objective was to support the morale of Britain’s
friends behind German lines. At first airplanes dropped the newspaper until the Germans
made it a priority to shoot down these planes. Then the British used air balloons to drop
the newspapers. The British dispatched these balloons to France twice a week, but only a
portion of would reach occupied France. If the wind suggested the balloons would land
33
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in the battle zone, the British attached propaganda leaflets whose intended audience was
Germans soldiers instead.
In at least one issue, the newspaper carried a notice to readers quite different than
that in the clandestine press. Unlike the clandestine press, which beseeched readers to be
very circumspect in sharing news from the paper, the dropped-in paper asked readers to
not throw out or destroy the newspaper, but to pass it to their neighbors, as they too were
anxious to know what is happening in the world.37 This suggests that perhaps the British
military leaders were not as cognizant of the danger facing people in the occupied zone if
the Germans caught them with the newspaper. However, the people of Lille, Roubaix,
and Tourcoing knew to treat the airplane dropped newspapers just like those of the
clandestine press.
For the purpose of this dissertation, I read sixteen issues of the newssheet.
However, the source was not from a collection from the occupied zone, so it is uncertain
if anybody in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received these articles. Hence, there can be
no benefit in discussing specific articles, but it is worthwhile to note the type of news it
carried. Much like all the other newspapers, it provided battle coverage, this time infused
with British propaganda. One news story that was more likely than most to reach the
people of the occupied zone via this newspaper was the British naval attack on the
German-held Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostende. At least five articles described
the destruction of these important ports and the subsequent attempts to rebuild them by
the Germans.38 In truth, the daring British operation was a failure, not achieving its
objective of blocking the port by sinking three old cruisers loaded with cement, and
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resulting in five hundred casualties.39 Even though the Germans quickly dug a new
channel at Zeebrugge and subsequent raids on Ostende failed, the attempt boosted British
morale.40 Overall, all the news published in this newspaper was extremely positive for the
Allies and hinted the war was going extremely badly for Germany. As most of the issues
examined for this dissertation were from the last months of the war, it was of course
easier for the British to find positive, frequently accurate information as the Allies were
on the cusp of winning the war.
Planes intermittently dropped another newspaper, Le Cri des Flandres, over the
occupied cities of France.41 The man publishing the newspaper was Abbé Lemire, the
mayor of Hazebrouck, a town northwest of Lille that was the key British rail center north
of the Somme. A former professor of theology in a seminary, Rome excommunicated
Abbé Lemire, supposedly for not asking their permission to sit as a Deputy in the
Chamber of Deputies, but in reality because of the liberality of his opinions.42 Henry
Russell Wakefield described Lemire as a leader in a town right at the front. Lemire took
it upon himself to produce a newspaper to help sustain morale for those closest to the
fighting. The German authorities created similar newspapers for German troops, two of
which, Liller Kriegszeitung and La Gazette de Colgone, were readily available in the
occupied cities of France.
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More German Newspapers – 1. Liller Kriegszeitung
The Liller Kriegszeitung was a newspaper of the Sixth German Army, meant for
the occupation forces, and published in Lille, its name translating to “Lille War News.”
Hauptmann D.L. Hoecker and Rittmeister Freiherr Von Ompteda of the Lille high
command published the four-page Liller Kriegszeitung from December 8,1914, until
September 27, 1918, three times a week. Captain Paul Oskar Höcker, a well-known
writer from Brandenburg, edited the newspaper, overseeing writers from the army. He
was a best-selling author prior to the war, and he quickly wrote An der Spitze meiner
Kompagnie (At the Head of my Company) in 1914 from the front.43 Soon after its
publication in English, The New York Times described his book as one of the most
graphic and convincing pieces of writing to come out of the war.44 The Germans
produced the newspaper using the office space and equipment of the closed-down L’Echo
du Nord (a large regional daily before the war).
The Liller Kriegzeitung was a well-produced, high quality newspaper, in terms of
both presentation and content. It contained articles not only providing military and
political news and analysis, but also articles on history and geography, science and
medicine, literature and musical criticism, poems, and illustrations.45 From 1915 through
1917 the newspaper included a two-page illustrated supplement, the Kriegslugbläther,
produced by Karl Arnold. The artistic quality of the photographs and drawings were of a
high caliber, but always carried a pro-German propaganda message. Within Germany, the
newspaper enjoyed a widespread reputation for excellence and good taste; in Germany
and among the German armed forces in France it was a highly regarded newspaper.
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By the end of 1916, the Germans produced 110,000 copies per issue, with copies
given free to members of the Sixth Army. To cover the cost of these free-publications,
the Germans created a quasi-publishing company that produced postcards, propaganda
brochures, and a few books. For example, La Guerre 1914-1918 was a seventy-eight
page book explaining how the Germans were not responsible for the war, and France’s
true enemies were Britain and Russia.46
The Germans considered Lille a prized capture, so many of the articles and
illustrations in the Liller Kriegszeitung pertained to situations and events taking place in
the city. The Journal des réfugiés du Nord published an article noting that several
German newspapers, including the Liller Kriegszeitung, were producing a lot of
information and articles on Lille, as the city had become a meeting point for German
reporters. From a French point of view, the coverage was not impressive, as it did not
contain detailed information about the state of the city, but rather tirades heavy on
psychological analysis.47 While glorifying the beauty of grandeur of Lille along with
German pride at taking the French city, the tone of the newspaper was certainly antiFrench. However, the writers and publishers of the paper directed most of their hostility
towards the upper, ruling classes of Lille, while they reported quite fairly on the
population in general. The newspaper editors even went so far as to publish an article
showing German admiration for the invaded population.48 Nor did the paper advocate
nonfraternization with the local population. As Richard Cobb notes, the content of the
newspaper, including suggestions of guided tours of Lille’s museums and art galleries,
seemed to encourage German soldiers to take part in city life and permitted contact with
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the civilian population.49 However, the Liller Kriegszeitung, like all other German
military newspapers, lost much of its individuality in 1917 as the Army High Command
believed they were a useful, influential tool, that needed to be better utilized and directed.
The German Army High Command homogenized and centralized the information
included in all its newspapers and restructured the newspaper. Wolfgang Natter describes
the change, noting “…whatever particularity has been possible for expressing Frontgeist
within this medium prior to Patriotic Instruction became more circumscribed, even as its
consolidation of a purported authentic voice from the trenches served as further material
to sustain élan at home.”50
Realistically, very few men and women of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing read
this newspaper. The Germans did not intend the newspaper for the occupied population
and hence did not make it available to them. In an environment where the occupied
people learned to covertly gain news, whether through smuggled newspapers or passing
around issues of the clandestine press, it would not have been difficult for them to
stealthily picked up copies of the Liller Kriegszeitung from cafés and around town.
Furthermore, the Germans did not actively use threats to discourage the people from
reading the paper. However, two factors kept the people of the occupied cities from
reading this newspaper. Firstly, the newspaper was in German, and very few people in
the tri-city area could read German, especially when written in “Bavarian slang,” like this
newspaper. Richard Cobb commented that he needed assistance in translating this
newspaper while researching his book.51 Secondly, it most likely did not seem
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worthwhile to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to secretly work to attain this
newspaper, when news from the German perspective was so readily available in La
Gazette des Ardennes.

More German Newspapers – 2. La Gazette de Cologne
Known as the Kölnische Zeitung in German, this German-language newspaper
was a little-read source of information for the French in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing
for many of the same reasons as the Liller Kriegszeitung; it was written in German and
was another source of German propaganda. Nevertheless, Annette Becker notes that
when it was available in the cities, people did look to it for battle information.52 It was a
semi-official newspaper, which even before the war frequently inserted articles by the
Foreign Office.53 Needless to say, the newspaper’s editors were strong proponents of the
German war aims. Prior to the German army mobilizing, the newspaper’s St. Petersburg
correspondent, who also happened to be a member of the German embassy staff, wrote
that a preventative war was necessary against Russia.54 The paper’s editors placed
responsibility for the war not on the country that declared war, Germany, but on the
countries that made war necessary, England and Russia. The editors noted that Germany
just was not so obtuse as to wait for the enemy to finish preparing for war.55
However, one cannot dismiss this newspaper completely as a source of news for
the French in the occupied cities. Typed copies of translated articles from La Gazette de

52

Annette Becker, Journaux de combattants et civils de la France du Nord dans la Grande Guerre (Paris:
Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), 15.
53
Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War (New York: Berg, 2004), 71, 78.
54
Auguste Gauvain, L’Europe au jour le jour, Volume 7: La Guerre européenne (juin 1914- février 1915)
(Paris, Édition Bassard, 1920), 245.
55
Ibid., 382-3.

335
Cologne, published from 1915 through the summer of 1916, seem to have been printed
utilizing machines similar to those of the clandestine press and on similar inexpensive
paper. It appears some of the occupied French shared these articles in a manner
comparable to that of the clandestine press.56 One article, entitled “The Utilization of the
Occupied Regions of France,” boasted about the amount of raw materials and
manufactured goods the German military was expropriating from the Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing.57 It is plausible that the aim of the unknown translator and distributor of this
article was to increase the ire that the French in the occupied zone felt towards the
German occupiers and validate what many Frenchmen saw occurring before their own
eyes.

Books Authorized by the Germans
Periodically La Gazette des Ardennes included an advertisement for books and
pamphlets available for order from the Libraire de la Gazette des Ardennes. The people
of the occupied cities treasured books, especially as cold winters forced many of them to
sacrifice their collections to keep themselves warm, burning the pages in fires or ripping
them out to insulate their clothes. However, even for those who still had the money to
buy books, those advertised in La Gazette des Ardennes most likely would not have
interested them. Not surprisingly, the literature advocated everything German while
lambasting the Allies and in particular the British. A quick examination of four of the
books and pamphlets sold in the occupied zone provide a glimpse into the type of
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information French people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing could purchase, if they had
the means and desire.
One pamphlet announced for sale in the Gazette des Ardennes was Bruce
Glasirr’s (sic) La Militarisme Anglais. This was a translation of Glasier’s thirty-page war
pamphlet. In it, he denounced the “materialists” who held positions of power and
influence in Victorian England and how they led to the current British state. Bruce
Glasier was an ardent socialist and chairman of the Independent Labor Party in Scotland.
He supported the British anti-war organization, the No-Conscription Fellowship, which
encouraged men to refuse war service.58 Utilizing British and French writings against the
Allied war effort was a key German propaganda technique, employed more frequently by
the placement of adulterated articles by French and English authors in German
newspapers. Hence, the misspelling of Glasier’s last name was most likely a
typographical error rather than an attempt to misrepresent his identity.
The Gazette des Ardennes also advertised the book, Les Peuplades de Couleur, by
D’Hansvorst. It is difficult to determine much information about the author of this book.
It is possible that Hans Vorst, the Moscow correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt during
the First World War, wrote this book, although his specialty was Russia rather than the
use of men from Africa in fighting in Europe. The point of the book is not difficult to
garner however. France was the only country to recruit men from its African colonies to
fight in Europe, doing so to compensate for its demographic weakness against the
Germans.59 During the course of the four years, France had approximately 171,000 West
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African troops serving in Europe, and their casualties numbered over 80,000 men.60
Many in Europe feared that this practice threatened European racial superiority, a fear the
Germans played up in occupied France both in the newspapers they published and in this
book. After the war, Germany’s defeat by a country that allowed Africans to fight and
kill white men helped fuel the racism of the inter-war years.61
Karl Helfferich’s Le Prospérité nationale de l’Allemagne de 1888 à 1918 was
also available for sale in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Dr. Karl Helfferich was the
German Secretary of the Treasury and later Imperial Vice Chancellor. Prior to the war he
was Director of the Deutsche Bank. This was an updated and translated version of his
original work, Deutschlands Volkswahlstand 1888-1913.62 The book provides a detailed
analysis of Germany’s economy, examining issues such as population growth, food
supply, and the use of science in business, the training of labor, the country’s
consumption, aggregate income, and national wealth. It depicts Germany’s economy as
solid and growing, thanks to a well-trained work force and the utilization of the latest
science and business techniques.
La Gazette des Ardennes also advertised Sevn Hedin’s Vers l’Est avec l’Armée
allemande sur le Front Oriental for sale.63 This 150-page book was a translated and
abridged version of Hedin’s 1917 work, Kriget mot Ryssland. Hedin was a Swedish
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explorer and scientist and one of the few foreign correspondents who was with the
German army since almost the beginning of the war. The Germans’ choice of Hedin was
not surprising. He had already established a name for himself as a brave explorer and
was a passionate Germanophile. In 1909, he proposed a Scandinavian Union that would
have close ties to Germany to counter-balance the Anglo-Russian reconciliation.64 In
1915, Hedin published With the German Armies in the West, a translated version coming
out the same year as the Swedish original. For the purpose of this dissertation, I came
across no evidence that the Germans made this book available in occupied France. It
would not be surprising if the Germans withheld this book, for it provided an inaccurate
assessment of life in Lille. Hedin suggests that Lille sustained little damage at the hands
of the Germans, and the areas bombed, namely the Porte Douai area, had to be because of
French resistance. Furthermore, this ardent Germanophile claimed life had returned to
normal in Lille, noting, “In the central parts of the town the traffic is almost animated and
there are plenty of people about. Young women of not even doubtful virtue and dressed
in almost the latest fashion flit about like butterflies on pavements… Many shops and
hotels are open and seem to be carrying on as if nothing happened.”65 Other books and
pamphlets fitting the same pattern as the above-mentioned books were available to
readers in the occupied zone. However, they added little to the knowledge of the people,
as their content was so distasteful to the occupied French that they either disregarded
what they read, or more frequently, simply chose not to read those books.
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One should not exaggerate the influence of the sources discussed in this chapter
upon the people of the occupied zone. Either few Frenchmen had access to these
newspapers, books, and pamphlets, or the messages these sources contained were so
disagreeable few people would heed them. However, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing dealt with an overwhelming feeling that they lacked news and information
about the war raging in such close proximity to them. Under these circumstances, some
people were bound to read any source that could potential provided them with the
information they so craved. In such a situation, these news sources need to be included in
a study of the media available to the occupied people.

340
Conclusion

In his study of the occupation of Belgium, Larry Zuckerman raises an interesting
question: why did Germany’s enemies make so little of the occupation, even when the
Germans provided them with fresh insults every week?1 Zuckerman suggests that perhaps
the rest of the world was not outraged by German behavior in areas they occupied
because nobody outside the occupied zones could appreciate what was happening, as they
lacked a frame of reference. Once the world truly understood the possible effects of
German military extremism with the Second World War, the horrors of that war
overshadowed the indignities of the First World War. During the last fifteen years,
several historians have taken on the task of examining what happened in northern France
during the First World War and providing a frame of reference for life in the occupied
zones. This dissertation aimed to add to this discussion, through an examination of what
news was available. As Asa Briggs and Peter Burke note in the introduction of their
work, A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet, historians need to
take serious account of the role of communication in history.2 Historians need to treat
media not only as a source recording history, but also as an element that helps shape
events and is worthy of analysis.
Piqued at losing control of the three great cities of northern France, the Germans
were radical in defiling, destroying, and stealing from the cities as they withdrew in 1918.
They systematically burglarized the French cities, vandalizing, usually beyond repair, any
industrial or agricultural item they could not take with them. If Frenchmen had believed
1
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what the German-controlled press reported for four years of conflict about how the
Germans conducted war and which side was winning the war, the Germans’ withdrawal
and their actions in leaving would have shocked those Frenchmen. However, nobody
was shocked. Despite four years of reading how the Germans were fighting and winning
the war in an honorable manner, in the face of dastardly British acts, the people of Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing knew when the Germans began facing difficulties, and the largescale pettiness the Germans were capable of in the face of that loss. This disconnect
between the world presented in the pages of the German-controlled newspaper and reality
became obvious during the final weeks of the war. It was apparent that the Germans
were losing the war, as the once confident German occupiers became mere shadows of
their former selves. However, the German-controlled newspapers continued to report as
if the war was going reasonably well for the Germans, especially in the papers produced
in France. The newspapers in the occupied zone usually only referenced the changing
situation and the potential of a German loss in their last issue, immediately before the
German evacuation.
During the First World War in non-occupied zones, governments suppressed all
news that could distress their people and shift domestic public opinion away from
supporting the war. The reverse was true in the occupied zone – editors and censors
attempted to withold any news that could provide hope. The aim was to create feelings of
disillusionment and surrender, creating an occupied populace that was easy to control and
whose desires for peace outweighed any patriotic concerns over who won the war and
what the repercussions would be. If such propaganda was hugely successful, perhaps the
occupied people would even be willing to continue a relationship with the occupiers once
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the war was over. Having to ingest news with this raison d’être, with only a short lived
clandestine press and intermittently available smuggled newspapers as an alternative, was
one of the greatest hardships of occupation that the people of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing endured.
The Germans considered their ability to control news in the occupied zone as vital
to their war aims. Hence, distribution of clandestine papers was one of the most serious
infractions against occupation rules. Receiving unadulterated news was also a passion
for many in the occupied zone, making the producers of the secret press some of the
greatest heroes in northern France. For those fortunate enough to have access to these
underground newspapers, the papers could act as a potential counter to the interpretations
of news in the German-controlled press. For example, both sources reported upon the
German zeppelin attacks on Paris and London. The German papers painted an image of a
Paris and London crippled with fear. The clandestine press cited the same events as
evidence of the German’s panicking. This fresh point of view was a great gift to the
occupied. However, these newspapers were available for only eighteen short months of
the four long years of occupation, and people had to read the German-controlled press to
fulfill their human desire for information.
The Germans wanted to foster a certain amount of dependence among the people
of the Nord by being their only link to the outside world.3 Through different Germancontrolled or censored newspapers, the Germans provided a substantial amount of news
reflecting their viewpoint. The two local newspapers, the Gazette des Ardennes, Le
Bruxellois, and briefly, two other Belgian papers, combined to provide a significant
amount of news. While some of the German-controlled newspapers only provided short
3

Buffton, 57.

343
blurbs about crucial events, readers could piece together information from the different
sources, since the individual newspapers told different parts of the same story. Early
during the war, readers could find out that female refugees repatriated from their northern
cities to Paris were helping the war effort by working a few hours a week making clothes
for the wounded and children.4 From La Gazette des Ardennes, readers could learn that
people repatriated from the north living in Paris faced some hostilities, as locals resented
the competition for employment.5 Finally, from La Belgique readers would find out that
authorities created a floating village made of barges on the Seine for those refugees
unable to find a place to live.6 Furthermore, the newspapers may have reinforced their
shared message. Before the Germans occupied the area, people may have read different
newspapers that provided slightly different analyses of the same events. Now several
newspapers, while varying in what information they provided, all carried the same
message that France was weakening, Britain was evil, and Germany was the future of
Europe. The occupied people’s reliance upon the Germans for news has historically
created the perception that those in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received little
information about the war beyond what they could garner with their own senses. Perhaps
the true problem of news was not the sheer lack of it, although it was an element as
compared to pre-war levels, but the lack of certainty that it could be trusted, the amount
of speculation needed to be digested with it, the delay with which it was received, and the
uncertainty that any follow-up might be forthcoming.
The industrial urban areas of northern France knew both the hardships and
benefits of city life. German occupation exacerbated the problems of city life, including
4
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difficulties finding employment that allowed for a decent standard of living. The
occupation also took away some of the privileges of urban living, such as easy access to
news prepared by French journalists and editors. Surprisingly, considering the harsh life
and limitations on advancement the large working class endured, most adults in these
cities were literate and considering being informed a way of life. As the German military
gravitated towards military extremism, demanding complete obedience from enemy
populations, they took away information supplied from outside sources. To help attain
complete obedience, the Germans isolated the occupied French not only physically from
their countrymen, but also mentally, by acting as the most powerful conduit of
information.
By taking control of the information people received, the German occupiers in
northern France created their own version of history and current events. To use a modern
term, the “spin” placed on events perpetrated the German line, and often distorted the
truth to the point of deception. However distorted, the news in German-controlled
newspapers did give the readers of occupied France great insight into what events were
occurring, even when misleading them in the significance of those events or who they
were benefiting. Since readers did not trust German-controlled media, they knew to
question the “spin,” hence leaving readers with a knowledge of what events were
important to the war, but uncertainty about who was winning. They did not know if the
Germans were leaving vital facts out or exaggerating the importance of other elements of
the story. For example, people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing knew about the Battles
of the Somme and Ypres as fact; they speculated about who was winning these battles.
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Analyzing the news became a passionate hobby for many in the occupied zone, who were
just trying to figure out some semblance of the truth.
In his portrayal of life in occupied Lille, one of Maxence van der Meersh’s
characters commented that since October 1914 news from France had entirely ceased.
He used language poignantly foreshadowing later history, when he said the Germans
lowered a steel curtain between the occupied districts and the rest of the world. The
narrator noted that, “it was quite obvious that the continued ignorance was sapping the
morale and generally unsettling the civilian population; and it was undoubtedly the
intention of the enemy to do so.”7 Indeed, with the liberalization of press laws during the
Third Republic, the average urban Frenchman had grown to expect an abundance of
relatively unadulterated information from a variety of sources. Despite the hardship
caused by the lack of trusted news, however, it did not disappear as entirely as imagined.
Rather, the pain came from the source of news. Rumors and false information occurred in
the occupied cities, as the newspaper’s versions always came with doubt. When it came
to information, in many ways the occupied zone was comparable to the trenches. Both
were environments that produced their share of fausses novellas. Like the occupied
populations men in the trenches had a lack of regular news from the outside, endured the
closeness of the enemy, and relied upon mouth to mouth communication that made
inaccuracies quite common.8
Responsibility to evaluate the information presented falls upon the media
consumer every time he or she reads a newspaper, a greatly amplified situation in
occupied France. As John Merril and Jack Odell waxed poetic on the topic, “The
7
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problem faced by journalist’s audiences is to…. try to separate the wheat of honest
journalism from the chaff of propaganda.”9 Propaganda propagators, in general, can only
take advantage of trusting people. Readers can protect themselves by “wrapping
themselves in a protective cloak of skepticism, or even cynicism.”10 The people of Lille,
Roubaix, and Tourcoing, while losing safety and comfort, did have, along with their
dignity, a heavy cloak of cynicism about anything touched by the German occupiers. In
general, newspapers may have historically encouraged skepticism, as readers noted the
discrepancies between reports of the same events in different newspapers, or even within
the same newspaper, and the regularity with which later issues contradict statements
made earlier.11 The people of these cities were media savvy enough to naturally question
the information received and questions the writers’ motives.
Madame Reboux escaped occupation after twenty-six months but not before her
daughter died from a lack of food. She said, “it is easy to forbid a conquered people; it is
hard to compel them.”12 While not the aim of this dissertation, it is natural to want to
comment on whether German propaganda disseminated through newspapers in the
occupied zone was successful. The easy answer is no, as the people of occupied France
never began to sympathize with the German point of view. Even the German military
leaders did not feel their propaganda efforts during the First World War were successful;
they lamented their lack of propaganda sophistication as compared to that of the British,
and believed it was a contributing factor to them losing the war. The Nazis took
propaganda to a new level under Josef Goebbels, but he and Hitler looked to British and
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Russian propaganda from the First World War for inspiration, not their own country’s
efforts. However, it is easy to dismiss German propaganda efforts in hindsight because
they lost the war. The people of northern France were a strong, resilient people able to
fend off assimilating German propaganda, while utilizing their newspapers to gather what
information they could. Could these people have remained resilient if the war had lasted
another year or two or would or would they have simply wanted peace at any cost and
become more susceptible to the German line?
It is also interesting to think about how the occupation and its news reception
affected historical thought. One of the most distinctive features of French historical
scholarship is its contribution to the study of mentalité, or the mental furniture of
populations in the past. Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments rather
than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political or social programmes.13 In
her work studying media-related memories, Ingrid Volkmer determined that the news
people receive is a part of their historical perception, or what people remember of history,
which is a key component of culture memory.14 People remember time not as a sequence
of events but as a discursive surface, readable only through layers of subsequent
meanings and context, such as how media sources reporting the events at the time
affected memory. To understand the relationship between events and how people
remember those events and the role media plays between the two is comparable to
“archeology in which the goal is not simply to uncover something that has been buried,
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but to discover how and why additional layers have been built on top of it.”15 Studying
the content of these newspapers reveals a great deal about different topics. Beyond
demonstrating that the occupied zone did receive more news than previously believed,
they show how Germans wanted people to see the war. They also provide glimpses (if
one can weed out the propaganda) of what life was like in the occupied zone. They also
show the information these people received that became a part of the collective
consciousness and hence an element in how they understood the war. The content of
these newspapers is a small but important tool in providing a cultural reconstruction of
the cities’ shared mentality during the war.
While this dissertation revealed that the people of occupied France had access to
more news than believed, it does not diminish what they lost in terms of media access
during the occupation. More than precise information about specific events, the great gift
a system of news imparts is the confidence that we will be informed about any especially
important or interesting events in an accurate manner.16 When such information comes
from a trusted source, it provides a type of security people in northern France expected by
the First World War and that they lost during occupation. The source of their news and
their lack of trust in that source to provide an accurate description is why the people of
occupied France remember receiving very little news during the war.
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